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ABSTRACT
The development of the internet and digital technologies represent a major opportunity
for humanity in transforming businesses and providing new tools for everyday communication.
Internet users are spending increasing amounts of time online and undertaking a greater range
of online and social networking activities. However, just like a double edged sword, the internet
also presents opportunities to cybercrimes in the Information society. The nature of some
‘traditional’ crime types has been transformed by the use of computers and other information
communications technology (ICT) in terms of its scale and reach, with risks extending to many
aspects of social life, such as financial transactions,

sexual offences,

harassment and

threatening behavior, and commercial damage and disorder.
Cybercrime is a transnational menace in the sense that it cuts across borders. The most
critical challenges of the information society have been the security of digital data and
information systems and the prevention of the malicious misuse of information
communications technologies by cyber criminals, terrorist groups, or state actors. Measures to
address these security challenges of the information society birthed a concept known as “cyber
security”.

Cyber security seeks to promote and ensure the overall security of digital

information and information systems with a view to securing the information society. Thus,
the concept is broadly concerned with social, legal, regulatory and technological measures that
will ensure the integrity, confidentiality, availability and the overall security of digital
information and information systems in order to achieve a high degree of trust and security
necessary for the development of a sustainable information cyber space.
This dissertation contends that, on the one hand, International laws are behind in
providing proper regulatory coverage for cybercrime, while, on the other hand, existing
regulations have largely been unsuccessful in containing cyber security threats primarily due
to complications caused by the disharmonization of cyber security laws and regulation. This
dissertation also attempts to discuss the legal and regulatory aspects of cyber security in
International law. An analysis of international, regional and national regulatory responses to
cyber security in both developed and developing countries was made. It calls attention to the
limits and challenges of these regulatory responses in the promotion of cyber security and
explores several regulatory measures to address the highlighted challenges with a view to
i

promoting global cyber security. It suggests several regulatory measures to enhance global
cyber security and also emphasizes the need for the collective responsibility of states for global
cyber security.

ii
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
The surge being witnessed in information and communication technology and its
increased use in all facet of life, is as a result of the inherent nature of man, to constantly be on
the move so as to share ideas, exchange knowledge and build stronger innovations. Since its
development, the Internet has become a platform which people use and where people are given
numerous opportunities for professional development and personal fulfillment as well as value
creation. The internet has permeated every sphere of life including but not limited to
maintaining continuity in business activity, education employment, entertainment, provision of
basic citizens’ services, socializing. It has aided the creation of numerous and innovative digital
platforms and services, which in turn have been utilized in providing services that make life
better. Its relevance when COVID-19 pandemic was at its peak cannot be underestimated. It
offered itself for use in providing necessities such as keeping in touch, learning, working and
accessing basic services.
The emergence of information and communication technology (ICT), fundamentally
altered the manner individuals and state communicate with one another, manage critical
infrastructure and participate in global economic activity. It made the modern world a hyperconnected one with the attendant benefits, which accrue to governments, businesses and

1

individuals. For instance, just as stated before, it bridged the turnaround time for search for
information, learning and dissemination of information.
Today, we can walk into a supermarket or shops without cash; we now carry our bank
of money in just a slim card; Netflix can curate the types of movies you would most likely want
to see based on your social media information and the sites you most-often visit; people can
now study and earn certificates online without much as any physical contact between
teacher/lecturer and student. With just a click, one can buy virtually anything online from the
comfort of one’s home: the greatest impact in health, education, and commerce has been
precipitated by technology and the use of internet [Aims Education, 2019] 1. Using this as a
background, the development of technology has not been without its disadvantages and these
disadvantages and dangers in the nature of cybercrime, have led to this dissertation.
According to O’Dea [2021], in its early days, the use of the internet was the exclusive
preserve of the military and American universities, who used same strictly for scientific
purposes. 2 Improvement in technology meant that by the mid-1990s, modems and telephone
lines, enabled individuals to also access the internet vide dial-up Internet services. Further
improvement in technology within a decade led to the introduction of broadband Internet access
[O’Dea, 2021]. 3 This innovation made the internet not just more readily available and
accessible but also improved its speed.

According to AIMS Education, there are two perspectives to look at the impact of technology in all spheres of
life; for example, technological developments in healthcare have saved countless patients and are continuously
improving the quality of life today. It is however not limited to this; technology in the medical field has had
massive impact on nearly all processes and practices of healthcare professionals such as in the manner in which
files are now kept and sourced and also in the ease of workflow . See AIMS Education. (2019). The Impact of
Technology In Healthcare. AIMS Education. <https://aimseducation.edu/blog/the-impact-of-technology-onhealthcare>
2
O’Dea,S.
(2021).
Number
of
mobile
broadband
subscriptions
worldwide
2007-2021.
Statista.https://www.statista.com/statistics/273016/number-of-mobile-broadband-subscriptions-worldwidesince-2007/
3
O’Dea,S.
(2021).
Number
of
mobile
broadband
subscriptions
worldwide
2007-2021.
Statista.https://www.statista.com/statistics/273016/number-of-mobile-broadband-subscriptions-worldwidesince-2007/
1

2

According to the International Telecommunication Union, an estimated 4.9 billion
people are using the Internet in 2021. 4 This implies that circa 63 per cent of the population of
the world is now online. The 2021 figure indicates that there is an increase of 17 per cent, with
almost 800 million people estimated to have come online since 2019.
It was estimated that by the year 2017, mobile broadband subscriptions will approach
70 per cent of the world’s total population and by the year 2020, the number of networked
devices (the ‘internet of things’) will outnumber people by six to one, transforming current
conceptions of the internet [UNODC, 2016] 5. In the hyper connected world of tomorrow, it
will become hard to imagine any crime that does not involve electronic evidence linked with
internet protocol (IP) connectivity [UNODC, 2016] 6.
This paper is founded upon the background of the multiplying increase in the use of the
internet and the development of technology, which incidentally has led to the existence of
cybercrime. The ease of access in communication and advancement in diverse sectors
precipitated by technology has come with its adverse effects. The freedom of information has
led to the existing and multiplying surge in cybercrime the world over [O’Neil, 2001] 7. A
person’s ID could be stolen to commit fraud as well as destroy the person’s reputation; there
have been rapid increase in data breaches 8, theft of states secrets 9, hijacking of online purchases

International Telecommunication Union. (2021). Measuring Digital Development Facts and Figures 2021.
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUITUPublications:
Geneva,
2021
iii.
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2021.pdf.
5
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft
prepared for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
2016
6
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft
prepared for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
2016
7
O’Neil, M. (2001). Cybercrime Dilemma: Is it Possible to Guarantee Both Security and Privacy?. Brookings.
<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cybercrime-dilemma-is-it-possible-to-guarantee-both-security-andprivacy/amp/>
8
Cyber researchers have estimated the global annual cost of the data breaches in the year 2020 to be over $2.1
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to defraud, to mention a few [IP, Commission Report, 2013] 10. The rising popularity of social
media platforms has also afforded new ways to self-publish one’s opinions, ideas and works
without much moderation, thereby affording new ways to commit harm to fellow persons
worldwide [UNODC, 2016] 11. The losses caused by cybercrime are usually financial losses,
injury to reputation, loss of privacy of data or trade secrets, emotional injury, etc., as opposed
to physical injuries [Rustad, 2014, p.112] 12. The world is constantly grappling with diverse
forms of criminal activities and the circumstances encouraging it, however, the fight against
the criminal use of the internet and technology, is one that seems to have outlived the means
being adopted against it, at least in some jurisdictions.
The difference between cybercrime and traditional crimes as drawn above signals one
thing: that the world is faced with a more dangerous and uncontrollable series of crime where
cybercrime is concerned as opposed to traditional crime [ITU, 2011] 13. Notably, cybercrimes
continue to skyrocket ahead of policies and laws to control them [Orji, 2012, p.31 14, and even
when laws and policies are made, identifying cybercriminals for prosecution is usually a clog
in the wheel for the full enforcement of these laws.
The advent of information and communication technology (ICT), unhindered by physical
boundaries, has brought about world interconnectivity. However, just as the advantages are
many, the disadvantages aided by its anonymity are enormous as well and they pose a serious
threat to the international legal order as we know it especially with regards to jurisdiction and
sovereignty. The absence of physical boundaries makes it difficult for states to regulate
communication taking place within its territory.
10
The IP Commission Report. (2013). The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual
Property. NBR, 2013<https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads
11
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft
prepared for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
2016
12
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1.1

Statement of the Problem
Having given the background to the study, it is now time to state the problem that
necessitated this research which focuses on the limits and challenges of the regulatory aspects
of cyber security and cyber-crime.
Ab initio, the internet was designed for purposes of sharing unclassified reports between and
among a group of scientists, [Lipson, 2002, p. 5] 15 however, it has become a tool for
accomplishing much more than that and is now has become a sine qua non to human existence.
The design never contemplated the need to monitor user behavior or the need to protect the
system from attack which ironically emanates from the same internet. This design of the
internet (anonymity and lack of protection from attack) remained constant despite the fact that
the use of the internet changed considerably. The implication of this flawed design is that the
internet is vulnerable to cyberattacks on a scale that is unprecedented. It has been stated that
the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks will likely increase, due to the fact that the
technical knowledge needed to carry out cyber-attacks, is at an all-time low given that
guidelines for sophisticated attack methods have become common and readily available at the
click of a button on the same internet [Stahl, 2011, p.248] 16
The inherent weakness of the internet has been ruthlessly exploited by a wide range of
individuals and groups, including but not limited to governments (including their military and
intelligence agencies), criminal enterprises, proxies for governments, ‘hackers’ and causebased groups. The motivations for cyber-attacks may be financial or national security interests,

Lipson, H. F. (2002).Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues 13
Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 2002, p. 5.
16
Stahl, W. M. (2011). The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the Principles of International Maritime
Law to the Problem of Cybersecurity. 40 georgia journal of international and comparative law, p.248.
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or to attain peer recognition, and to the promotion of several causes or even for fun [Satola &
Judy, 2011]. 17
One of the greatest impediments against global efforts towards stemming cybercrimes
remains the anonymous nature of the identity of cybercriminals [Ajayi, 2016, pp.1-12]. 18 There
is no one way of identifying a cybercriminal largely because the global information system is
free and there is no prerequisite that must be fulfilled before a user can login to connect with
anyone anywhere in the world. Because of this masked use, there have been growing debates
to end the anonymity in the use of the internet by the mandatory introduction of identification
as a prerequisite to using the internet. 19 Human rights activists have however opposed this
vehemently on the basis that it violates individuals’ rights to privacy [Clark, 1997]. 20
However, even if we succeed in removing anonymity, one cannot totally exclude the
possibility that technologies cannot be manipulated by cybercriminals to by-pass identification
on the internet. If we stretch our imagination further and a nations cyber security unit is well
equipped and effective, and in fact traces the IP address of a cybercriminal to a particular
location, the next hurdle cannot be scaled as the identity (physical looks, body build or gender)
of a cybercriminal is undisclosed to the owner or operator of the Internet service provider [Orji,
2012, p.31]. 21
The above argument aside, presently, cybercriminals use anonymity networks to
encrypt (block access) traffic and hide their internet protocol address or other internet-

Satola, D., Judy, H.L. (2011). Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing International Cooperation and
Collaboration in Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: Reflections on the Proceedings of the Workshop on
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Kabay, M.E.(1998). Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation, Incivility and Lawlessness
Versus Freedom and Privacy. Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the European Institute for computer
Anti-virus Research (EICAR), (Munich, Germany March, 1998).
20
Clarke, R. (1997). Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms’. Australian
National University. <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html>
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connected digital device in an effort to conceal their internet activities and locations [UNODC,
2019]. 22 Popular amongst these anonymity networks are Tor and Freenet. According to the
IOCTA report, 2015 and 2016 [Europol, 2019], 23 cybercriminals such as child sex offenders,
producers, and cyber terrorists make increasing use of the Darknet and other similar areas
largely because it offers them great anonymity. This portends grave problems for victims who
suffer grossly without any hope of fighting for their right largely due to the anonymous nature
of cybercriminals.
Anonymity which makes it difficult to identify cybercriminals breeds further issues. In
these situations, the country with jurisdiction is often unclear, assuming the location of a
cybercriminal is found to be away from the detecting State [Europol, 2019]. 24 In the same vein,
the legal framework that should regulate the collection of evidence or the use of special
investigative powers becomes problematic [Europol, 2019]. 25 This problem speaks to the
possibility of enforcing the laws existing to prevent cybercrimes because only a cyber-criminal
who can be found can be criminalized. The point being made is that so long as the identity of
cybercriminals remains elusive, the law, no matter how well-crafted, cannot work; the law does
not work in vacuum.
Another problem which is faced by legal and regulatory frameworks of cyber security
and cyber-crime is sovereignty which raises issues along jurisdictional lines. Every
international treaty, regional law and national law makes provisions for the sovereignty of
States [United Nations Charter]. 26 The implication of sovereignty for each State is that every

22
United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. (2019). Module 6: Practical Aspects of Cybercrime Investigation
and Digital Forensics. UNODC. <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-6/key-issues/legal-andethical-obligations.html>
23
Europol. (2019). Common Challenges in Combating cybercrime. Eurojust and Europol Joint Report Public
Information
24
Europol. (2019). Common Challenges in Combating cybercrime. Eurojust and Europol Joint Report Public
Information
25
Europol. (2019). Common Challenges in Combating cybercrime. Eurojust and Europol Joint Report Public
Information
26
United Nations. United Nations Charter. UN, 2021<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>
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State has a right to decide matters within its territory, independently and to the non-intervention
of other nations.
With respect to cybercrime, jurisdiction is two-fold; geographical jurisdiction and
jurisdiction in personam. 27 Geographical jurisdiction has to do with whether a Court has the
power beyond the territory where it is situate, while jurisdiction in personam deals with
whether a court is empowered to hear and determine a case of a cybercriminal not within its
jurisdiction [Orji, 2012, p.31]. 28 Essentially, the cyberspace has no geographical boundaries;
there is no way to decipher where a particular person is using the internet from or from what
territory certain information is being sent. 29
Assuming the problem of identifying the cybercriminal is solved and it happens that
he/she is situated in another country different from where the victim of the crime is domiciled,
it becomes quite dicey as to who should have jurisdiction to try the offence [Orji, 2012, p.31].. 30
Some international laws exist on this subject matter. The Budapest Convention, 2001 also
known as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime deals with criminal offences
committed against or with the help of computer networks such as the Internet. The Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime suggests certain guidelines in relation to jurisdiction in respect of
cybercrimes. A country has jurisdiction if the cybercrime was committed:
A. In its territory;
B. On board a ship flying the flag of the country;
C. On board an aircraft registered under the laws of the country;

Latin ‘against a person’; opposite of In rem meaning ‘against a thing’ for example, property
Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation .Wolf Legal Publishers. p.31
29
A cybercriminal can be in location A, and then make the server hosting his information or transaction be location
B and this information is sent to location C.
30
Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation .Wolf Legal Publishers. p.31
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D. By one of the countries nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was
committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State. 31
Unfortunately, the above provision falls short in providing a definition of what is meant
in Article 22(1)(a) above by ‘In its Territory’. Particularly does this mean that a nation has
jurisdiction when the victim of the crime is in that Territory or when the IP address
communicating the attack or information is in that territory or when the cybercriminal is in that
territory? If the nature of cybercrime as we have discussed it so far is anything to go by, then
all these places can qualify as the territory in which a cybercrime is committed.
Another problem with the Budapest Convention is that it is only applicable to
contracting States under the Convention and discouragingly, only 64 countries had ratified the
Convention as at 2020 [Daska & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020]. 32 This takes us back to the problems
highlighted about jurisdiction prior to the discourse on the Budapest Convention. Putting the
Budapest Convention aside, what the above presupposes is that in a situation where a
cybercriminal commits an offence and his/her victim is situated in a country away from where
the cybercriminal is domiciled; the right of jurisdiction would naturally tilt in favor of the
country where the victim of the cybercrime is domiciled. This is primarily because international
laws support that only the jurisdiction of the victim would give out adequate punishment
commensurate to the crime committed by a criminal. However, even this principle raises
further challenges in fighting cybercrime – issues of extradition.
Extradition is the process of returning somebody accused of a crime by a different legal
authority for trial or punishment. 33 A look at the definition of extradition gives the idea that if
a person is alleged to have committed a cybercrime in one jurisdiction and escapes to another

Article 22(1), Budapest Convention
Daska, J., Kennedy-Mayo, D. (2020). Budapest Convention: What is it and How is it being Updated?. Cross
Border Data Forum.<https://www.crossborderdataforum.org/budapest-convention-what-is-it-and-how-is-itbeing-updated/
33
Microsoft Encarta Dictionary 2009
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country, all that needs to be done by the country where the cybercriminal is domiciled is to
expeditiously return the said criminal to the requesting country, to face trial; however, it is not
this simple [Orji, 2012, p.31]. 34 On the one hand, it might be difficult for the domiciling State
to find the exact location of the cybercriminal in the State; on the other hand, assuming the
cybercriminal is found, the principle of State independence and sovereignty earlier explained
gives States the autonomy to decide whether or not to turn in the criminal.
In international law, there is no instrument that imposes on sovereign nations an
obligation to automatically return cybercriminals to another State for trial. What the Budapest
Convention provides for in Article 2 is extraditable offences without an obligation to extradite
for those offences. On the contrary, Article 24 provides for mandatory grounds upon which
extradition request may be refused. In effect, countries where cybercriminals are situating, for
different reasons, more often than not, refuse to extradite cybercriminals and this development
presents an insurmountable challenge to the enforcement of cybercrime laws across the globe. 35
Pure political offences are excluded from the realm of extradition [Bassiouni, 1999]. 36
The problem this poses is that it becomes difficult to decide what ‘pure political offences’ are
as it relates to cybercrime. For example, if an expert brings down a website used for propaganda
of political falsehood about a particular government’s activities and the said expert flees to
another country, would his alleged offence be political or purely criminal? [Ajayi, 2019, pp.112] 37
Another problem with respect to the legal and regulatory framework of cyber security
and cyber-crime is the absence of neither a comprehensive unifying international law nor any
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law in any particular region and sub-region. The UNCTAD reports that about 13% of the
nations of the World lack cybercrime laws. 38 For example, Legal frameworks vary between
countries in Europe, making effective cross-border investigation and prosecution of cybercrime
extremely challenging. [NGM, 2021] 39 The main differences relate to which conduct is
criminalized as cybercrime and how investigations may be conducted.
The majority of laws bordering on cybercrime are majorly national or regional laws. For all
intents and purpose, the only international law bordering on cybercrime in the international
scene is the Budapest Convention which from all indications unsuccessfully deals with the
issue bordering on jurisdiction and not necessarily all issues militating against the fight of
cybercrime.
Regrettably, another problem is that the existing but inadequate laws have fallen behind
in context and time. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Africa and Asia have the least effective cybercrime and security laws largely because the trends
reflected in these laws are not in tune with global efforts [UNCTAD, 2021]. 40 These issues
when cumulated portend retrogression in the global efforts being taken to ensure that
cybercrime is reduced to the barest minimum.
The consequence of laws falling behind in context is the absence of rising new offences
in the cyber space. In Zanzibar for example, the offence of child pornography is not explicitly
an offence. What is provided for instead is child grooming which relates more to activities
aimed at attracting minors into illegal business and not necessarily with exposure of nude or

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2021). Cybercrime Legislations Worldwide.
UNCTAD. <https://unctad.org/page/cybercrime-legislation-worldwide>
39
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40
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sexual images of minors on the internet [Haji, 2021]. 41 Identity theft, cyber ware, phishing and
email spamming are growing offences which have not been considered as offences in numerous
jurisdictions. In nations such as India, there is no clear-cut definition of what constitutes
cybercrime, thereby leaving the numerous laws bordering on the subject matter to diverse unconnected interpretations [Kaundal, 2019, p. 68]. 42 In largely underdeveloped nations, offences
such as email spoofing and identity theft are still not considered offences even though
cybercrime laws exist in these States. It is almost impossible to be extradited, tried or charged
of cyber crime in Bosnia and Albania principally because the framework for same is
nonexistent [Monnik, 2017]. 43 Other nations falling back in cybercrime and security laws
include Mongoli, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Congo and Mozambique. Until 24, May 2017
hacking and Cybercrime was not an offence in Ireland [FitzGerald, 2017]. 44
The above identified problems will form the crux of the discussion in this thesis. The
said problems will give rise to the research questions which this thesis intends to answer.

1.2

Research Question
This dissertation shall answer the following questions:
1. What international legal responses and measures have been taken against cybercrime so far?
2. What commendable policies and legal regulatory mechanisms are being adopted by
comparative jurisdictions and under international law in the fight against cybercrime?
3. What are the impediments to the legal and regulatory aspect of the fight against cybercrime at
national, regional and international levels?
Haji, A. (2021). Cybercrime and Analysis of Laws: A Case Study of Zanzibar Legal
Issues<http://repository.out.ac.tz/591/1/FAKI.pdf>
42
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4. What proposals can be made and adopted to enhance the legal and regulatory aspect of the fight
cybercrime and strengthen cyber security?
1.3

Objectives of the Research
The major research objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. To ascertain the international legal responses and measures that have been taken against
cybercrime so far
2. To determine the policies and legal regulatory mechanisms that are being adopted by
comparative jurisdictions and under international law in the fight against cybercrime.
3. To ascertain the impediments to the legal and regulatory aspect of the fight against cybercrime
at national, regional and international levels.
4. To make proposals which may be adopted to enhance the legal and regulatory aspect of the
fight cybercrime and strengthen cyber security.

1.4

Research Methodology
The research methodology adopted in this study is doctrinal [Aboki, 2009] 45. The
researcher theorizes the concept of cybercrime and cyber security using primary sources such
as statutes, international treaties, reports of select cyber security bodies and proposals on the
subject matter in the international space [Aboki, 2009]. 46 The researcher makes use of
secondary sources such as textbooks, articles, legal journals, periodicals and in some cases,
newspaper publications to further explicate the discourse. This is thereafter followed by
criticisms, findings and recommendations. The researcher further makes use of the analytical

Aboki, Y. (2009). Introduction to Legal Research Methodology (2nd ed, Zaria:Tamaza Publishing Co Ltd 2009)
p. 3.
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p. 3.
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and comparative method of research. The researcher adopts the analytical method to analyze
the impediments facing the fight against cybercrime, as well as measure the adequateness of
the legal and regulatory frameworks for cybercrime and cyber security in select jurisdictions.
Particularly, the comparative method used, to extract and explain information on the measures
against cyber crime in jurisdictions selected so as to draw a lesson for Nigeria. These methods
of research have been adopted as a means to give the reader better perspective on the discourse.

1.5

Significance of the Research
The researcher strongly believes that the result of this dissertation will enable better
policy and regulatory responses to the issues of cybercrime. Particularly, it is believed that
having conceptualized on the importance of cyber security, and the difficulties of fighting
cybercrime given its very broad difference from traditional crimes, that states such as Nigeria,
as well as organizations who are yet to develop regulatory and legal responses around this
subject would see reasons to do so. This study will serve as reference material for future and
further researchers in this field of study and tends to expand the horizon of existing knowledge
to a frontier.

1.6

Scope of the Study
The scope and limitation of this dissertation is on cybercrime and cyber security laws.
Specifically, the discourse focuses on the problems flowing from the continuous development
of technology in the global space and emphasize on the uniqueness of the problems of
cybercrime drawing its difference from traditional crimes. Significantly, this dissertation
analyses the steps being taken internationally and nationally to combat cybercrime and
introduce cyber security. It makes a case for the importance of this proposal in the ‘internet
world’ we now live in today. This study espouses the need for better cybercrime laws for certain
14

jurisdictions such as Nigeria and regions such as Africa by drawing comparison from select
jurisdictions. It is the submission of this dissertation that while a lot is being done at the
international scene to curtail cybercrime and drive cyber security, the same cannot be said for
some nations and this automatically drives the fight against cybercrime backwards considering
that cybercrime is no respecter of national boundaries. The study appreciates the difficulties in
fighting cyber crime and draws these impediments while trying to give perspectives and
solutions to them as well as conceptualize on strides being made at international level to curtail
the problem. This dissertation concludes with practical solutions/proposals to the many
challenges to the fight against cybercrime both for the national and international scene.
In essence, the work is divided into six chapters. This chapter contains the background
to the study, the statement of the problem as well the research questions and research objectives
amongst others. The Chapter basically, is a roadmap for the thesis.
Chapter two titled ‘Introduction to Cybercrime and Cyber Security’ is divided into two.
Part A focuses on cybercrime, while part B focuses on cyber security. Part A contains the
definition, history and evolution of cybercrime, state responsibility for cybercrime and
differences between cybercrime and traditional crimes, while part B gives an overview of, the
scope of cyber security, its goals and importance and the global cyber security agenda. It also
talks about the liability of internet service providers and enquires into the real world
implications of cyber security. The essence of the chapter is to give a background on the
meaning of the two basic terms cybercrime and cyber security) which are the bedrock of this
thesis for purposes of getting everyone acquainted with their meanings.
Chapter three on its part gives an overview of the international legal responses and legal
measures on cyber security. The legal and regulatory framework of some international and
regional organizations like The United Nations, the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the Group of Eight (G8) African Union (AU), European Union (EU), The Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), The Organization of American States (OAS), The Association
of South-East Asian Relations (ASEAN), The Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council,
15

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Interpol were analyzed.
Additionally, certain specific International Legal Frameworks on Cyber Security and
cybercrime and the limits of same were analyzed.
Similarly, chapter four contains an overview of the national legal responses and legal
measures on cyber security and cybercrime. Specifically, the legal and regulatory frameworks
of States like United States, the United Kingdom, and the People’s Republic of China, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Nigeria were analyzed.
The essence of chapters three and four is to ascertain the state of legal and regulatory
framework on cyber security and cyber-crime both at the international and select national
levels. Being armed with this knowledge will aid in determining whether there are deficiencies
and how to correct them.
In chapter five, the impediments to the fight against cybercrime and cyber security is
considered and discussed. The discussion of same led us to the final chapter, Chapter 6 which
contains recommendations and proposals on how to enhance the legal and regulatory aspect of
the fight against cybercrime so as to ensure cyber security.

1.7

Limitation of the Study
The nature of this research makes it highly reliant on current and diverse academic
sources on the subject matter, especially secondary sources in academic journals, book reviews,
monographs and specialised academic texts. Most of these sources are not readily available;
therefore, we had to rely almost entirely on electronic copies of these sources on the databases
and indexes of academic information providers. Although, a good number of sources on our
subject area are accessible from the free web and open access sources, however, to claim a
good coverage of the sources on the topic of this dissertation, it was necessary to have access
to the major legal academic databases and information providers, which I had a good access
to, through the school library.
The next chapter will give an overview of Cybercrime and Cybersecurity.
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A. CYBERCRIME
2.0 Introduction
It is inherent in man’s nature to constantly be on the move so as to share ideas, exchange
knowledge and build stronger innovations. The implication of this is that the world all over
continues to witness a surge in information technology and its increased use in all facet of life.
In 2011, at least 2.3 billion people, the equivalent of more than one third of the world’s total
population, had access to the internet [ITU, 2011] 47. Over 60 per cent of all internet users are
in developing countries, with 45 per cent of all internet users below the age of 25 years [ITU,
2011] 48. It was estimated that by the year 2017 mobile broadband subscriptions will approach
70 per cent of the world’s total population and by the year 2020, the number of networked
devices (the ‘internet of things’) will outnumber people by six to one, transforming current
conceptions of the internet 49. In the hyper connected world of tomorrow, it will become hard
to imagine a ‘computer crime’, and perhaps any crime, that does not involve electronic
evidence linked with internet protocol (IP) connectivity 50. Today, we can walk into a
supermarket and shop without cash; we now carry our bank of money in just a slim card; Netflix
can curate the types of movies you would most likely want to see based on your social media
information and the sites you most-often visit; people can now study and earn certificates
online without much as any physical contact between teacher/lecturer and student. With just a
click, one can buy virtually anything online from the comfort of one’s home: the greatest impact

International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2011). ICT Facts and Figures. ITU.
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf&ved
4848
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2011). ICT Facts and Figures. ITU.
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf&ved
49
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft prepared
for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC.
50
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft prepared
for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
47

18

in health, education, and commerce has been precipitated by technology and the use of
internet 51.
However, with the ease of access in communication and advancement in diverse sectors
precipitated by technology came the resulting adverse effects. The freedom of information has
led to the existing and multiplying surge in cybercrime in the world over [O’Niel, 2001] 52. A
person’s ID could be stolen to commit fraud as well as destroy the person’s reputation; there
have been rapid increase in data breaches 53, theft of states secrets 54, hijacking of online
purchases to defraud to mention a few 55. The rising popularity of social media platforms has
also afforded new ways to self-publish one’s opinions, ideas and works without much
moderation, thereby affording new ways to commit harm to fellow persons worldwide 56. These
usually involve financial losses, injury to reputation, loss of privacy of data or trade secrets,
emotional injury, etc., as opposed to physical injuries [Rustad, 2014, p.112] 57. The world is
constantly grappling with diverse forms of criminal activities and the circumstances
encouraging it, however, the fight against the criminal use of the internet and technology is one
that has assailed the world allover since its commencement. For example, the ILOVEYOU
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virus of 2000, the Sony Pictures hack of 2014, the WannaCry worldwide ransomware attack of
2017 was the first of its kind: it locked down computer systems and encrypted the data in it,
and demanded ransom payments in Bitcoin [Berr, 2017] 58. It affected individuals, hospitals,
banks, companies and even governments all over the world and resulted in enormous personal
and financial loss [Berr, 2017] 59.
Since the rise in cybercrime, major internet users, especially organizations have not
slept on the need to protect the internet space. Extensively, cyber security is being looked into
and as such, organizations have developed software that can easily detect malwares or viruses
whether or not aimed to steal such organization’s data [Aaron, 2019, p.6] 60. China for example,
in order to protect its State’s secrets uses cryptography to store the state’s data secrets [Modise,
2020, p.25] 61. In 2010, the General Assembly resolution 65/230 requested the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to establish an open-ended intergovernmental expert
group to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to it by
Member States, the international community and the private sector, including the exchange of
information on national legislation, best practices, technical assistance and international
cooperation 62.
Laws are being made in the national, regional and international level, policies and
proposals are being drafted and the world is not resting. It is these efforts being made, the world
over to end cybercrime and maximize cyber security that this paper looks at. Specifically, this

58
Berr, J. (2017). WannaCry Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach $4billion. CBS News.
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/>
59
Berr, J. (2017). WannaCry Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach $4billion. CBS News.
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/>
60
Aaron, A. (2019). Alegal Analysis of Cybercrime and Cyber Torts: Lessons for Nigeria. [LL.B Thesis,
University of Lagos], p.6
61
In October 2019, China passed a law that regulates the use of cryptography. This law requires that all state
secrets be stored and transmitted using core common encryption while the development and use of commercial
encryption is allowed and regulated. See Modise, S. (2020). Botswana’s Position on Encryption. Lawyard
Journal, Vol. 2 p. 25.
62
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft prepared
for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC

20

chapter attempts to discuss the meaning of cybercrime and the diverse ways in which the
concept has been understood by different academicians and countries. It looks at the evolution
of this concept also. Particularly, a distinction is drawn between cybercrime and traditional
crime. This chapter also discusses cyber security as a resultant development of cyber crime and
tries to look at its evolution, policies and proposals being developed to make the world’s cyber
space better.
At the end of this chapter it is believed that a deeper and practical understanding of the concept
of cybercrime and cyber security will be appreciated.

2.1 Definitions of Cybercrime
It is pertinent that before attempting a definition of what cybercrime is that one
understands what crime means. A crime can be defined as an act the law makes punishable 63.
It is any act that a State makes an offence and assigns a sanction against 64. Traditionally,
offences and their sanctions are attached irrespective of the means employed to commit such
offence. The growth in diverse forms of crimes necessitated the need to classify some crimes,
create a legislative regime for them and punish same. The essence of a crime is that there is a
law punishing the prohibited act [Aaron, 2019, p.6] 65.
The concept of cybercrime is very complex to fix into a specific definition. Ajetunmobi
notes that advancements in technology have made it difficult for there to be an accurate
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definition of cybercrimes 66. But he also notes that a definition must include in it, the knowledge
or the use of a computer crime 67. At the Tenth United Nations Congress on Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, cybercrime was defined from two perspectives: The first or narrow
definition entailed cybercrime being any illegal behavior that was directed utilizing electronic
operations targeting the security of a computer system and the data processed by it [Ramos,
2014] 68. The second or broad definition entailed cybercrime being illegal behavior that is
committed in relations to or employing, a computer system or network [Ramos, 2014] 69.
Professor Ladan describes cybercrimes as all crimes which exploit modern technology
network, in which computers and/or computer networks are used for criminal activity 70. In
another view, Cybercrime has also been defined as a crime in which the computer or computer
network is the target of a crime or is used as a tool to commit an offence 71.
According to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), the
definitions of cybercrime mostly depend upon the purpose of using the term 72. A limited
number of acts against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data or
systems represent the core of cybercrime 73. Globally, cybercrime acts show a broad distribution
across financial-driven acts, and computer-content related acts, as well as acts against the
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confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of computer systems 74. The concept of cybercrime
will primarily cover acts which already are offences but committed with the use of a computer
or an electronic means or the target of a computer to commit an offence. Examples of
cybercrime are limitless 75. They would include cyber terrorism, cyber-related fraud, cyberrelated forgery, unlawful access to a computer, unlawful interception of computer data or
traffic, etc. From the definitions above, it can be deduced that computers, networks or data, are
either targets or the tools of cybercrime [Orji, 2012] 76. For this study, cybercrimes can also be
defined as when a non-state actor commits an act that is criminalized under state or
international law [Hathaway, 2012, p.817] 77.
In attempting a definition of cybercrime, it is pertinent to differentiate the scope and
concept of cybercrime from that of cyber torts. Understanding this difference draws from an
understanding of the difference between a crime and a tort. A tort may be defined as a wrongful
act that injures or interferes with another person’s person or property 78. A "tortuous act" is a
civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages 79.Thus,
the essential aspect of a tort is that it is a civil wrong that is done against a person (including
companies) rather than the State; specifically a person's interests which are protected by law.
It must be an act or omission (fault) of the defendant which causes damage to the claimant
[Cooke, 2009, p.3] 80. These interests are: interest in property, personal security, reputation,
privacy, as well as economic interests 81. Notably, cybercrime is an offence committed with the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft prepared
for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
74

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. Draft prepared
for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC
76
Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation. 1 Wolf Legal Publishers
77
Hathaway, O.A. et al. (2012). The Law of Cyber-Attack. 100California Law Review.p. 817, at 834
78
Carl Vinson Institute (2014). The Difference between Torts and Crime.
<https://www.georgialegalaid.org/resource/the-difference-between-torts-and-crimes>
79
Nimpar JCA, M. V Breughel &Ors v. Mondivest Ltd (2018) LPELR-44728 (CA) (Page 38, Paras. D-E).
80
Cooke, J. (2009). Law of Tort. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, p.3
81
Cooke, J. (2009). Law of Tort. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, p.3
75

23

use of a computer which is against the state while cyber torts is a civil wrong committed with
the use of computer or electronic device/connection (or targeted at a computer) which causes
personal injury to a person or group of persons [Aaron, 2019, p.6] 82. In many ways there is
usually a convergence between cybercrimes and cyber torts.

2.2 Evolution of Cybercrime and Computer Crimes
It is impossible to trace the first crime in the cyberspace but not impossible to trace the
first major attack on cyberspace or the first major attack on the world’s existence precipitated
by the use of computers and the internet [Crootof, 2018, p.588] 83. The history of cybercrime
can be traced back to the 1970s when criminals committed crimes via phone lines called
"phreaking" 84. This was the use of certain tones to make free calls [Aaron, 2019, p.6] 85. John
Draper, aka Captain Crunch, a former United States Air Force engineer, realized while working
at Silicon Valley in 1971 that the prize whistles given in the “Cap'n Crunch Cereal” boxes
produced the same tones as telephone switching computers 86. He then published instructions
on how it can be used to make free long distance calls; the number of phreakers increased after
this 87. He subtly exposed himself in an interview with Esquire magazine in 1971, and gained
the attention of the police; he was arrested, convicted and given five years' probation 88. He was
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subsequently jailed twice for phone fraud in 1976 and 1978 [O’Brien, 2018] 89.The group of
people associated with this were called phreakers. In those days, phreakers were only interested
in showing off their skills, gaining recognition from fellow hackers, and to disrespect and/or
taunt the police [Brush, 2008] 90.
In 1981, Ian Murphy, aka Captain Zap, was the first person to be tried and convicted as a felon
for cybercrime [Mifitzgerald, 2004] 91. He hacked the AT&T mobile network and changed their
internal clock to charge customers off-hours rates at peak-hours 92. He was punished with only
1,000 hours of community service and two and a half years of probation and inspired the 1992
movie, Sneakers [Le VPN, 2018] 93. In 1982, a computer virus which attacked Apple II
operating systems called "Elk Cloner" was created as a joke by a 15-year-old kid and is one of
the first known viruses to spread wildly through floppy disks 94. Soon after, the United States
passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1986which made it a crime to break into
computer systems. In 1988, Robert T. Morris Jr. released a self-replicating worm, called the
“Morris Worm”, onto the United States Department of Defense’s ARPANET (the precursor to
the internet). This affected over 6,000 networked computers and Mr. Morris got punished with
only a $10,000 fine and 3 years’ probation 95.
It has been noted the breed of cybercriminals that existed had vastly changed from
hackers who were not interested in money but just did it to spite the authorities or impress their
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colleagues, to hackers who were in it for the money 96. Some citizens would even act as spies
for other governments, and sell data to them for financial return 97. Unlike previous
cybercriminals, this breed was not careless about letting people know what they were doing
and maintained a low profile; this is the breed of cybercriminal that exists today 98. Another
difficult law enforcement faced was the transnational nature of cybercrimes: before law
enforcement could arrest and charge a cybercriminal in another country, they either had to have
an extradition treaty with such country or wait for him to flee to a country with which they had
one [O’Brien, 2018] 99. In 1989, the First National Bank of Chicago was the victim of a $70
million computer theft and the global shock resulted in the United Kingdom enacting their
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 which criminalized unauthorized access to computer
systems 100.The first large-scale case of ransomware was reported in 1989 [Juliana De Groot,
2020] 101. It was called the AIDS Trojan or PC Cyborg Ransomware and was created by a
biologist, Joseph Popp who handed out floppy disks containing the virus to those attending the
World Health Organization’s AID Conference [Juliana De Groot, 2020] 102. They were intended
to be AIDS information introductory diskettes; to regain access to the computers, the owners
had to send $189 to PC Cyborg Corporation in Panama 103.The more cybercrimes became
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prevalent; states began to legislate on them [ITU, 2011] 104. Cybercrimes have evolved over the
years; examples are a denial of service attacks, malware outbreaks, cracking and plundering
computer systems, intellectual property theft, cybersquatting, economic espionage, infiltration
and sabotage of networks, money theft, etc; the greater the technological advancement, the
greater the opportunity to commit cybercrimes.

2.3 Cybercrime and Traditional Crime
Often times, researchers and writers tend to talk about cybercrime as a separate entity
from traditional crime but it is carried out by the same types of criminals and for the same
reasons. Notably, cybercrime is not quite the same as traditional crime in different ways, yet
two noteworthy contrasts are that, in cybercrime, the culprit is regularly significantly harder to
find, distinguish and in the end, get. [Ayswariya & Aswathy, 2018] 105.
One of the contrasts amongst cybercrime and traditional crime is the proof of the
offences 106. Customary crooks for the most part leave hints of a crime, through either
fingerprints or other physical confirmations; however, perpetuators of cybercrime depend on
the internet as the means through which they carry out their crimes, and it leaves next to no
fingerprints or physical confirmation in its wake which could be used as proof 107. Scientific
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agents normally encounter awesome trouble in get-together confirmation that could prompt the
conviction of cybercriminals majorly because perpetuators can uninhibitedly change their
characters 108. This is further made complex by the fact that the internet permits the obscurity
of its clients.
A second major contrast, necessarily prompted by the first is length of examinations
[Krannenbarg, 2018] 109. Since cybercrime includes culprits utilizing distorted names and
working from remote areas, it for the most part takes more time to recognize the genuine
cybercriminals and secure them [Krannenbarg, 2018] 110. Notably, cybercriminals (for
examples, programmers) escape from capture on the grounds that the specialist can’t find them.
Conventional or traditional crimes take shorter days and age to explore in light of the fact that
the hoodlums as a rule leave proof that can be utilized to spot them [Krannenbarg, 2018] 111.
Example could include DNA, fingerprints, photos and recordings.

The scale of cybercrime vis-à-vis traditional crime also differ: a cyber attacker can
conduct on a scale that is not possible in the physical world but this will not be possible for a
traditional attacker [PGI, 2018] 112. A traditional bank robber may only be able to hit one or two
banks a week, a cyber-attacker can target 100’s if not 1000’s of sites at once [PGI, 2018] 113.
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Closely related to this is that in cybercrime, attacks can be performed from anywhere in the
world; they can be performed anonymously and within jurisdictions where the consequences
of those actions may not, or cannot, be addressed by the criminal justice system [Dennis,
2020] 114. Attackers are also able to extract far more data digitally than would ever be possible
in the physical world [Dennis, 2020] 115. For example 1 gigabyte of data is approximately 4,500
paperback books. Think of how many gigabytes of data is held on a system, hackers can extract
this within a matter of minutes.
Cybercrimes are conducted at machine speed; a criminal can write a piece of code that
can target multiple sites in minutes [Rouse, 2020] 116. Also, another part of cyber threat to be
considered which does not necessarily exist in traditional crimes is the public and media
perception of the crime [PGI, 2018] 117. Occurrences show that when large financial institutions
have been hacked, the media has often wholly apportioned blame to the organizations rather
than the criminals [PGI, 2018] 118. This will necessarily arise from the traditional
responsibilities that have been assigned to organizations who deal in individual and private
data to do everything within their power to create a safe cyberspace for their organization and
the data of the individuals handled. This is not the same in traditional crimes as this duty does
not exist.
The difference between cybercrime and traditional crimes as drawn above signals one
thing: that the world is faced with a more dangerous and uncontrollable series of crime where
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cybercrime is concerned as opposed to traditional crime [ITU, 2011] 119. Notably, cybercrimes
continue to skyrocket ahead of policies and laws to control them [Orji, 2012] 120, and even when
laws and policies are made, identifying cybercriminals for prosecution is usually a clog in the
wheel for the full enforcement of these laws.
2.4

State Responsibility for Cybercrime in International Law
In this regard, a look is taken at the reactions under international law for cybercrimes

committed by one state against another as well as the responsibilities international law demands
of States in the event of cybercrime, whether from individuals or from states. A principle of
international law is non-intervention in internal affairs of another state [UNODC, 2019] 121.
This rule is included in various treaties and conventions, such as Article 8 of the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of 1933, Article 3(e) of Charter of the Organization
of American States of 1948, the UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of The United Nations of 1970. Before any action can be taken
by an injured country, proof is needed to establish a violation of international law and attribute
the conduct to a state (as opposed to individuals acting on their own accord) [Diakonia,
2020] 122. Certain forms of cyber interventions can undermine the public’s confidence in the
ability of government to maintain essential services, public order and economic stability
[Diakonoa, 2020] 123. These forms of cyber interventions can include: conducting DDoS attacks
against critical infrastructure systems; using malware to infect critical infrastructure sectors
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with the intention of damaging systems, stealing, deleting, and modifying data, and/or
disrupting services; and spreading disinformation, fake news, and propaganda in order to
undermine the authority of the state and elicit a desired response by the target government and
population [UNDOC, 2019] 124. Having explained this, the ability to draw legal lines for
legitimate and illegitimate forms of cyber interventions (based on the principles of sovereign
equality, non-intervention, and territorial integrity) is an extremely fraught issue [UNODC,
2019] 125. This is owed in part to the failure of states to sufficiently articulate how the customary
international legal rules should be applied in cyberspace. Notably, discussions on these issues
are underway at the United Nations [UNODC, 2019] 126.
International law allows an injured State to bring an action against another State for
cybercrime committed against the former however, proof is needed to establish a violation of
international law and attribute the conduct to a State (as opposed to individuals acting on their
own accord) [Diakonia, 2020] 127. Even if still found to be an international wrongful act
(cybercrime) there are circumstances that could preclude the wrongfulness of a particular cyber
operation [Diakonia, 2020] 128. These circumstances are introduced in the International Law
Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
of 2001. This includes: Article 20- Consent:
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Valid consent by a state to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the
wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within
the limits of that consent.
Article 21-Self Defense:
The wrongfulness of an act of a state is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of a
self defense taken in conformity with the Charter of the UN
Article 25–Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act
not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the only
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b)
does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness
if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
It is quite difficult, if not impossible to visualize the above circumstances in the event
of a cybercrime by a State against another State. According to Rule 6 of Tallinn Manual 2.0
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2017: “a state must exercise due
diligence in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infrastructure under its governmental
control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious adverse
consequences for other States”.
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Significantly, States are obligated to prevent their territories from being used to commit
cyberattacks on other countries [Lotrionte] 129. Pursuant to the due diligence principle, states
are obligated to act to terminate cyber operations conducted from their state using reasonably
available means when notified of them 130.
Rule 14 of Talinn Manual 2.0 holds that:“a State bears international responsibility for a cyberrelated act that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of an international legal
obligation”.
Notably also, under Rules 15 through 17 of Tallinn Manual 2.0 and Articles 4, 6, 8,
and 11 of the International Law Commission’s Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts of 2001, the cyber acts of state organs, organs of other states, and non-state
actors could be attributed to the state.
The G7, in its Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace, noted that
“the customary international law of State responsibility supplies the standards for attributing
acts to States, which can be applicable to activities in cyberspace 131. The implication is that
States cannot escape legal responsibility for internationally wrongful cyber acts by perpetrating
them through ‘proxy’ 132. Cyber Proxies are “intermediaries that conduct or directly contribute
to an offensive cyber action that is enabled knowingly, whether actively or passively by a
beneficiary” 133.
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Another principle of International Law as contained specifically in Article 2(3) of the
UN Charter is that: “all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered”. Countries
react in different ways to cyber threats: a country could respond to instances of hacking and
malware distribution by non-state actors, by, for example using criminal justice measures, such
as arrest and indictments against perpetrators of these cybercrimes. In another view, if a cyber
act by a country, state-sponsor, or individuals and/or groups directed by a country falls below
the threshold of the use of force or coerciveness (i.e. cyberacts which violate international law
or at the very least are considered as unwarranted or unfriendly cyber interference which falls
short of a cyber intervention), the injured country can respond with retorsions 134. Examples of
retorsions are trade restrictions and sanctions.
2.5
i.

Offences Associated with Cybercrime

Phishing
Phishing has been described as a form of social engineering in which an attacker, also
known as a phisher, attempts to fraudulently retrieve legitimate users’ confidential or sensitive
credentials by mimicking electronic communications from a trustworthy or public organization
in an automated fashion [Shi & Saleem] 135 It describes acts that are carried out to make victims
disclose personal/secret information [Shi & Saleem]. 136
It has been defined as a kind of malicious attack where cybercriminals create a fake website
– meant to look like a popular online resource (a social network, online banking services, or
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online games) and use various social engineering methods to attempt to lure users to the website
[Kaspersky] 137 This aforementioned definition can be said to be too restrictive, as it only covers
one of the various ways by which phishing attacks can be carried out. However, the emailphishing contains three phases [Orji, 2012] 138. In the first phase, offenders identify legitimate
companies offering online services and electronically communicating with customers whom
they can target. An example is financial institutions. The second phase consists of the offenders
sending out a large number of fraudulent emails, which direct users to fraudulent websites,
resembling the legitimate websites 139 the last phase consists of the offenders using the
confidential information typed in by the victims to achieve a pay-out.
ii.

Hacking
Hacking can be defined ‘as gaining unauthorized access to a computer system either for the
purpose of exploration or for causing damage once inside. 140 This involves using technology
to gain unauthorized access to a computer system, program, or data. 141

iii.

Illegal Interception
Illegal interception describes the act performed by offenders which involves intercepting
communications between users (such as e-mails) or other forms of data transfers (when users
upload data onto web-servers or access-web based external storage media) in order to record
the information exchanged. 142
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iv.

Cyber-Stalking And Online Harassment
Cyber-stalking and online harassment are two related terms albeit still distinct [Judge
Harvey]. 143 Online harassment can take different forms [Nelson]. 144 A direct form of internet
harassment may involve the sending of unwanted e-mails which are abusive, threatening or
obscene from one person to another [McGraw, 1995]. 145 Another form may involve electronic
sabotage, by sending the victim hundreds or thousands of junk e-mail messages (commonly
known as spamming) and could include sending computer viruses.[Ellison & Akdeniz,
1998] 146 The third form occurs in live internet relay chat sessions, message boards or news
groups or by way of instant messaging. [Ellison & Akdeniz, 1998] 147
Online harassment is distinct from cyberstalking. There is no single accepted definition of
cyberstalking. 148 But cyberstalking refers ‘to the use of the internet, e-mail or other electronic
devices to pursue another person’.[Judge Harvey] 149 Cyberstalking also refers ‘to the use of
electronic communications or tracking technologies to pursue another person repeatedly to the
point of inducing fear’[Hensler-McGinnis, 2008]. 150 This occurs where an individual follows
or make continuous attempt to contact someone through the internet [Hensler-McGinnis,
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2008]. 151 Online harassment is distinct from cyberstalking by the fact that cyberstalking is
characterized by pursuit and fear [Hensler-McGinnis, 2008]. 152
v.

Viruses
These are computer software programmes that are deliberately designed to facilitate or
allow interference with a computer system. They may damage programs or delete files or just
replicate and thereby take up space on a hard drive. 153

vi.

Cyber-Squatting
Cyber-squatting has been described as an act which occurs when an individual or a
corporation registers a domain name that is spelled the same as a pre-existing trademark, and
demands money from the trademark owner before the registrant will release the domain
name. 154Cybersquatters have also been characterized as ‘individuals who attempt to profit from
the internet by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain names back to the companies
that spent millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trademark’ 155 It should be noted
that individuals who register names similar with trademarks differ in character. There are the
innocent characters that are not guilty of cybersquatting. These innocent characters register the
domain name based on some unrelated interest in the word itself, without intending harm to a
trademark owner. 156 The other characters of cybersquatters who are the guilty ones are ransom
grabbers and competitor grabbers [Mercer]. 157 Ransom grabbers are the paradigmatic
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cybersquatters; they strategically register trademarks as domain names with the aim to sell it
to the legitimate trademark holders. 158 Competitor grabbers are individuals or corporations that
register a domain name corresponding to a competitor‘s trademark in order to sell their own
goods on it or merely to hinder the legitimate trademark holder’s use of the domain
name.[Mercer] 159
Because this paper views cyber crime as including both crimes enabled by the internet
(crimes which would not have been committed without the internet and existence of computers)
and those which are targeted at computers and the internet, a broader instance of cybercrime
will still be discussed.
i. Child Pornography
This crime is majorly committed in two ways [Yasin, 2006]. 160 The first is by sharing
child pornography over the internet and the second is by using a computer to entice children
into meetings for illicit sexual encounters [Yasin, 2006]. 161
ii. Computer Related Fraud
Computer-related fraud has been described as one of the most popular crimes on the
internet [Yasin, 2006]. 162 This crime entails the offender using an automation and software
tools to mask criminals’ identities. The large volume of information stored on the internet
makes the networked computer a natural fit for the commission of fraud [Yasin, 2006]. 163
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B. CYBER SECURITY
2.6

An Overview and Scope of Cyber Security
The existence of the term cyber security and everything the term stands for is as a

necessary incident of cybercrime and the need to curb it [Herjavec, 2019] 164. Cyber security is
a broad concept used to refer to activities being taken to curb cybercrime and this is not
necessarily limited to only laws, regulations and/or policies. It means that the development in
safer technologies such as the development of cryptography 165 is all part of cybersecurity.
Cyber security is a multi-disciplinary aspect of information communications technology that
deals with the legal, regulatory as well as technological and non technological mechanisms put
in place with the aim of protecting computers, computer systems, computer networks, and
digital technologies including the information stored or transmitted by them from all forms of
threats [Orji, 2012] 166. Primarily speaking, cyber security simply protects the cyberspace and
protects information and communications technologies from all forms of cyber threats [Orji,
2012] 167.
A more appreciated definition, scope and overview of cybersecurity is given by Mariam
Dunn 168:
1. A set of activities and other measures, technical and non-technical, intended to protect
computers, computer networks, related hardware and devices software, and the information
they contain and communicate, including software and data, as well as other elements of
cyberspace, from all threats, including threats to the national security;
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2. The degree of protection resulting from the application of these activities and measures;
3. The associated field of professional endeavor, including research and analysis, aimed at
implementing and those activities and improving their quality.
Additionally, cyber security has also been defined as “the collection of tools, policies,
guidelines, assurances and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber-environment and
organization, as well as user’s assets” [ITU HLEG, 2008] 169
Different actors in the cyberspace will necessarily view cyber security in different ways. For
example, from a technological perspective, cyber security would refer to technical measures
developed to implement a secure operating system or technologies developed to safeguard
computer systems and the information stored on such computer systems [Orji, 2012] 170. This
perspective will also, necessarily encompass the development of technologies and technical
measures to ensure the safety of computer software and other digital technologies as well as
the safe and efficient operation of computer networks [Orji, 2012] 171. From an organizational
perspective, cyber security will mean all technical and non-technical measures taken by an
organization to ensure the safety, confidentiality and integrity of its computers and information
networks and the data stored or being communicated by them: this will also extend to the
protection of digital resources belonging to such an organization [Orji, 2012] 172. To an
individual computer user, cybersecurity would imply personal measures taken to secure a
personal computer as well as the security and confidentiality of data stored therein or in an
electronic storage device 173.Measures taken in this regard to protect the individual computer
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will also include the use of passwords to prevent unauthorized access to personal computers,
the use of reliable and updated antivirus software programmes to prevent malware intrusions
and the careful handling of personal data, such as non disclosure of personal information to
suspicious websites or where the authenticity of such data request is unreliable [Orji, 2012] 174.

2.7 The Basic Concepts of Cyber Security
The use of computer has grown from what it traditionally was known and used for.
Today, hundreds of persons can connect with the aid of the internet as well as the reliance of
national critical infrastructure on digital technology. With these developments has come the
development of some concept developed to better the space within which these developments
exist. These basic concepts are discussed below:
Telecommunications Security:
The idea of telecommunications security is the protection of information which is being
transmitted by telecommunication network; this is also inclusive of measures taken to protect
these networks and infrastructures which transmit this information 175. According to Uchenna
Jerome, the core objectives of telecommunications security are:
a) Denying unauthorized persons access to sensitive and classified information of value;
b) Ensuring the authenticity of information handled by telecommunications systems;
c) Preventing the disruption of telecommunications services and;
d) Ensuring the resilience of telecommunications networks 176.
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These objectives are not fulfilled merely through legal, regulatory or policy
mechanisms; it is also implemented through the application of technical securities measures
such as crypto security, transmission security, emission security and traffic flow security [Orji,
2012] 177.
John Kimmins 178 has this to say about telecommunications security:
“In the past, difference between telecommunications systems and computer systems were
readily apparent. Today that distinction is not so clear. For example…the software-controlled
digital switch, has replaced much of the older mechanically switched telecommunication and
equipment. The new era digital systems are taking on the characteristics of special purpose
computer systems processing a communication application. As such, they are subjected to
many of the same threats that confront computer systems, while at the same time retaining
much of the unique functionality associated with responding to customer demands for voice
communications” 179.
Many modern telecommunication devices today such as mobile phones perform the
functions of a personal computer. Today technologies such as 4G are already hitting the world
to make communication and connections faster and easier [Mosyagin, 2010] 180. The internet
today has enabled the development of numerous new ideas which hitherto would not have been
possible. Basically, telecommunications networks today create the necessary backbone with
which exchange of communication has been made easier.
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Data Protection:
According to Article 2(a) of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, data protection
refers to the Protection of the Privacy of Personal data or information relating to any
identifiable individual from all forms of threats and abuses. The right to data protection is
founded on the primary right of every individual to privacy 181. In today’s ever-spreading
application of information communications technologies, to spread personal information about
individual and organization, there is need to put up measures that will ensure that persons who
deal with these information put open in the digital space do so bearing in mind the safety of
those to whom such information relates: this is the primary concept of data protection. Having
one’s data in the wrong hands could lead to fraud, identity theft, to mention but a few.
Accordingly, the concept of data protection seeks to ensure the integrity, confidentiality and
overall security of such personal data that is stored in form of digital data in electronic storage
facility or in a computer system [Oloni, 2020] 182. This is part of what the concept of cyber
security seeks to achieve.
Information Security:
Information security refers to the protection of information and information systems
from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction. Information
security has also been used to refer to all aspects of protecting information [Dunn, 2005] 183 .
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not have the right to privacy enshrined in its Constitution.
182
Oloni, V. (2020). A Long Walk To Freedom: Nigeria’s Data Protection Journey. Lawyard Journal, Vol. 2,
p.25
183
Dunn, M. (2005). A Comparative Analysis of Cybersecurity Initiatives Worldwide. (A paper presented at the
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity, ITU: Geneva) . p. 4
181

43

The concept of cyber security is also weaved into information security given that modern
information systems include computer systems and networks [Dunn, 2005] 184.
Security of Critical Infrastructures/Critical Information Infrastructures:
Attempting a definition of critical infrastructure is a complex one, not only because of
the numerous definitions that have been given to it over the years by different scholars, but also
because of the numerous areas that the concept covers alongside its numerous different
classifications in different countries. Primarily, critical infrastructures refer to key
infrastructures or sectors that are vital to the functioning and survival of modern societies [Orji,
2012] 185. What amounts to critical infrastructures varies from state to state. In the US, critical
infrastructures have been legally defined as:
1. Systems and assets whether physical or virtual, so viral to the US that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety or any combination of those matters 186.
2. Those physical and cyber based systems essential to the minimum operation of the economy
and government 187
In the Draft Proposal for an International Convention on cybercrime and Terrorism, an
attempt to define critical infrastructure was made: “critical infrastructures are the
interconnected networks of physical devices, pathways, people and computer that provide for
timely delivery of government services; medical care; protection of the general population by

Dunn, M. (2005). A Comparative Analysis of Cybersecurity Initiatives Worldwide. (A paper presented at the
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity, ITU: Geneva) . p. 4
185
Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation. 1 Wolf Legal Publishers
186
See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016, 42 U.S.C. Section 5195c. See also US Department of Homeland
Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 103 (2006) where ‘Critical Infrastructure’ was defined to
include networks vital to the nation.
187
See The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive
No. 63, White Paper (May 22, 1998). Also see Moteff. J. & Parfomak P. (2004). Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets: Definition and Identification. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, p. 4
184

44

law enforcement; fighting; food; water; transportation services, including travel of persons and
transport of goods by air, water, rail road; supply of energy, including electricity, petroleum,
oil and gas products; financial and banking services and transactions; and information and
communications services 188.
2.8 Goals of Cyber Security
According to the CIA Triad 189 there are three major goals of cyber security, to wit:
1. Confidentiality: keeping sensitive information private. Encryption services can protect your
data at rest or transit and prevent unauthorized access to protected data.
2. Integrity: this is the consistency of data, networks and systems. This includes mitigation and
proactive measures to restrict unapproved changes, while also having the ability to recover data
that has been lost or compromised
3. Availability: refers to authorized users that can freely access the systems, networks, and data
needed to perform their daily tasks. Resolving hardware and software conflicts, along with
regular maintenance is crucial to keep systems up and available 190.
The CIA’s criteria are one that most of the organizations and companies use when they have
installed a new application, creates a database or when guaranteeing access to some data 191.
For data to be completely secure, all these security goals must come into effect. These are
security policies that all work together, and therefore it can be wrong to overlook one policy 192.
2.9

Importance of Cyber Security to a Nation State

Article 1(7) Draft International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism
The CIA Triad is a venerable model for the development of security policies used in identifying problem
areas, along with necessary solutions in the arena of information security.
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The discussion so far perhaps already gives a hint on how indispensable cyber security
is for every State. Particularly, the discussion on the importance of cyber security is important
given the discussion on the differences between cybercrimes and traditional crimes noting the
greater danger in the former, as well as the discussions on the cyber attacks that the world had
suffered due to increases in technology. The fact of the matter is, whether you are an individual,
small business or large multinational, you rely on computer systems every day. Pair this with
the rise in cloud services, poor cloud service security, smart phones and the internet of things
(IoT) and we have a myriad of cyber security threats that did not exist decades ago [Tunggal,
2020] 193. Governments around the world are paying greater attention to cyber threats and are
ultimately responding to cyber security demands. A great example is the Guidelines on Data
Protection Regulation.
Cyber security is important in a nation because it encompasses everything that pertains
to protecting sensitive data, personally identifiable information, protected health information,
personal information, intellectual property, data, and governmental and industry information
systems from theft and image attempted by criminals and adversaries [Tunggal, 2020] 194. Put
simply, a slack in cyber security could affect every other sectors of a nation. Ideally, cyber
security is important to proactively coordinate the prevention and mitigation of those cyber and
telecommunications threats that pose the greatest risk to nations; pursue whole-of-nation
operational integration by broadening and deepening engagement with partners in the
technological sector and its information sectors through information sharing to manage threats,
vulnerabilities and incidents; build better and resilient agencies to provide sound proposal to
combat cybercrime, maintain a sustained readiness to respond immediately and effectively to
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all cyber and telecommunications incidents of national security; break down the technological
and institutional barriers that impede collaborative information exchange, situational
awareness, and understanding of threats and impact; help create cyber security centers to serve
stakeholders as a national center of excellence and expertise for cyber and telecommunications
security issues [Tunggal, 2020] 195. Cyber security is important also to protect the privacy and
constitutional rights of the citizens in the conduct of their legal activities 196.
2.10 Global Cyber Security Agenda and its Critical Components
The global cyber security agenda focuses on a framework for international cooperation
in cyber security 197. The International Telecommunication Union recognizes that information
and technology security are critical priorities for the international community and the cyber
security which is in everyone’s best interest can only be achieved through collaborative
efforts 198. In 2005, the World Summit Information Society (WSIS) which met in Tunis called
upon ITU to act as the sole facilitator of Action Line C5, “Building confidence and security in
the use of ICTs” 199. Following this, the GCA was launched in 2007, by the then ITU SecretaryGeneral, Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré. A multi stakeholder High Level Expert Group (HLEG) which
comprised of more than one hundred experts from Governments, Industry, International
organizations, NGOs and academic institutions was further established to further develop main
goals, analyze current developments in all areas of cyber security and formulate proposals on
possible long-term strategies and emerging trends in cyber security. In 2008, all these proposals
and suggestions were keyed into five strategic pillars of the GCA by the HLEG 200.
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The GCA is built upon five strategic pillars, which is also known as work areas, and made up
of seven main strategic goals 201:
•

Legal Measures

•

Technical Measures

•

Organizational Structures

•

Capacity Building

•

International Cooperation
Legal Measure:
To better understand the legal aspects of cybersecurity, ITU has devised cybercrime
legislation resources. With these resources, ITU is working to assist countries in moving
towards harmonizing legal frameworks. This activity also addresses the ITU-D Study Group
Q22/1 approach for organizing national cybersecurity efforts, highlighting that establishing the
appropriate legal infrastructures is an integral component of a national cybersecurity
strategy 202. The ITU cybercrime legislation resources currently consist of two main
deliverables: the ITU publication titled ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation and
Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries. ITU- IMPACT Collaboration
As the world’s first non-profit comprehensive global public-private partnership against cyber
threats, the International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) is well
positioned to assist partner countries, especially developing nations who are broadening their
Internet capabilities 203.
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The GCA is made up of seven main strategic goals:
1. Elaboration of strategies for the development of a model cybercrime legislation that is
globally applicable and regional legislative measures [emphasis supplied].
2. Elaboration of strategies for the creation of appropriate national and regional organizational
structures and policies on cybercrime [emphasis supplied].
3. Development of a strategy for the establishment of globally accepted minimum security
criteria and accreditation schemes for software applications and systems [emphasis
supplied].
4. Development of strategies for the creation of a global framework for watch, warning and
incident response to ensure cross border coordination between new and existing initiatives
[emphasis supplied].
5. Development of strategies for the creation and endorsement of a generic and universal digital
identity system and the necessary organizational structures to ensure the recognition of
digital credentials for individuals across geographical boundaries [emphasis supplied].
6. Development of a global strategy to facilitate human and institutional capacity building to
enhance knowledge and know-how across sectors and in all the above-mentioned areas
[emphasis supplied].
7. Proposals on a framework for a global multi-stakeholder strategy for international
cooperation dialogue and coordination in all the above-mentioned areas

204

[emphasis

supplied].
These goals have the five point strategies embedded in them. In other to ensure that
these goals and aims of the GCA are not static the HLEG is saddled with the major
responsibility of ensuring further development of the GCA, by proposing refinements to its
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main goals; analyzing current developments in cybersecurity, including both threats and stateof-the-art solutions, anticipate emerging and future challenges, identify strategic options, and
formulate proposals to the ITU Secretary-General; meet the goals of the Global Cyber Security
Agenda; to provide guidance on possible long-term strategies and emerging trends in cyber
security 205.
2.11

Liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs):
The concept of cyber security makes it impossible for the government only, to take full

responsibility for the protection of its citizen’s cyber space. The division of this responsibility
imposes certain standards within which certain persons/organizations must act for a safer cyber
space to be achieved. When information or transactions are carried out over networked
platforms, several establishments are usually involved, the implication of this is that where
unlawful or malicious activities are carried out on the internet, these persons/organizations who
are key players in the movement of these transactions become liable or responsible [Orji,
2012] 206. These people will necessarily include Internet Service Providers (ISP) and email
service providers. ISPs are the major focus of regulatory agencies with regards to malicious
conducts in the cyber space; the reason for this is not farfetched: malicious acts against
computer systems in many cases are routed from criminal actors and service providers located
in other countries, given this situation, the ISPs located within a state’s borders are usually the
most proximate and most suitable for investigation having regard to the principle of national
sovereignty 207. There are no fixed limits as to the responsibilities of an ISP; the responsibilities
of ISPs as provided in the laws of each State usually determine the liability of an ISP. For
example, under the Nigerian Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1998, protection
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is offered to an internet service provider from liability for copyright infringement by their users,
if the internet service provider meets certain statutory requirements which are referred to as
“safe harbors” 208. To fall within the protection of the DMCA, an internet service provider must,
among other things, take certain steps when it receives notice that infringing material resides
on its network; adopt and implement a policy that provides for termination in appropriate
circumstances of users who are repeat infringers; and accommodate standard technical
measures that are used by copyright owners to identify and protect copyrighted works 209.
In some States like the USA, the responsibilities and liabilities of ISPs are clearly
defined in legislation 210. In South Africa, this is also the case 211however; Nigeria does not have
any single piece of legislation which clearly defines the responsibilities and liabilities of
ISPs 212. However, countries such as Nigeria that do not have a single comprehensive piece of
legislation bordering on the liabilities of ISPs have these liabilities and responsibilities
scattered in different laws of such State where the activities of ISPs will necessarily come into
consideration 213.
2.12 Inquiring the Real World Perspectives of Cyber security
An attempt is made here to analyze the multiple dimensions of cyber security which affects the
real world.

Section 512
Section 512(c)(1) makes provisions for the procedure of notice and take-down
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National Security:
According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 214, National Security has
been defined as the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state through the use of
economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. The traditional idea
associated with the concept of national security is related to the waging of wars or the
prevention of wars [Walt, 1991] 215. However, following the end of the cold war era, the
traditional view that national security has only been concerned with militant threats or crisis
appears to have shifted to accommodate other factors that may threaten the well being of a state
such as economic crisis, poverty, environmental crisis, infrastructural crisis and crime
explosion [Obasi, 1998, pp.275-296] 216. Measures taken to prevent acts or conditions that may
impair the effective functioning or survival of a State and its general well being within the
concept of national security includes all measures taken to ensure the protection of critical
sectors/infrastructures or essential services that are vital to a State such as: telecommunications
services, banking services, transport services and government services [Orji, 2012] 217. Some
states have witnessed severe cyber attacks causing great consequences and disruptions to their
national security. For example, the New York Times gives a detailed discussion of cyber
attacks launched against the public and private critical information infrastructure of Estonia in
2007:
“On April 26-27, the day the government’s decision to relocate a disputed Soviet-era stature
(commemorating an unknown Russian who died fighting the Nazis), a flood of junk messages
hit the web sites of Parliament, the President and the Prime Minister and the sites crashed. On
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April 30, several daily newspaper websites were brought down and high-level meeting took
place with plans to protect vital services such as online banking. On May 2, Internet Service
Providers from around the world succeeded in blocking most of the incoming malicious data.
On May 5, the Estonian government announced that the attacks originated in Russia. On
Victory Day in Russia, May 9, botnet attacks began and shut down Estonia’s largest bank’s
online portal, leading to loses of more than one million dollars. In one case, the attackers sent
a single huge burst of data to gauge the capacity of the network. Then hours later, data from
multiple sources flowed into the system, rapidly reaching the upper limit of the routers. May
18 saw the last major wave of attacks, though small-scale assaults continued for several weeks”
[Landler & Mark off, 2007] 218.
Estonia was near a complete digital collapse that would have shut off many vital
services and caused massive and widespread social disruptions [Shackelford, 2009, p 205]219.
It was estimated that over 1 million computers sourced from more than 560 unique networks
located in more than 50 countries in the world were involved in the attacks through the use of
botnets 220. In August 2008, Georgia suffered similar methods of cyber attacks [Kelsey, 2008,
p. 1429] 221.
Economic Security:
The economic dimension of cyber security implies approaching the issue of threats
against computers systems and networked information infrastructures as a threat against
economic security since most sectors that are classified as critical infrastructures that rely on
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information technologies are vital to the economic well being of any nation 222. A practical and
more detailed way of approaching the economic dimensions of cyber security is by looking at
the degree of economic loses that are incurred as a result of attacks against computer systems
and communications networks that are vital to strategic sectors of an economy [Orji, 2012]223.
Apparently, huge financial losses caused by cyber security threats make States economically
vulnerable.
In May 2000, the “Love Bug” virus appeared on the internet and spread around the
world in two hours, infecting over forty-five million computer users in over twenty countries
and causing between two and ten billion dollars in economic damage [Brenner &Koops, pp.67] 224. The United States suffered up to 17 billion US Dollars loose as a result of malicious
software in 2003 [Marco, 2009, p.216] 225. Other forms of cybercrime such as internet related
stock fraud is estimated to cost investors over 10 billion US dollars per year [Williams, 2002,
p.3] 226. It is believed by business organizations (especially in the USA) that with the continuous
threats posed by cybercrimes to economic security, cyber crime is closer to them than physical
crime [Williams, 2002, p.3] 227. Asides from damaging corporate reputations and causing
financial loses for corporations, cyber security threats can greatly reduce public confidence in
ecommerce and state’s financial system and even disrupt the global informational economy

These critical sectors include: Banking and Finance, Central Government/Government Services,
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[Orji, 2012] 228. Cybercrime and the absence of cyber security measures to curb its
consequences and threats can reduce the economic efficiency of states.
Human Rights:
The human rights perspective connected with cyber security is as it relates to rights to
privacy. Within this scope, it construes incidents of malicious threats against personal
information in computer systems or digital data storage devices as an infringement of the
human right to privacy [Orji, 2012] 229. The implication is that acts that threaten the integrity
and confidentiality of personal information stored in computer systems constitutes a violation
of the human right to privacy. Cyber security measures being put in place in many countries
put this into perspective.
On another hand, the human right to freedom of expression or communication implies
that human beings are entitled to express or hold opinions and also to receive and impart ideas
without interference. This will necessarily include the right to communicate or the right to
access the internet 230. Within the context of this right, malicious conducts against the
availability of computer systems such as denial of service (DoS) attacks or the unlawful denial
of access to an authorized user may hypothetically be construed as an infringement of the
human right to expression or communication 231.
Human Security:
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This concept as it relates to cyber security achieved global attention following the
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of 1994 232. The report
argued that insuring “freedom from want” 233 and “freedom from fear” 234 for all persons is the
best approach to tackle the problem of global insecurity 235. The concept of human security is
related to development of sectors in nations. An example driving this home is the disruption of
critical information infrastructures which can deprive a society of its basic services such as
electricity, public transport, water, sanitation, and even emergency services such as police and
fire protection; all of which can endanger human lives or provoke feelings of insecurity or mass
social panic 236. Personal data security also comes in this regard: issues such as identity theft,
cyber bullying, and cyber stalking can give rise to human security concerns in the information
society.
2.13 Cybercrime Legislation as a Part of a Cyber security Strategy
Globally, it is believed that the fight against cybercrime begins with putting in place
specific and comprehensive laws and policies in this regard. Cyber crime legislations are those
pieces of laws, regulations, guidelines, legislative proposals and drafts aimed at curbing cyber
crime and enhancing cyber security [Michalsons, 2020] 237. Imperatively, many advanced
countries of the world had long enacted their respective cyber laws and this is aiding the world
all over in the fight against cyber crime.
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According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 238, cybercrime
legislations identifies standard of acceptable behavior for information and communication
technology (ICT) users; establishes socio-legal sanctions for cybercrime; protects ICT users,
in general, and mitigates and/or prevents harm to people, data, systems, services and
infrastructure, in particular; protects human rights; enables the investigation and prosecution
of crimes committed online (outside of traditional real-world settings); and facilitates
cooperation between countries on cybercrime matters [UNODC, 2019] 239.
In most nations, the bulk of what forms their cyber security are legislations making
provisions for the responsibilities of government agencies handling ICT, and ISPs as well as
organizations dealing with large data [Michalsons, 2020] 240. A very good example is Nigeria,
and most African countries: the legislations on cybercrime form most of the measures taken to
provide cyber security. Cybercrime legislations provides rules of conduct and standards of
behavior for the use of the internet, computers, and related digital technologies, and the actions
of the public, government, and private organizations; rules of evidence and criminal procedure,
and other criminal justice matters in cyberspace; and regulation to reduce risk and/or mitigate
the harm done to individuals, organizations, and infrastructure should a cybercrime occur 241.
Whatever these actions are globally or in a particular State, the point is that States and the
International bodies are not sleeping on curbing cybercrime.
2.14 Conclusion
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This Chapter has critically discussed the evolution of cybercrime and computer crime. It further
discussed differences between cybercrime and traditional crime, offences associated with
cybercrime and state’s responsibility of cybercrime in International Law. Furthermore, it
discussed that cybersecurity was introduced combat cybercrime, to enhance and strengthen
security in the cyber space, highlighting the goals of cybersecurity and its importance to the
nation states. The next chapter will examine efforts being made internationally, to combat
cybercrime and ultimately, ensure cyber security and how it is accepted among states.
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CHAPTER THREE
OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES AND LEGAL
MEASURES ON CYBER SECURITY.
3.1 Introduction
Legal framework for cybercrime is sine qua non to preventing and combating
cybercrime. It is the legal framework that will provide criminalization, international
cooperation, jurisdiction, procedural powers, amongst others. At the national level, legal
framework on cybercrime focuses on criminalization, although reference is made to issues of
electronic evidence, jurisdiction, investigative measures and global cooperation [UNODC,
2013, p. xviii]. 242
At the international and regional level numerous efforts have been made to put in place
a legal framework for cybercrime with some success recorded especially in the last decade.
Eighty-two (82) States have either signed and or ratified one or more multilateral instrument
on cybercrime 243 which are about nineteen (19) in number. An analysis of these international
and regional multilateral legal instruments reveals that they have common provisions with a
little bit of divergences [UNODC, 2013]. 244 These instruments have had tremendous impacts
on existence of national laws as States use them as model laws and in other cases domesticate
them as local laws.
In this Chapter, we will discuss the responses of international and regional bodies to
cybercrime as well as the legal framework set up by them. We will equally, point out the
challenges to the effectiveness of these responses and framework.
3.2 International Responses on Cyber Security
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In the past, international responses have been sought in respect of other phenomena, just as
the phenomenon of cybercrime. However, the challenges presented by cybercrime are unique
and unprecedented due to its transnational element 245, jurisdictional issues 246 and other factors.
This subsection scrutinizes responses by international organizations and bodies to
cybercrime including the law and practice of states vis-à-vis those responses.
3.2.1 The United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is usually the first port of call for responses to international
issues due to its universality. Unfortunately, the UN has been unable to produce a binding
international cybercrime agreement. 247 The UN cannot however be accused of inaction. The
UN has taken a number of important actions for addressing the challenge of cybercrime. These
actions will be discussed hereunder.
It may appear that the UN took its first action with respect to cybercrime in September,
1990 when General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/121 after the eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The resolution dealt with
computer-crime legislation. 248 On the basis of this resolution, the UN published a manual in
1994 on the prevention and control of computer-related crime. 249
The issue of computer-related crimes came up for discussion in 2000 during the 10th
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders which
was held in Vienna [UNCJIN, 2000]. 250 In the course of the discussion, the conversation
devolved on the nature of the crime, investigation and legal response to same. 251 The
conclusions of the workshop contain major elements of the debate that is still ongoing:
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criminalization, procedural issues, international cooperation, public-private partnership and
capacity building [UNCJIN, 2000]. 252
In the Vienna Declaration issued after the Congress, called upon the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to undertake work in regard to the above, “taking into
account the ongoing work in other forums”. They declared their commitment “to working
towards enhancing our ability to prevent, investigate and prosecute high-technology and
computer-related crime” [ITU, 2014]. 253
In the same year that the 10th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders was held, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on
combating cybercrime, 254 wherein it identified a number of measures to tackle the menace of
cybercrime thus:
States should ensure that their laws and practice eliminate safe havens for those who criminally
misuse information technologies; Law enforcement cooperation in the investigation and
prosecution of international cases of criminal misuse of information technologies should be
coordinated among all concerned States; Law enforcement personnel should be trained and
equipped to address the criminal misuse of information technologies.
In 2001, the UN passed the resolutions on Combating the Criminal Misuse of
Information Technologies 255 wherein it invited Member States to: “take into account, as
appropriate, the work and achievements of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice and of other international and regional organizations”, in the development of national
law, policy and practice to combat the criminal misuse of information technologies 256 and; to
take into account the measures set forth in its resolution 55/63 Member States “when
developing national law, policy and practice to combat the criminal misuse of information
technologies” 257. Unfortunately, the resolutions were non-binding as the States were merely
invited to take into account, the work of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
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Justice and of other international and regional organizations, in the development of their
national law.
On the 21st day of December, 2001, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution
56/183 wherein it endorsed the holding of the World Summit on the Information Society
(Summit) for purposes of discussing opportunities and challenges to information society. The
first Summit was held in Geneva in 2003 258 during which the Geneva Declaration of
Principles 259 and the Geneva Plan of Action 260 were adopted. The Plan of Action contained
action line C5, ‘Building Confidence and Security in the use of ICTs’, which makes provision
in art 12(b) for certain measures that States should jointly take with the private sector, for
purposes of preventing, detecting and responding ‘to cyber-crime and misuse of ICTs’[ITU,
2003, p.6]. 261
In 2002, the UN General Assembly adopted another resolution on cybercrime. 262 The
resolution took note of the existing international and regional organizations approaches in
fighting cybercrime and “promoting dialogue between government and the private sector on
safety and confidence in cyberspace” and then invited Member States to take “note of the value
of the measures set forth in its resolution 55/63, and ... to take them into account in their efforts
to combat the criminal misuse of information technologies”. The resolution further invites
states to take into account the direction provided by the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice when developing national legislation.
Another action was taken in 2002 with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography. The Protocol addressed the issue of child pornography generally and then made
express reference to role of the internet in distributing such material. 263
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Resolutions A/Res/57/239 of 31 January 2003 264 and A/Res/58/199 of 30 January
2004 265 are the two main UN General Assembly resolutions dealing with cybersecurity. They
both recalled Resolutions 55/06 and 56/121.
In Resolution A/Res/57/239 of 31 January 2003, the UN invites all relevant
international organizations, including relevant UN bodies, to consider, inter alia, the elements
annexed to the resolution for the creation of such a culture in any future work on cybersecurity
and in their efforts to develop throughout their societies a culture of cybersecurity in the
application and use of information technologies. It equally invited Member States and all
relevant international organizations to take, inter alia, the said elements and the need for a
global culture of cybersecurity into account in their preparations for the World Summit on the
Information Society, to be held at Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003 and at Tunis in
2005. 266
In Resolution A/Res/58/199 of 30 January 2004, the UN invites all relevant
international organizations, including relevant UN bodies, to:
Consider, as appropriate, inter alia, [the elements annexed to the resolution] for protecting
critical information infrastructures in any future work on cybersecurity or critical infrastructure
protection; ...consider, inter alia, these elements in developing their strategies for reducing risks
to critical information infrastructures, in accordance with national laws and regulations; ... take,
inter alia, these elements and the need for critical information infrastructure protection into
account in their preparations for the second phase of the World Summit on the Information
Society, to be held in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005 267
In 2005 at the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok,
Thailand, cybercrime again came up for discussion. In the background paper 268 and in the
workshop 269, issues relating to the evolving use of computer systems in commission of offences
and the transnational dimension were addressed. Some States called for a UN convention on
cybercrime, 270 which was included in the discussion guide for the eleventh UN Crime
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Congress. 271 Unfortunately, a harmonization could not be achieved. The key part of the
Bangkok Declaration provides as follows:
We note that, in the current period of globalization, information technology and the rapid
development of new telecommunication and computer network systems have been
accompanied by the abuse of those technologies for criminal purposes. We therefore welcome
efforts to enhance and supplement existing cooperation to prevent, investigate and prosecute
high-technology and computer-related crime, including by developing partnerships with the
private sector. We recognize the important contribution of the United Nations to regional and
other international forums in the fight against cybercrime and invite the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, taking into account that experience, to examine the feasibility
of providing further assistance in that area under the aegis of the United Nations in partnership
with other similarly focused organizations.
Post the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok,
Thailand in 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration which amongst others
endorsed the 2005 Bangkok Declaration, wherein the international community’s efforts to
enhance and supplement existing cooperation to prevent computer-related crime were
encouraged; reaffirmed “the fundamental importance of implementation of existing
instruments and the further development of national measures and international cooperation in
criminal matters” including but not limited to cybercrime 272; and invited “further exploration
of the feasibility of providing assistance to Member States in addressing computer-related
crime under the aegis of the United Nations, and in partnership with other similarly focused
organizations”.
The second World Summit was held in 2005, during which the Tunis Agenda for the
Information Society was adopted. This Agenda called for the development of ‘necessary
legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime’ by States, and to, while doing
so, take into account existing international and regional frameworks and initiatives ‘including,
but not limited to, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime’. 273
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The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) whose responsibility it is to
facilitate action line C5, had to launch a Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) in 2007.274 The
GCA is divided into five pillars/work areas: Legal Measures, Technical and Procedural
Measures, Organizational Structures, Capacity Building and International Cooperation.275
However, the GCA is not working towards a binding global initiative.
On the 21st day of December 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution
64/211 276as part of the “Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity” initiative. The Resolution
refers to the two major resolutions on cybercrime i.e. Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 as well as
the two main resolutions on cybersecurity i.e. Resolutions 57/239 and 58/199. The annexure to
the resolution which is voluntary self-assessment tool for national efforts to protect critical
information infrastructures calls for states to review and update legal authorities (including
those related to cybercrime, privacy, data protection, commercial law, digital signatures and
encryption) that may be outdated or obsolete as a result of the rapid uptake of, and dependence
upon, new information and communication technologies. The resolution further calls on states
to use regional international conventions, arrangements and precedents in these reviews.
The need to negotiate a global convention for cybercrime came up in 2010 during the
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice held in Salvador,
Brazil. Opinions were clearly divided on the issue. 277 While China, Russia 278, Asian and
Pacific, 279African, 280 Latin American and Caribbean 281 nations were in support of negotiating
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a global convention 282, the United States, European Union 283 and the United Kingdom 284 were
not in support on the ground that the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is
sufficient and that efforts should rather be geared towards capacity building.
At the end of the Congress, a Declaration 285 was issued which sought to balance the
above competing views. In the Declaration, it was recommended that “United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, upon request, provide, in cooperation with Member States, relevant
international organizations and the private sector, technical assistance and training to States to
improve national legislation and build the capacity of national authorities” 286 for purposes of
tackling cybercrime. This recommendation took care of the interests of the United States,
European Union and the United Kingdom.
Paragraph 42 of the Salvador Declaration then invited “the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice to consider convening an open-ended intergovernmental
expert group to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to
it by Member States, the international community and the private sector, ... with a view to
examining options to strengthen existing and to propose new national and international legal
or other responses to cybercrime.” 287 This invitation, hinted on the need for a UN Convention
on Cybercrime, albeit indirectly.
Pursuant to the invitation in paragraph 42 of the Salvador Declaration, the General
Assembly in its resolution 65/2305, requested the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice (CCPCJ6) to establish an Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Group (IEG),
Greg Masters. (23 April 2010). Global Cybercrime Treaty Rejected at UN. SC
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to “conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to it by
Member States, the international community and the private sector, including the exchange of
information on national legislation, best practices, technical assistance and international
cooperation, with a view to examining options to strengthen existing and to propose new
national and international legal or other responses to cybercrime”. The Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice met and convened an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert
Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of the Problem of Cybercrime (‘Expert Group’).
The Expert Group met in Vienna in January 2011 288 and subsequently in February 2013 during
which it deliberated on Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime published by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime. 289
The Comprehensive Draft Study on Cybercrime which was presented at the second
meeting of the IEG, comprising eight chapters was deliberated on but the meeting did not reach
agreement on same nor the options proposed. States were then asked to submit comments by
May 2016. Comments were submitted by 22 States and the European Union. The content of
the Study form part of the annual discussion of the Expert Group where they discuss substantial
chapters so as to update information make observations, conclusions and recommendations.
According to the 2018-2021 work-plans, the Expert Group will in 2020 discuss the chapters on
international cooperation and prevention and in 2021, produce a consolidated list of
conclusions and recommendations to be provided to the CCPCJ for further processing.
The issue of a global cybercrime convention was muted at the subsequent meeting of
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice which was held in April 2013, but
same was deferred. The Commission rather came up with a draft resolution wherein it invited
member states “to continue to consider … ways and means to strengthen international
cooperation in combating cybercrime”, and requested for the convening of an open-ended
intergovernmental working group to further study the problem of cybercrime and states’
responses to it. 290 Another draft resolution contains a request to the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) “to strengthen partnerships for technical assistance and capacity-building
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with Member States, relevant organizations, the private sector and civil society”, and “to serve
as a central repository of cybercrime laws and good practices”. 291
The UN General Assembly in A/RES/73/187292adopted in 17 December 2018,
approved the new agenda item proposed by the Russian Federation in December 2018, titled
“Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes”.
Based on this agenda, in December 2019, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution
A/RES/74/247

which

mandates

the

establishment

of

an

Open-ended

Ad

Hoc

Intergovernmental Committee of Experts, representative of all regions, to elaborate a
comprehensive international convention on “countering the use of information and
communications technologies for criminal purposes”. This wording opens a scope potentially
wider than what defined by ‘cybercrime’ and does not correspond to any previously established
definition. The meeting of the ad-hoc committee was slated to begin with a three-day session
in August 2020 to agree on an outline and modalities for its further activities.
In that same resolution 73/187 293 adopted on 17 December, 2018, the General
Assembly requested the UN Secretary General to seek views of Member States on the issues
they have with respect to fight against cybercrime. The views of Member States were collated
and formed part of the report issued by the Secretary General 294.
It has been more than a decade since the proposal for a UN Convention on cybercrime
was made. This proposal is far from being realized.
Other measures were taken under the UN system to address cybercrime related issues.
For instance, in 2007, the ECOSOC passed a resolution on international cooperation in the
prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of economic fraud and identity-related
crime. 295 While this resolution does not specifically address cybercrime, the UNODC relied on
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it and on Resolution 2004/26 296 to establish a core group of experts to exchange views on the
best course of action on economic fraud and identity-related crime 297 and the core group has
undertaken a number of studies which inter alia included aspects of cybercrimes. 298
In 2019, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/74/173 wherein it
encouraged States to implement measures that: ensure investigation and prosecution of
cybercrimes; facilitate international cooperation; set up trainings for law enforcement and
judiciary official; encourage technical assistance and capacity building and; promote
cooperation with the private sector and civil society.
It is important to further note that problems such as that of cybercrime have necessitated
working groups in diverse regions. The UN Open-ended Working Group was established
through resolution 73/77 by the UN General Assembly. 299 In line with the name adopted for
the Working Group, it provides an opportunity for States to hold inter-sessional consultative
meetings with bodies, non-governmental organizations as well as industries in an open manner
and on diverse issues affecting all or particular Member States. These Working Groups have
however been more direct. The Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible
State Behavior in Cyberspace was established following a resolution 73/266 by the UN General
Assembly. Particularly, and in conjunction with other efforts being taken by the UN, the
establishment of the expert group allows assessment and accommodation by the UN on the
views of Member States on the efforts taken in individual States to strengthen information
security and further international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime. 300 The Group
also has a mandate to consult regional organizations such as the African Union, European
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Union, Organization of American States and so on, on matters relating to cybercrime and cyber
security. 301
3.2.2 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) with headquarters in Geneva was
founded as the International Telegraph Union in 1865. It is a specialized agency of the United
Nations. ITU has 192 Member States and more than 700 Sector Members and
Associates. 302The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency
within the UN and plays a starring role amongst others in cyber-security issues. It was the lead
agency at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) that took place in two phases
in 2003 in Geneva and in 2005 in Tunis. The outcome of the Summit is contained in the Geneva
Declaration of Principles 303, the Geneva Plan of Action 304; the Tunis Commitment 305 and the
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society 306.
The Geneva Plan of Action amongst others, governments, in cooperation with the
private sector were called upon to:
Prevent, detect and respond to cyber-crime and misuse of ICTs by: developing guidelines that
take into account ongoing efforts in these areas; considering legislation that allows for effective
investigation and prosecution of misuse; promoting effective mutual assistance efforts;
strengthening institutional support at the international level for preventing, detecting and
recovering from such incidents; and encouraging education and raising awareness. 307
In the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, the need for international cooperation
in the fight against cybercrime was highlighted and reference was made to the existing
legislative approaches for instance the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime as well
as the UN General Assembly resolutions. The Agenda stressed the importance of prosecuting
cybercrime including ones involving many jurisdictions. The Agenda provides further thus:
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We further underline the necessity of effective and efficient tools and actions, at national and
international levels, to promote international cooperation among, inter alia, law-enforcement
agencies on cybercrime. We call upon governments in cooperation with other stakeholders to
develop necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting
existing frameworks, for example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on “Combating the
criminal misuse of information technologies” and regional initiatives including, but not limited
to, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. 308
As part of the outcome of WSIS, ITU was designated as the facilitator for Action Line
C5 titled “building confidence and security in the use of ICTs”. 309In 2007, the ITU Global
Cybersecurity Agenda was launched during the second Facilitation Meeting for the said Action
Line C5. 310 The Global Cybersecurity Agenda has seven key goals, 311 which arebased on five
strategic pillars. 312
For purposes of analyzing and developing measures and strategies with regard to the
seven goals of the GCA, the ITU Secretary-General created a high-level expert group. 313In
2008, the expert group published the “Global Strategic Report” at the end of their
deliberation. 314The Report in Chapter 1 provides amongst others for legal measures in respect
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of cybercrime; an overview of different regional and international approaches in fighting
cybercrime 315; an analysis of criminal law provisions 316; procedural instruments317; and
regulations governing the responsibility of Internet service providers. 318
ITU has organized several regional conferences to specifically address, among other
things, the issue of cybercrime. 319It has equally, in partnership with the public and private
sectors developed cybersecurity/CIIP tools to assist Member States awareness campaign, selfassessments, revision of legislation and expanding watch, warning and incident-response
capabilities. Some of the tools include the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation, the
Understanding Cybercrime Guide, the ITU National Cybersecurity/CIIP Self-Assessment Tool
and the ITU Botnet Mitigation Toolkit. It has also adopted a number of cybercrime-related
resolutions. 320
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3.2.3 The Group of Eight (G8)
The Group of Eight (G8), for purposes of improving the implementation of the 40
recommendations adopted by G8 Heads of State in 1996, established five sub-groups, one of
which is a “Subcommittee on High-tech Crimes” in 1997, dealing with the fight against
cybercrime. 321 During their meeting in Washington DC, United States, the G8 Justice and
Home Affairs Ministers adopted ten Principles and a Ten-Point Action Plan to fight high-tech
crimes. 322 The Heads of the G8 subsequently endorsed these principles, which include:
a. There must be no safe havens for those who abuse information technologies.
b. Investigation and prosecution of international high-tech crimes must be coordinated among all
concerned states, regardless of where harm has occurred.
c. Law-enforcement personnel must be trained and equipped to address high-tech crimes.
In 1999, the G8 made specific plans for the fight against high-tech crimes at a
Ministerial Conference on Combating Transnational Organized Crimes in Moscow as specified
in the communiqué issued after the Conference. 323The communiqué contains several principles
in the fight against cybercrime that form part of the international and regional strategies.
The idea of a 24/7 network of contacts for transnational investigations which has been
adopted by a number of international platforms in the fight against cybercrime was first
developed under the umbrella of the G8 [Gercke, 2011] 324.
In 2000, during the G8 Conference in Paris, the G8 specifically addressed the topic of
cybercrime and called for action to prevent the existence of or destruction of lawless digital
havens. 325 In 2001, the G8 again met for a workshop in Tokyo and discussed procedural
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instruments in the fight against cybercrime 326. The workshop focused on implementation of
data-retention obligations and the use of data preservation as an alternative solution. 327
After the 2004 meeting of the G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, they took note
of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime which was to come into force on July 1,
2004and issued a communiqué in which they addressed the need for the creation of global
capacities in the fight against criminal uses of the Internet. 328
Again in 2006 when the G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers met in Moscow, they
discussed cybercrime and cyberspace related issues, particularly the need to improve effective
counter-measures by strengthening the instruments in the fight against cybercrime. 329
In the same year, the G8 Summit was held in Russia at the end of which they issued a
Declaration wherein they reaffirmed their “commitment to collaborative work, with our
international partners, to combat the terrorist threat”, including inter alia “effectively
countering attempts to misuse cyberspace for terrorist purposes, including incitement to
commit terrorist acts, to communicate and plan terrorist acts, as well as recruitment and training
of terrorists”. 330The issue of cyber-terrorism came up again during the 2007 meeting of the G8
Justice and Interior Ministers in Munich, Germany. An agreement was reached to criminalize
in no specific terms, the misuse of the Internet by terrorist groups. 331
Cybercrime again came up for discussion during the 2009 meeting of Justice and Home
Affairs Ministers in Rome, Italy. The final declaration called for the implementation of
directive to block websites, as updated and disseminated by international organizations, used
for child pornography. 332 With regard to cybercrime in general, the final declaration noted an
increasing threat of cybercrime; called for closer cooperation between law enforcement and
326
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service providers; and called for the strengthening of the G8 24/7 High-Tech Crime Points of
Contact. 333
In 2010, a brief discussion of cybercrime was done at the G8 Summit in Muskoka,
Canada. The Muskoka Declaration released after the Summit, raised concern about the growing
threat of cybercrime with regards to terrorism and called for intensity in the fight against
same. 334
At the e-G8 Forum in 2010, Cybercrime and Cybersecurity were both discussed at great
length 335 but surprisingly were left out of the final Declaration issued after the Summit. 336
3.2.4 The International Criminal Police Organization (The Interpol)
The Interpol is made up of 181 member states. It has its headquarter in Lyon, France
and has National Central Bureaus in various States through which it coordinates its activities.
Its mission, is to support law enforcement organizations throughout the world, in particular by
facilitating the exchange of information, coordinating joint operational activities of member
states, and developing and sharing expertise and best practices covering a wide range of
criminal offences. 337According to the Interpol Constitution, the aims of the organization are
“To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police
authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of
the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’” and “To establish and develop all institutions
likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes”. 338
When Interpol was formed back in 1923, it was known as International Criminal Police
Commission (ICPC) 339 and they did not have to tackle cybercrime with the novel challenges
associated with it. They had to fashion out a way of combining the old modus operandi with
the implementations of new different approaches so as to tackle cybercrime. They not only

Final Declaration of the 2009 G8 ministerial meeting of Justice and Home Affairs, Rome, p. 7, available from
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/declaration1giu2009,0.pdf.
334
G8
Summit
2010.Muskoka
Declaration,
available
from
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2010muskoka/communique.html.
335
Press
release
from
30.5.2011,
availablefrom
<http://www.eg8forum.com/en/documents/news/Final_press_release_May_30th.pdf>.
336
G8 Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, available from http://www.g20g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/renewed-commitment-for-freedom-anddemocracy.1314.html.
337
Interpol, What is Interpol, available from https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL
338
http://www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Legal-material/Reference-Documents/Constitution-and-GeneralRegulations
339
Deflem, International Police Co/operation — History of, in The Encyclopedia of Criminology, New York, 2005
pp. 795-798.
333

76

adapted, but also had to find methods of action within the limits of the laws existing in the
different countries.
Interpol leads the international approach against cybercrime by researching emerging
crimes, investigating the latest training techniques, and developing new policing tools. It
developed the National Central Reference Points for Computer-Related Crime which is
basically an early warning system between IT Crime Investigation units for purposes of
providing a secure and appropriate Interpol channels for utilization by specialized IT crime
investigation units and for exchange of information in minimum delays.340
Due to the transnational and international nature of cybercrime, the cooperation of
Interpol is especially needed to solve same. For purposes of this cooperation and collaboration,
all Interpol Member States hosts an Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB) which connects
their national law enforcement with other countries and with the General Secretariat of
Interpol. 341
A Cyber Fusion Centre was created to coordinate and facilitate transnational
cybercrime investigations and operations which involve intelligence sharing and providing
guidance on best practices in conducting cybercrime investigations. A secure and neutral
collaboration workspace for law enforcement & industry to share & develop cyber intelligence
to tackle cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime
Interpol’s General Secretariat has also supported the formation of regionally organized
working groups comprising local experts in computer-related crime who meet periodically to
share experiences and develop best practices 342. Interpol has also stressed financial and hightechnology crime as two of Interpol’s top five priorities (along with terrorism, drugs, organized
crime and people smuggling).
Another initiative set up by Interpol is the setting up of Global Complex for Innovation
(IGCI) in 2014. The IGCI is a global coordination body located in Singapore. IGCI’s main aim
is to be one step ahead of cyber-criminals by assisting in the detection and prevention of digital
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crimes by focusing on research and development. The IGCI combines global cyber-expertise
from law enforcement and key private sector partners worldwide. The setting up of IGCI was
inspired by the successful 2012 'sting' operation called Operation Unmask which resulted in
the arrest of individuals believed to be connected with the hacking collective Anonymous. 343
To tackle the increased cyber threats emanating from Southeast Asia, the Interpol
established the ASEAN Cyber Capability Desk in July 2018. However, in 2020, the ASEAN
Cyber Capability Desk was renamed as the ASEAN Cybercrime Operations Desk to better
reflect its functions and operational relevance to the ASEAN countries. 344 The Operations Desk
has coordinated a couple of successful operations including Operation Night Fury (2019-2020)
and Operation Goldfish Alpha (2019) 345
The organization has equally provided a range of training courses, targeted to the needs
of participants, covering topics such as emerging trends in cybercrime, investigation
techniques, digital forensics and more.
3.3 An Analysis of International Legal Frameworks on Cyber Security
3.3.1 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) 346, is the
only binding international instrument on cybercrime. Observer States even took active
participation in the drafting process. The Convention was opened for signature in November
2001. By August 2016, 49 States were Parties and a further 18 had signed it or been invited to
accede. These included from the African continent Mauritius (Party), Ghana (invited),
Morocco (invited), Senegal (invited) and South Africa (signed). 347
The Convention enjoys wide recognition as a decisive document on international best
practice and enjoys compliance even from non-signatory states. Consequently, most states,
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regional and even international organization rely on the principles expounded therein for
purposes of drafting model legislation and new international instrument on cybercrime. The
Convention is supplemented by an Additional Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism committed
through computer systems which was adopted in 2003 348. The Budapest Convention is the sole
substantive multilateral agreement that addresses cybercrime with convergent, harmonized
legislation and capability building. 349
The Budapest Convention basically requires Parties to (a) criminalize a series of
cybercrime (b) give procedural powers to criminal justice authorities to secure electronic
evidence in relation to any crime and (c) participate in effective international cooperation.
The Convention provides for various offences (even though not comprehensive) which
were broadly classified into the following 350:
a) Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems 351;
b) Computer-related offences 352;
c) Content-related offences 353;
d) Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights 354; and
e) Ancillary liability and sanctions 355.
Additional offences are created under the Additional Protocol. The Protocol makes the act
of using computer networks to publish xenophobic and racist propaganda, a punishable
offence.
Apart from the provisions on substantive offences, the convention makes provision for
international cooperation in Chapter III. The model upon which the Convention functions is
that of mutual information sharing and formal assistance. The essence of the model is lay down
procedure to seek and receive such assistance and to facilitate better law enforcement. The
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and
xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, European Treaty Series - No. 189, , available from
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800
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general principles under which the said cooperation and assistance can be sought is provided
for in Article 23 of the Convention as follows:
The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter,
and through the application of relevant international instruments on international cooperation
in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and
domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings
concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of
evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.
From the above provision, it is obvious that the cooperation and assistance provided for
in the Convention is dependent on pre-existing cooperative agreements between the parties.
Accordingly, the Convention complements multilateral and bilateral treaties already in
existence between parties 356. With respect to cooperation and assistance the Convention in
Article 27 provides for facilitation of mutual legal assistance (MLA) between parties where
such mutual arrangements does not exist.
The procedural provisions in the Convention describe in detail the powers that criminal
justice authorities may exercise in the investigation of the criminal offences against and by
means of computers established under the first pillar, but also when investigating any other
offences that may require computer evidence.
On procedural issues, provision is made in in Article 24 of the Convention for principles
and procedures related to extradition for criminal offences. These sections primarily aid formal
legal assistance between signatory parties to the Convention in case of a cybercrime.
Article 46 provides that:
The Parties shall, as appropriate, consult periodically with a view to facilitating:
(a)
The effective use and implementation of this Convention, including the identification
of any problems thereof, as well as the effects of any declaration or reservation made under
this Convention;
(b)
The exchange of information on significant legal, policy or technological developments
pertaining to cybercrime and the collection of evidence in electronic form;
(c)
Consideration of possible supplementation or amendment of the Convention.
Pursuant to the above, the Council of Europe set up the Cybercrime Convention
Committee (T-CY). The T-CY usually conducts biannual plenary where shortcomings,
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developments, objections and possible amendments of the Budapest Convention are
discussed. 357
The Budapest Convention is not without criticisms. It has been described as being
violative of the state sovereignty. Particular reference is made to Article 32 which provides
that:
A party may, without the authorization of another Party: (a) access publicly available (open
source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically; or (b)
access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in
another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the
lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.”
By virtue of the above provision, the police of one state are entitled to access servers
located in another state, even without approval from authorities of that other state. It equally
allows trans-border access to stored computer data either with permission from the system
owner (or service provider) or where publicly available. It is on the basis of this infringement
on state sovereignty that Russia refused to sign the Convention. 358. Nonetheless, the T-CY has
addressed and countered this allegation in its guidance note on Article 32 359.
The Convention has also been criticized for failing to protect rights of individuals and
states, and for being inadequate and non-sufficient in ensuring a safe cyberspace [Shalini,
2016]. 360 Another criticism is that the MLA provided for under the Convention was lengthy,
complex, practically inefficient and incompatible with modern investigation [Shalini, 2016].361
The Convention has also been criticized as being Euro-centric. In fact, India, China and
Brazil who hold this view, are of the opinion that a treaty negotiated by Europe has no inherent
application to non-European states and therefore refused to adopt the Convention. They hold
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onto this opinion despite the fact that non-European countries are party to the convention [Alex
2014]. 362India particularly refused to sign because the Convention was drafted without
consulting them 363 and because it believes that the Convention is insufficient to tackle
cybercrime [Pratap, 2013]. 364
Given these objections and complaints about the Budapest Convention which have
limited the number of persons who signed the Convention, the Convention is often criticized
for having a limited reach. There is therefore a demonstrable need for a unique, equitable and
all-encompassing Treaty/Convention, negotiated with active participation from all states that
governs cybercrime.
In September 2017, negotiation for a second Additional Protocol on enhanced
international cooperation and access to evidence in the cloud commenced. It is expected that it
will be available in 2021. 365This is perhaps a response to the criticism against the international
cooperation mechanism under the Convention.
3.3.2 The Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime
The need for a Model Law on Computer and Computer-Related Crime was first raised
during the 3-7 May 1999 meeting of Commonwealth Ministers in Port of Spain, Trinidad and
Tobago. 366The aim of which is to support Commonwealth countries in setting up a legal
framework for criminalization and investigation of computer and computer-related crimes. The
Ministers therefore gave the Commonwealth Secretariat the mandate to convene an expert
group to consider the content of a model law on computer and computer related crime. In view
of this, the Secretariat convened a meeting of an expert group who had their meeting in July
2000, with instruction to prepare drafting instructions for a model law on computer and
computer related crime. 367
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Based on the report of the expert group, a draft model law was prepared and submitted
to Senior Officials of Law Ministries at their meeting in London in November 2001. 368
A second meeting of the expert group was convened to consider submissions made
subsequently and also the changes made to the final Council of Europe Budapest Convention
on Cybercrime. In March 2002, the second meeting was held and a final draft was submitted
to Commonwealth Law Ministers at their meeting of 18-21 November 2002, held in
Kingstown, St Vincent and the Grenadines [Alex, 2014]. 369
The Law Ministers of the commonwealth approved the draft and recommended it for
use by Commonwealth States and directed the Senior Officials of the Commonwealth to keep
the Model Law under review to keep it up to date [Alex, 2014]. 370
The Model Law is divided into three Parts. Part I (sections 1-5) is the introductory part,
dealing with the objects of the Model Law 371, definitions of relevant terms 372 and jurisdiction
of the enacting state 373. Part II (sections 5-10) provides for offences. The offences provided for
include the following: illegal access 374, interfering with data 375, interfering with computer
system 376, illegal interception of data 377, etc, illegal devices 378 and child pornography 379.
Part III (sections 11-21) provides for procedural powers. This part started with
definition of relevant words in section 11 and then went to specifically provide for search and
seizure warrants 380, assisting police 381, record of and access to seized data 382, production of
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data 383, disclosure of stored traffic data 384, preservation of data 385, interception of electronic
communications 386, interception of traffic data 387, evidence 388 and Confidentiality and
limitation of liability 389.
3.3.3 The Draft International Convention to Enhance Protection from Cybercrime and
Terrorism
The Draft International Convention to Enhance Protection from Cyber Crime and
Terrorism was developed sequel to the conference hosted on December 6-7, 1999 at Stanford
University. The conference was co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution, the Consortium for
Research on Information Security and Policy (CRISP) and the Center for International Security
and Cooperation (CISAC). The representatives of States and NGOs, industry experts and
academia, who were part of the meeting, were of the unanimous view that there was need for
greater international cooperation and multilateral treaty to discuss the growing problem
of cybercrime and terrorism. 390
The Draft is designed to encourage universal recognition of basic offenses in
cyberspace and universal agreement to cooperate in investigating, extraditing, and prosecuting
perpetrators. The Draft contains the description of the conduct it covers, confirms in which
cases States have jurisdiction, and proposes an international Agency for Information
Infrastructure Protection (AIIP) which would serve as a formal framework in which interested
groups will cooperate in developing standards and practices concerning cybersecurity.
The Stanford Draft, even though it does not address State conduct, is designed to inspire
universal recognition of certain basic conducts in the cyberspace as offenses and universal
agreement to cooperate in investigating, extraditing, and prosecuting alleged offenders. Article
3 describes the conduct it covers, including: interfering with the function of a cyber-system,
cyber trespass, tampering with authentication systems, interfering with data, trafficking in
illegal cyber tools, using cyber systems to further offenses specified in certain other treaties
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and targeting critical infrastructures. The Draft then required all States Parties to agree to
punish these specified conducts. Article 3 avoided and omitted controversial issues such as
regulation of political, religious or ethical contents and protection of intellectual property so as
to achieve speedy agreement among nations. Article 2 which precedes Article 3 provides for
mode of implementation of treaty offenses in domestic law of signatory States.
Articles 6 and 11 of the Stanford Draft provides for mutual legal assistance and law
enforcement to enhance State Party cooperation in investigation. States Parties are required to
exchange information, render assistance in gathering and preserving evidence, arrest alleged
offenders, prosecute or extradite them, and to implement agreed international standards on law
enforcement and security.
Article 5 provides for how jurisdiction of States may be determined when offenses are
committed by establishing precedence in the following manner: where alleged offenders reside
at the time of commission of offence; where the conduct of offenders has substantial effects;
and the last being the dominant nationality of the alleged offender.
Article 7 provides for a prosecution or extradite obligation which is to be borne byall
States in which an alleged offender is present.
A proposal for an international Agency for Information Infrastructure Protection (AIIP)
was made in Article 12, to serve as a formal structure in which interested groups will cooperate
through experts in countries around the world in developing standards and practices concerning
cyber security. All States Parties are represented in the AIIP Assembly, which would adopt
objectives and policies consistent with the Convention, approve standards and practices for
cooperation, and approve technical assistance programs, among other responsibilities. The
AIIP Council, elected by the Assembly, would, among other duties, appoint committees to
study particular problems and recommend measures to the Assembly. 391
3.3.4 The Draft Code on Peace and Security in Cyberspace - A Global Protocol on
Cyber Security and Cybercrime
The essence of this code is to establish Crimes against peace and security in cyberspace
as crimes under international law through a Convention or Protocol [Stein & Solange, 2009,
p.i]. 392 This is borne out of concern that the technological developments in cyberspace have
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created new needs for cyber-security measures in protecting against criminal activity and the
need for strategies on the development of a Protocol for cyber-security and cybercrime that
may serve as a global model cyber-security and cybercrime legislation that is applicable and
interoperable with existing national and regional legislative measures [Stein & Solange, 2009,
p.3] 393
Article 1 of the Draft Code provides for measures in substantive criminal law; Article
2 provides for measures in procedural law: investigation and prosecution; Article 3 provides
for measures against terrorist misuse or use of internet; Article 4 provides for measures for the
global cooperation and exchange of information; lastly Article 5 provides for measures on
privacy and human rights.
3.4 Limits of International Responses and Legal Measures
3.4.1 Jurisdiction.
Cybercrime is borderless. A person may sit in the comfort of his office or home, or even
café, with a phone, tablet, laptop or desktop connected to the Internet and perform illegal
activities that have grave negative impacts thousands of kilometers away. This scenario has
been aptly expressed as “the ubiquity of information in modern communication systems makes
it irrelevant as to where perpetrators and victims of crimes are situated in terms of geography.
There is no need for the perpetrator or the victim of a crime to move or to meet in person.
Unlawful actions such as computer manipulations in one country can have direct, immediate
effects in the computer systems of another country....” [Ulrich 1999] 394
It is for this reason that jurisdictional boundaries based on geographical borders could
undermine international efforts to ensure safe cyber-space. Law enforcement experts share the
opinion that organized crime networks actively exploit existing jurisdictional boundaries in
their criminal business models to avoid detection and prosecution.
Already, anonymity is an impediment to the fight against cybercrime. Where that is
surmounted, one then faces the jurisdictional challenge. Where it is determined that a person
who has allegedly committed a cybercrime resides in a State other than that of the victim, the
court located in the same state as the victim cannot try the alleged offender due to lack of
Stein, S. and Solange, G. (2009). A Global Protocol on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime, (Oslo: E-dit, 2009), p.
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geographical jurisdiction geographically and also jurisdiction in rem. In this situation,
extradition may be recommended, but same is fraught with difficulties too, given that there
must be in existence extradition treaty or MLA treaty between the requesting state and the state
having custody of the alleged offender and there is need to scale the double criminality
requirement 395.
3.4.2 The Absence of a Global Treaty of all Nations on Cyber security
Calls for and attempts to have a cybercrime-specific treaty have been made without
success. The USA is not in support of this initiative as it feels that will limit its rich and
multifaceted cyber-interventions abroad.
The 2012 proposal by Russia to conclude a cybercrime treaty modeled on the Chemical
Weapons Convention did not succeed due to resistance from the US [Ido & Itamar 2016]. 396
Russia has constantly argued that the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is a regional treaty,
outdated, and violates principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. 397
In 2019, Russia tried again by pushing for the adoption of a cybercrime resolution that
will require the UN Secretary-General to collect countries’ views about cybercrime. It was
referred to the Third Committee who came up with a Draft. 398 The Assembly on 27 December,
2019, adopted the resolution- even though a number of major Western powers and human rights
groups opposed same- and the Third Committee draft — “Countering the use of information
and communications technologies for criminal purposes”. 399 In doing so, it decided to establish
an open-ended ad hoc intergovernmental committee of experts to elaborate a comprehensive
international convention on that subject [Joyce & Allison 2020]. 400 The committee of experts
was slated to meet in August 2020 to discuss the proposed convention.
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While the Russian proposal is bedeviled with many objectionable points, it is important
to have a global treaty on cybercrime; otherwise, safe-havens may be created for cybercriminals. The only existing international convention on cybercrime (Budapest Convention)
has been ratified or acceded to by only sixty-four States. The implication is that the States that
are yet to ratify same are not bound. Even those who have ratified must rely on MLA and the
one provided for under the Convention has been criticized for being lengthy, complex,
practically inefficient and incompatible with modern investigation [Kier 2012, p. 67]. 401
3.4.3 Digital Evidence in Prosecution
Physical evidence is rarely used in the course of prosecuting cybercrime. Prosecutors
rely on digital footprints i.e. traces left on the Internet by users, but these type of evidence are
delicate and vulnerable to damage as even an attempt to examine same can lead to
contamination or destruction. This usually happens when a cybercriminal sets his computer to
self-destruct if an attempt is made to access the data. They have little evidential value and are
hardly relied on by courts to ground conviction in cybercrime (which is a criminal offence
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt.
These digital footprints are a representation of sound or light waves interpreted as
numbers, usually in the binary system. In other words, they are a collection of ones and zeros
represented by magnetization, light pulses, radio signals or other means. The nature of this
evidence makes it very prone to manipulation and alteration. It is for this reason that the
evidence has been ascribed little or no evidential value and are sometimes not admissible.
In addition to the above admissibility challenge, digital evidence for prosecution of
cybercrime can easily be destroyed by cybercriminals to escape the arm of law. Cybercriminals
are equally capable of manipulating digital footprint to steer off investigation which most times
lead to arrest of innocent persons whose identity may have been stolen.
When persons alleged to have committed cybercrimes are charged, the aim is to obtain
conviction and the means of obtaining the conviction is by leading credible and cogent
evidence in court. The nature of digital evidence may make this impossible. Even if there is a
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global convention on cybercrime ratified by all States, until the digital evidence challenge is
surmounted, the efforts to fight cybercrime will continue to suffer serious drawback.
3.4.4 Lack of consensus
Lack of consensus among States on the definition [Wall, 2004, pp.20-21] 402 and
criminalization of cybercrime limits international efforts against cybercrime. A cybercriminal
may stay in jurisdiction A and commit a cybercrime in jurisdiction B and if the definition and
criminalization of cybercrime differs in both jurisdictions, then it will be difficult to prosecute
the alleged offender. For instance, the State in which the alleged offender is present may not
have criminalized the said conduct, thus failing the double criminality requirement [Russel,
2004, p.84] 403.
On the other hand, it may have criminalized it as a minor offence punished with less
than the minimum sanctions for international cooperation [Aldo &Darje, 2013, p.328]. 404
Criminals may fully exploit this

and focus their activities on the most tolerant legal

systems regarded as safe havens 405. It is for this reason that a resident of the Philippines who
created and distributed the "LOVE BUG" computer virus could not be prosecuted despite the
adverse negative effects of the virus. As at the time he created and distributed the Philippines
had no cybercrime law [Marie-Helen, 2014] 406.
3.4.5 Lack of International Cooperation
International cooperation is fundamental in the fight against cybercrime. Unfortunately,
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), the main instrument for international law enforcement
cooperation between member states in the fight against cybercrime is slow (which is
incompatible with time-sensitive issue of cybercrime) and fraught with other challenges. Note
must be taken however of the fact that international cooperation is facilitated by bilateral,
regional, and multilateral cybercrime treaties. Commonwealth of Independent States'
Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information of 2001
includes several articles dedicated to international cooperation (Articles 5-7). The Budapest
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Convention also has provisions on international cooperation. Furthermore, Articles 32 and 34
of the League of Arab States' Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology
Offences of 2010 include provisions on mutual assistance, procedures for cooperation, and
mutual assistance requests. The African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal
Data Protection of 2014, Article 28 includes provisions on harmonization, mutual legal
assistance on cybercrime matters, and information exchange. However, these usually require
the existence of dual criminality, the absence of which hampers the process.
There are, however, exceptions to the dual criminality requirement. For instance,
Article 29 (3) of the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime of 2001 does not require
dual criminality for the "expedited preservation of stored computer data" "by means of a
computer system, located within the territory of that other Party and in respect of which the
requesting Party intends to submit a request for mutual assistance for the search or similar
access, seizure or similar securing, or disclosure of the data" for the substantive offences
included in this Convention 407.
The differences in legal systems and frameworks require early coordination and
involvement of judicial authorities, with a clear need to streamline the MLA process wherever
possible, but this is rarely done due to poor desire to cooperate. Accordingly, a better
mechanism for cross-border communication and the exchange of information for the purpose
of investigation, prevention and protection is clearly needed; otherwise, the fight against
cybercrime will continue to suffer drawbacks. In other words, if the current differences in legal
frameworks and ineffective international cooperation are not remedied, we may be simply
taking one step forward and two backward and end creating safe havens.
Another challenge to the achievement of international cooperation is violation
international human rights obligations 408. A state may reject a request for international
cooperation if the request will result in violations of international human rights obligations.
Another challenge to international cooperation lies with non-existent or poor
implementation of extradition treaties. The existence of an extradition treaty is not a guarantee
that a person will be extradited to the requesting country. This was observed in the case of
See Articles 2 through 11 for the said offences.
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Lauri Love, a British hacker, whose extradition to the United States was denied despite the
existence of the UK-US Extradition Treaty of 2003 [Simon, 2017] 409.
3.4.6

National Implementation
International law, whose mechanisms have long been identified as being slow in

addressing a phenomenon like cybercrime that changes constantly [Peter, 2004, pp. 10-11]410,
requires that states ratify treaties and implement them into national legislation. There is already
the challenge of getting an international treaty owing to the lengthiness of negotiations, the
need to reach consensus, and procedures for signature and ratification 411. The implementation
phase is of crucial importance for establishing a common approach to the issue of cybercrime
[Miquelon-Weismann, 2005] 412.
In a study carried out by Calderoni 413 on implementation of implementation of
European legal framework on cybercrime, he found as follows:
The current level of implementation of the European legal framework on cybercrime shows
several inconsistencies. These relate more likely to the security, political, economic and
reputational factors in the implementation of international measures rather than to their legal
enforceability. At present, the EU action does not show a significant added value. This is
confirmed by the problems in the implementation of the FD. The Treaty of Lisbon and the
Stockholm Programme will bring some changes to this situation, but they are not likely to entail
radical changes in the short term. Nevertheless, it is possible that in the long run they will
stimulate a better implementation of the legal consequences of cybercrime; it is legitimate to
wonder whether the current European legal framework will still be of any relevance once these
changes will eventually become applicable. 414
The Budapest Convention has achieved a somewhat reputation as the grundnorm of
cybercrime legislation/treaty to which every other one must conform to. Despite its wide reach,
Simon, P. (8 September 2017). Keyboard Warrior: the British Hacker Fighting for his Life. The Guardian.
Peter, C. The Council of Europe Convention on cyber-crime: A response to the challenge of the new age?, in
Giovanni, I., Gianfranco, M. (2004). Cybercrime: Conferenzainternazionale. La Convenzione del
Consigliod'EuropasullaCriminalitàInformatico,. (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004) pp. 3- 29 at 10-11.
411
Amalie M. W. (2003) The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. Berkeley Technology Law Journal,
vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 425-46 at p. 443; XinganLi. (2007). International Actions against Cybercrime: Netwroking
Legal Systems in the Networked Crime Scene. Webology, Vol. 46, no. 3.
412
Miquelon-Weismann, F. M. (2005). The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized Implementation of
International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process?.John Marshall Journal of Computer &
Information Law, vol. 23, no. 2 , 329-61 at 353.
413
Francesco, C. (2014).The European Legal Framework on Cybercrime: Striving for an Effective
Implementation,
Researchgate.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227301292_The_European_legal_framework_on_cybercrime_Stri
ving_for_an_effective_implementation
414
Francesco, C. (2014).The European Legal Framework on Cybercrime: Striving for an Effective
p.
16
Implementation,
Researchgate,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227301292_The_European_legal_framework_on_cybercrime_Stri
ving_for_an_effective_implementation.
409
410

91

it still suffers the above challenges to implementation. One can only imagine what the case is
with other legal framework.
3.5 International Regional Responses to Cyber Security
3.5.1 African Union (AU)
The African Union commenced the development of a legal framework on cybercrime
in 2008, which is quite late when compared with its European counterpart. 415 This delay may
be linked to the late and low penetration of ICTs in Africa. The 2008 AU Draft Report on
a Study of the Harmonization of Telecommunication, and Information Communication
Technology Policies and Regulation is perhaps AU’s first statements on the need to promote
cyber-security 416.The Report emphasized that there was need to establish a harmonized policy
and regulatory framework on cybersecurity for Africa. 417
Subsequently, the AU Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information
Technologies, on 5th day of November, 2009, convened an Extraordinary Session in
Johannesburg, South Africa, where Oliver Tambo Declaration was adopted. 418The Declaration
directed the African Union to:
“Jointly develop with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), under
the framework of the African Information Society Initiative, a Convention on cyber legislation
based on the continent’s needs and which adheres to the legal and regulatory requirements on
electronic transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection”. 419
The Declaration also recommended that AU Member States should adopt the proposed
Convention by 2012. 420
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The 2011 Draft Convention for the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for
Cybersecurity in Africa which seeks to harmonize the legal framework of member-states on
date protection, cybercrime, electronic commerce and cyber-security, was the outcome of the
efforts of the UNECA and AU. 421
The Draft Convention was afterwards adopted 422in June, 2012, during the meeting of
the AU Expert Group on Cyber-security in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 423 Further approval was
given to the Draft during the 22nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council in January,
2013. Subsequently, it was presented to the AU Justice Ministers Conference for legal
validation. 424
The Draft Convention was scheduled for a final adoption in January 2014, but due to
technical delay [Rosewarne & Odunfa, 2014, p. 40] 425, and opposition from academia and civil
society groups[Van Zyl, 2014] 426, a revised version was finally presented and adopted in June
2014 during the 23rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in Malabo [Orji, 2014, pp.129135]. 427The concerns raised were that the Draft Convention was drafted without consulting
widely with the relevant stakeholders in Member-States, 428 and that the draft is devoid of
critical cyber-security governance mechanisms to enable effective international cooperation
and legal harmonization. 429
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Unfortunately, four years after the adoption of the AU Convention on Cyber Security
and Personal Data Protection 430out of 55 AU States 431, only 10States have signed, and only
one state has ratified it. 432
3.5.2

European Union (EU)
The European Union (EU) has over the years developed several legal instruments

addressing aspects of cybercrime. Even though those legal instruments are in general only
binding for the 27 Member States, several countries and regions are using the EU standards as
a reference point in their national and regional discussions on harmonization of legislation. 433
The Treaty of Lisbon on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which came
into force in December 2009 gave the EU mandate in the field of computer crime. 434 Arts. 82
to 86 of the Treaty provide the EU with a mandate for harmonizing criminal law legislation.
Computer crime (a term which is broader than cybercrime) is specifically mentioned as one of
the relevant areas of crime in Art. 83, paragraph 1. Pursuant to Art. 4, paragraph 2(j), the
development of computer-crime legislation falls under shared competence between the EU and
Member States. Pursuant to Art. 9 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, instruments that
have been adopted prior to the fundamental changes in the structure of the EU, remain in force.
As far back as 1996, the EU was already addressing internet-related matters and the
risks associated thereto. 435 In the same 1996, it highlighted the importance of cooperation
between Member States to combat illegal content online 436. In 1999, the European Parliament
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and the Council adopted a self-regulation styled action plan on promoting safer use of the
Internet and combating illegal and harmful content on global networks. 437
Fast forward to 2001, the European Commission (EC) had to address the problem of
cybercrime and point out the importance of effective action to deal with threats to the
availability, integrity, and dependability of information systems and networks. It did this in a
published Communication titled “Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the
Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime”. 438Later in
2001, the European Commission published a communication on “Network and Information
Security” 439wherein it analyzed the problems in network security and drafted a strategic outline
for action in this area.
The European Commission in 2007 published a communication on a general policy on
the fight against cybercrime, 440wherein it summarized the current situation and emphasized
how important the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is, especially given its status
as the predominant international instrument in the fight against cybercrime. The
Communication lists the following issues as the areas of focus of the EC:
a. Strengthening international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime
b. Better coordinated financial support for training activities
c. The organization of a meeting of law-enforcement experts
d. Strengthening the dialogue with industry
e. Monitoring the evolving threats of cybercrime to evaluate the need for further legislation.
In 2000, the EC issued the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 441which addresses,
inter alia, the liability of Internet service provider (ISP) for acts committed by third parties 442.
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The Directive indicates that there is no intention to harmonize the field of criminal, as such; it
does also regulate liability under criminal law. 443
On the issue of cyber child pornography, the EC in 2000 issued the Council Decision
to combat child pornography on the Internet (1999) a Communication as a sequel to the 1996
communication on illegal and harmful content on the Internet 444 and the related 1999 action
plan on promoting safer use of the Internet and combating illegal and harmful content on global
networks. 445Nevertheless, the Decision makes no provision for an obligation on member-states
to adopt specific criminal law provisions.
The first EU legal framework that directly addresses aspects of cybercrime was adopted
in 2001. 446The Council Framework Decision contains obligations to harmonize criminal law
legislation with regard to specific aspects of computer-related fraud and the production of
instruments, such as computer programs, that are specifically adopted for the purpose of
committing an offence mentioned in the Framework Decision. 447
A second Framework proposed 448 and a revised version adopted in 2005. This one is
framework decision on attacks against information systems. It was modified and adopted by
the Council in 2005.449This Framework takes note of the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime, 450but its focus was harmonization of substantive criminal law on protection of
infrastructure elements and highlights the lacuna and differences in the legal frameworks of the
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Member States and effective police and judicial cooperation in the area of attacks against
information systems. 451
In the same 2005, the EC adopted the EU Data Retention Directive 452, containing an
obligation for independent service providers to store certain traffic data that are necessary for
the identification of criminal offenders in cyberspace. Concerns have however been raised on
the likelihood of the implementation of the Directive leading to breach of fundamental rights.453
The EU in 2007 started the process of amending the Framework Decision on Combating
Terrorism European. 454The essence of the amendment sought was to criminalize the
dissemination of terrorist expertise through the internet and thereby take measures to close the
gap and bring the legislation throughout the EU closer to the Council of Europe Convention on
the Prevention of Terrorism. 455
In 2010,a proposal for a Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography was made. 456The aim is to make it harder for
persons to use the ICT to produce and distribute child pornography 457 and use the Draft
Directive as a means of implementing international standards, such as the Council of Europe
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. 458The
draft Directive proposes the criminalization of obtaining access to child pornography by means
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of information and communication technology 459and assists Member States in implementing
the process of blocking
In September 2010, the European Union presented a proposal for a Directive on attacks
against information systems. 460 The aim of this was to update and strengthen the legal
framework to fight cybercrime in the European Union by responding to new methods of
committing crimes. 461 In addition to the criminalization of illegal access (Art. 3), illegal system
interference (Art. 4) and illegal data interference (Art. 5) already introduced by the 2005
Framework Decision, the 2010 draft Directive contains two additional offences in Draft
Articles 6 and 7.
3.5.3

The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a group of 21 Pacific Rim countries

dealing with the improvement of economic and political ties. APEC has never provided a legal
framework on cybercrime, but has identified cybercrime as an important field of activity,
referred to international standards such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and have
called for closer cooperation among officials involved in the fight against cybercrime. 462 The
Declaration of the 2008 meeting of the APEC Telecommunication and Information Ministers
in Bangkok, Thailand, highlighted the importance of continuing collaboration to combat
cybercrime. 463 In addition, APEC has closely studied the national cybercrime legislation in
various countries 464 under a cybercrime legislation survey, and has developed a database of
approaches to assist economies in developing and reviewing legislation. 465
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In 2002, APEC leaders released a Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting
Growth to enact comprehensive laws relating to cybercrime and develop national cybercrime
investigating capabilities. 466 They made a commitment to enact a comprehensive cybercrime
and cyber-security laws in line with the prevailing international legal instruments, including
but not limited to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/63 and the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime, by October 2003.
APEC has equally organized a number of conferences 467 and equally called for closer
cooperation among officials involved in the fight against cybercrime. 468 In 2005, it specifically
organized a Conference on Cybercrime Legislation to inter alia promote the development of
comprehensive legal frameworks on cybercrime and cybersecurity. 469
3.5.4

The Organization of American States (OAS)
The Organization of American States (OAS) started taking note of cybercrime issues

within its region in 1999. The Ministers of Justice or Ministers or Attorneys General of the
Americas (REMJA) have inter alia held a couple of meeting within its mandate and scope with
respect to cybercrime. 470 It was in that same year when they met for the second time that they
made a recommendation for the establishment of an intergovernmental expert group on
cybercrime. The expert group was given the following mandates:
a. Complete a diagnosis of criminal activity which targets computers and information, or which
uses computers as the means of committing an offense;
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b. Complete a diagnosis of national legislation, policies and practices regarding such activity;
c. Identify national and international entities with relevant expertise; and
d. Identify mechanisms of cooperation within the inter-American system to combat
cybercrime. 471
During the 2000 meeting of REMJA, the issue of cybercrime was addressed and some
recommendations were agreed on. 472 These recommendations included to consider the
recommendations made by the Group of Governmental Experts at its initial meeting as the
REMJA contribution to the development of the Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to
Cybersecurity, referred to in OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 1939 /XXXIIIO/03. Another recommendation made at the meeting was that Member States were urged to
review mechanisms to facilitate efficient and broad cooperation among themselves to combat
cybercrime and to as far as practicable, study the development of legal and technical capacity
to join the 24/7 Network established by the G8 to assist in cybercrime investigations. Member
States were equally urged to consider acceding and ratifying the Council of Europe Convention
on Cybercrime and/or consider implementing the principles contained therein where they
cannot accede.
The intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime earlier set concluded their report and
submitted same to Special Group on Justice of the Permanent Council for possible presentation
to and consideration by the Third Meeting of Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys
General of the Americas. The following recommendations inter alia were made:
1. That states still lacking legislation covering cybercrime take steps to fill that gap.
2. That member states be requested to make every effort to harmonize their laws on cybercrime
in such a way as to facilitate international cooperation in preventing and combating these illicit
activities.
3. That member states determine their training needs in the area of cybercrime and explore
bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms to meet those needs.
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4. That states consider the possibility of becoming members of the 24-Hour/7-Day a Week Point
of Contact Group, or participating in other existing mechanisms for cooperation or the
exchange of information in order to initiate or receive information.
In addition, the Working Group of Governmental Experts on cybercrime recommended
that training be provided in the management of electronic evidence and that a training
programme be developed to facilitate states link-up to the 24 hour/7 day emergency network
established by the G8 to help conduct cybercrime investigations. Pursuant to such
recommendation, three OAS regional technical workshops were held during 2006 and 2007,
the first being offered by Brazil and the United States, and the second and third by the United
States. 473
The recommendations were adopted by REMJA-III.
At the end of the fourth meeting of REMJA in 2002, it was recommended that, the
Group of Governmental Experts 474 on cybercrime be reconvened and mandated to follow up
on implementation of the recommendations made by expert group which were adopted by
REMJA-III, and consider the preparation of pertinent inter-American legal instruments and
model legislation for the purpose of strengthening cooperation in combating cybercrime.
After REMJA-VI, one of the recommendations made was to strengthen cooperation
with the Council of Europe so that the OAS Member States can give consideration to applying
the principles of the Convention on Cybercrime and to adhering thereto, and to adopting the
legal and other measures required for its implementation. 475 Similarly, the meeting
recommended that efforts should continue to strengthen mechanisms for exchange of
information and cooperation with other international organizations and agencies in the area of
cybercrime. These recommendations were reiterated at the 2008 meeting 476.
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Lastly, the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), the secretariats
of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Working Group on
Cybercrime were requested to continue developing permanent coordination and cooperation
mechanisms for implementation of the Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy
adopted through OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04).
Cybercrime was once again discussed in 2010 at REMJA-VIII. 477They briefly
discussed the importance of continuing to consolidate and update the Inter American Portal for
Cooperation in Cybercrime through the OAS Internet page, and strengthening states’ capacity
to develop legislation and procedural measures related to cybercrime and electronic evidence.
3.5.5

The Association of South-East Asian Relations (ASEAN)
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 478 was established on August 8,

1967, in Bangkok, Thailand. The Declaration establishing it was originally signed by the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from five countries: Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Thailand but the ASEAN Charter entered into force on December 15, 2008.
ASEAN has provided a limited pan-Asian approach, but it does form a basis for
developing a wider regional forum for considering matters of mutual legal assistance
[Broadhurst, 2006]. 479 Its approach, even given the developing nature of the region, emulates
that of the European Union. The action plan of the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations
in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) was endorsed in October 2000 in partnership
with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP). This endorsement illustrates the
quickening of MLA responses to transnational crime such as cyber-crime. ASEAN has held
ministerial meetings on problems of transnational crime four times 480. These meetings oversee
the work of the Annual Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime and consider the
deliberations of meetings of the ASEAN National Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL) and their
cooperative efforts to combat transnational crime.
The declaration issued after 1997 First ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime
outlined a variety of measures aimed at enhancing regional coordination and cooperation in
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transnational criminal matters. At the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational
Crime (held in Myanmar in 1999), ASEAN ministers issued another ambitious communiqué
outlining a broad plan of action to tackle organized transnational crime.
During the Third and Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in
Singapore (2001) and Bagkok (2003) respectively, the theme of greater cooperation was
reiterated but reference was then specifically made to commitment to collaborate further in the
battle against computer-related crime 481.
On October 8, 2003, A Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEANChina Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity was signed, in Bali, Indonesia. The
Declaration provided for a mechanism for the parties to formulate cooperative and emergency
response procedures for purposes of maintaining and enhancing cybersecurity, and preventing
and combating cybercrime.
In July 2006, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) released a statement which
emphasized the belief that an effective fight against cyberattacks and terrorist misuse of
cyberspace requires increased, rapid and well-functioning legal and other forms of cooperation.
ARF participating states and organization who have not enacted or implemented cybercrime
and cybersecurity laws were urged to do so in accordance with their national conditions
relevant international instruments, including the ten recommendations made in the UN General
Assembly Resolution 55/63 on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies.
In November 2007, during the meeting of the Ministers of ASEAN member countries
and China, with responsibility for cooperation in combating transnational crime, met in Brunei,
an agreement was reached that given the emerging challenges and increasing scope of
international crime cooperation, the ASEAN_China Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
needed to be reviewed and revised accordingly.
On the 17th day of November, 2009, the 7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime was held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, and a declaration was issued to the
effect that further effort is needed to strengthen regional cooperation in combating transnational

see Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime issued on October
11, 2001 in Singapore: available from http://www.aseansec.or.id/5621.htm
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crime and that they totally welcomed the signing of revised ASEAN-China Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU.
The 8th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime was held in Bali,
Indonesia, on October 10-11, 2011, to consolidate and further strengthen regional cooperation
in combating transnational crimes. The Ministers noted that cybercrime has been growing so
rapidly, and that they should step up efforts and cooperation in fighting those crimes. 482
A Working Group on Cybercrime was set up during the 9th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting on Transnational Crime was held in Vientiane, Laos, on 17 September 2013,
established. The ASEAN Working Group on Cybercrime (WG on CC) was adopted at a
meeting in Singapore on May 27, 2014. The scope of the WG on CC was as follows:
a. To facilitate information sharing on cybercrime related issues such as trends, best practices,
and new techniques and tools;
b. To establish regular points of contact for cybercrime cooperation;
c. To develop capability building and training initiatives;
d. To identify critical areas for collaboration within the ASEAN Member States and with
Dialogue Partners, on cybercrime;
e. To explore possible collaboration with strategic private sector partners;
On 28 September 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the agreed Work Programme to
Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes was adopted during
the Preparatory SOMTC for the 10th AMMTC, particularly on cybercrime components such
as information exchange, regulatory and legal matters, law enforcements, capacity building,
and extra-regional cooperation.
During the 11th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) on
26 July 2017, The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (2016-2025)was
adopted. Member States agreed to continue to cooperate closely in their efforts to prevent and
combat cybercrime and other stated crimes.
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On November 13, 2017, in Manila, the Heads of States of ASEAN adopted the ASEAN
Declaration to Prevent and Combat Cybercrime. The purpose of the Declaration was to
strengthen the commitment of ASEAN Member States to cooperation at the regional level in
the prevention and combating of cybercrime [Stein, 2018, p.31]. 483
3.5.6 The Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council
The League of Arab States consists of twenty-two independent Arab States. Six
countries signed the agreement in Cairo on March 22, 1945 but 16 more countries have joined
the organization [Stein, 2018, p. 36]. 484
In order to harmonize legislation in the Arabic region, UAE in 2007 submitted model
legislation to the Arab League (Guiding Law to Fight IT Crime). 485
On the 21st day of December, 2010, The League of Arab States Convention on
Information Technology Offences was adopted in Cairo, Egypt. This Convention seeks to
protect the Arab society against information technology by providing for a common criminal
policy The Convention equally makes provision on procedural law, jurisdiction, and Mutual
Legal Assistance.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recommended at a conference in 2007 that the
GCC countries seek a joint approach that takes into consideration international standards.
Subsequently the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) developed a model law for combating
cybercrime.
3.5.7

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The height of the ECOWAS effort in the fight against cybercrime is the August 2011

adoption of the Directive C/DIR.1/08/11 on Fighting Cybercrime at the ECOWAS Council of
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Ministers Sixty Sixth Ordinary session at Abuja. 486 The Directive requires Member States to
criminalize cybercrime 487.
The main aim of the Directive is to “adapt the substantive criminal law and the criminal
procedures of ECOWAS member states to address the cybercrime phenomenon”. It includes
provisions on: types of cybercrimes 488, sanctions and rules of procedures.
The Directive also establishes a framework to facilitate international cooperation on
cyber security. In this respect, article 33(1) of the Directive provides that:
“Where Member States are informed by another Member State of the alleged commission of
an offence as defined under the Directive, such Member States “shall cooperate in the search
for and establishment of that offence, as well as in the collection of evidence pertaining to the
offence”. 489
The Directive further provides that “such cooperation shall be carried out in line with relevant
international instruments and mechanisms on international cooperation in criminal matters”490.
The ECOWAS legal framework on international cooperation which applies in this instance are:
the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 491 and the ECOWAS
Convention on Extradition. 492
Within the framework of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
regardless of the absence of an applicable bilateral mutual assistance agreement between the
requesting and requested Member States, every ECOWAS Member State has an obligation to
render mutual assistance to all other ECOWAS States where such assistance is requested with
respect an offence that constitutes a crime in both the requesting and requested Member
States 493,.
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The ECOWAS Convention on Extradition on its part requires Member States to render
extradition requests on the basis of dual criminality regardless of the absence of a bilateral
extradition treaty between the requesting and requested Member States [Orji, 2015]. 494
ECOWAS has established other rules for cross – border cooperation and technical
assistance which could be used by Member States to render mutual assistance on cybercrime
issues. 495
In addition to the above, workshops, conference and seminars have been organized by
ECOWAS to build the capacity of member states on the fight against cybercrime. 496
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter carefully highlighted the efforts done internationally and regionally to enhance
cybersecurity. However, these efforts are not without its limits as was discussed above, which
make it practically difficult to apply the laws. It has not achieved the aim of why it was created.
The international legislations to enhance cybersecurity are disharmonized that it does not
achieve its aims and objectives. It is the dissertation’s observation that these legislations are
not properly put in place to enhance cybersecurity. The need for a global treaty on cybersecurity
cannot be overemphasized with the increasing interconnectivity of countries and national
critical infrastructures in the global network society. The world has leaped into an age where
each nation’s security and prosperity is increasingly dependent on the actions of the other
nations of the world. Apart from the laws that regulate cybercrime in the UN and international
Africa region, there are various efforts in select jurisdictions that have made attempt to tackle
cybercrime. These jurisdictions and efforts made by them will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4.1. Introduction
The most critical challenges of the information society have been the security of digital
data and information systems and the prevention of the malicious misuse of information
communications technologies by criminals, terrorist groups, or state actors [Orji, 2012, p.
viii] 497. The developments in the criminal use of information communications technologies
continues to race ahead of the ability of regulatory frameworks to keep up with robust legal
frameworks, nevertheless, nations of the world are not resting on their laurels to ensure that the
growth in technology does not herald the end of human life. A detailed analysis of international
legislations and responses on cybercrime has been attempted in the preceding chapter of this
study. This chapter becomes pertinent in aiding readers and researches alike in appreciating the
strides that the world’s developed and most technologically advanced nations as well as some
developing nations are taking to end cybercrime and ultimately achieve cyber security.
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This chapter attempts to examine the legislative, institutional, and policy responses of
some developed and technologically advanced countries as well as developing countries to
cybercrime and cyber security. In this regard, the chapter examines responses to cybercrime
and cyber security in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, United Arab Emirates,
and Nigeria. It also looks at some of the major challenges that hinder cyber security governance
in Nigeria while drawing lessons from these select developed and developing nations.
In the USA for example, the issue of cybercrime and cyber security is both a federal
and state concern; this is the case with all the nations which will be discussed in this chapter
[Orji, 2012, p. viii] 498. The issue however, is that while some states in these countries have
made commendable progress in putting in place legal and regulatory frameworks to combat
cybercrime, the same cannot be said of the other states which invariably put the entire nation
at a slow pace in its fight against cybercrime. Asides from the issue of narrow legislative
measures in these nations, some of these nations have their cybercrime legislations and policies
to be sector-specific too. In the USA for example, the finance and communications sector are
the major victims of cybercrime and this is plausible considering the amount of data which
both sector deals with. Progressively, majority of its laws on cybercrime target these areas. A
good example is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1990.The discussion on the legal and regulatory
mechanism as well as policies in the US on cybercrime will focus on the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act; Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (The
CAN – SPAM Act); the Unlawful Access to Stored Communication Act; Identity Theft Act;
Access Device Fraud Act; the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; the Wiretap Act; the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act; the Federal Information Security Management Act;
and the Cyber Security Research and Development Act. Institutional Regulatory Mechanisms
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will include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). Policy Mechanism will include the National Strategy
to Secure Cyberspace; the Comprehensive National Cyber security Initiative (CNCI) and the
Cyberspace Policy Review; The United States International Strategy for Cyberspace.
This chapter will give detailed analysis of the following legislative, institutional and
policy framework respectively, in the UK: the Computer Misuse Act; the Terrorism Act;
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; the UK Computer Emergency Response Team
(GovCertUK); the National Cyber Security Centre; the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and
the Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.
The People’s Republic of China has recorded laudable growth in technology and its use
in recent times [Orji, 2012, p. viii] 499. Incidentally, there have been high cases of cybercrime
in the nation and as such legislative measures are being taken to ensure that the nation does not
slip into a technological nightmare. This chapter will analyze the following robust legislation,
institutional regulatory mechanisms and policies in the people’s Republic of China: the
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China; the Cyber Security Law of the People’s
Republic of China; the Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
Management Regulations; the Chinese Regulations on Safeguarding Computer Information
Systems; and the State Secrecy Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems on
the Internet.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has the most detailed and comprehensive cyber-crime
law in the Arabian Gulf and wider Middle East. The specific legal framework regulating cyber
crime is the Federal Decree Law Number 5/2012. Institutional Regulatory mechanisms include
the CERT; UAE Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) and the NESA (National
Electronic Security Authority). Policy Mechanism on Cyber crime in the Nation is the Standard
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Information Security Policy (SISP) which incorporates diverse sub policies to ensure cyber
security.
Nigeria has come a long way in the development of technology and the incident security
of its cyber space. Asides from the provisions contained in the Criminal Code Act 500 which
criminalizes the commission of any form of crime irrespective of what means is adopted to
commit such crime, a discussion here will include: the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commissions Act; the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act; the Money
Laundering Act; the Criminal Code Act; Evidence Act; Cybercrime Act; the Nigerian
Communications Act; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission; the Nigerian Cybercrime
Working Group (NCWG); the National Information Technology Development Agency; the
National Cyber Security Policy; the Computer Security and Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection Bill; The Nigerian Cyber security and Data Protection Agency Bill.
At the end of this Chapter, an in dept understanding of the legal, regulatory and policy
framework on cybercrime and cyber security in the select countries would havebeen achieved.
The technological issues or problems which precede these laws will also be fully discussed as
well as responses which could be gotten from these countries to strengthen cybercrime
legislations in other developing countries.

4.2. The United States of America
As far back as the 1900s, law enforcement agencies in the United States of America
had begun to face problems connected with cybercrime [Jarret & Bailie, 2019] 501. Although
the United States has always been multiple steps ahead in putting in place laws to regulate
futuristic circumstances and issues, the exponential increase in the use of the internet in the
Criminal Code Act, Cap C38 LFN 2004.
Jarret, M.H, Bailie, M.W. (2019). Prosecuting Computer Crimes.Office of Legal Education Executive Office
for United States Attorneys <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf>
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State, its resultant use to commit crimes and the lack of expertise and technological know-how
of the law enforcement agencies made it difficult to fashion out regulatory responses against
cybercrime, immediately [McNicholas &Angle, 2021] 502. Progressively, the need to put in
place specific and comprehensive legal and policy frameworks to tackle the use of computers
to commit crimes became pertinent. In this light, the United States passed diverse federal laws.
These US national laws are discussed below.
4.2.1. Legal Framework
4.2.1.1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 503 (CFAA)
The CFAA was enacted by the Congress in 1986 as the first specific law to tackle the
issue of cybercrime in the United States 504. Doyle [2020] notes that the Act is a federal cyber
security framework that protects federal computers and other computers connected to the
internet from trespass, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as
instruments of fraud 505. The Act is not broad in scope and as such its aim is to fill the cracks
and loopholes which have been created in other federal laws in the nation as it relates to cyber
security 506.
The offences provided for by the Act include obtaining national security information,507
accessing a computer and obtaining information without consent, 508 trespassing in a
government computer, 509 accessing a computer to defraud and obtain value, 510 intentionally
damaging by deliberate transmission, 511 recklessly damaging by intentional access, 512
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negligently causing damage and loss by intentional access, 513 trafficking in passwords, 514 and
extortion involving computers. 515
In some situations, the Act allows victims who suffer specific types of loss or damage
as a result of violations of the Act to bring civil actions against the violators for compensatory
damages and injunctive or other equitable reliefs. 516 The situations in which a victim could
bring civil action for any equitable relief include physical injury to any person; a threat to public
health or safety; damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; loss to one
or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution,
or other proceeding brought by the US only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct
affecting one or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value; the
modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; and damage affecting 10
or more protected computers during any one-year period. 517 As long as a victim is able to prove
that he has suffered any type of loss or damage aforementioned, such will suffice for a victim
to bring a civil action against the violator.
The CFAA imposes both criminal and civil liability for unauthorized access or damage
to a protected computer [Thomson, 2018] 518. The CFAA covers theft of trade secrets; hacking
and data breaches; denial or interruptions of services; anti-competitive behavior. The CFAA
can be used by organizations to bring private civil law suits seeking injunctive relief or
compensation from terminated or rogue employees, competitors, or third-party hackers. The
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CFAA defines ‘computer’ to mean “any device for processing or storing data excluding an
automated typewriter, portable handheld calculator, or other similar device” 519. However, in
addition to desktop and laptop computers, the CFAA protects devices such as: Cell phones,
cell towers, and stations that submit wireless signals. This is the decision of United States Court
in the cases of United States v. Nosal; 520and United States v. Mitra. 521Additionally, the Act
protects websites, see United States v. Drew; 522 Restricted databases - United States v. Valle;523
iPads, Kindles, Nooks, and videogame systems such as Xbox - see United States v. Nosal. 524
Under Section 1030(e) (2), the term “protected computers” includes US government
computers, financial institution computers or Computers used in interstate or foreign
commerce. Criminal and civil actions under the CFAA arise from seven categories of
prohibited conduct defined in Sections 1030(a)(1)-(7).
The development and use of the CFAA has been largely aided by the decisions and
interpretations of the United States Courts on the Act. As evidenced above, numerous cases
have been decided under the CFAA. However, the types of cybercrime cannot exactly be fixed
into a box and as such, as more crimes continued to be committed with the use of the internet
and technology, the need for a more responsive legal framework became necessary in the US.
4.2.1.2. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act 2003
(The CAN – SPAM Act)
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, was passed
on January 2004 by the United States Congress and put into effect [McNicholas & Angle,
2021] 525. The Act is a response to internet stalking and increasing email spam messages being
sent to residence. The aim of the Act is to regulate bulk commercial email (spam) and set the
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limits for what was acceptable in this regards in the United States. Kigerl [2009] notes that the
foremost purpose of spam messages is to make money for the spammer 526, and the primary
means to do this is through fraudulent offers and deals. Among the most costly fraud associated
with spamming is phishing and advance fee scams. Phishing is the sending of email messages
that masquerade as a source the user trusts, such as their online bank or EBay account [Kigerl,
2009.] 527. According to him, the purpose of this tactic is to trick the target into revealing
sensitive personal credential information, such as account logins, passwords, credit card
numbers, or any piece of information that can be converted into stolen cash. This specific type
of identity theft costs the United States 52.6 billion dollars a year 528.
The major laws outlined in the CAN SPAM Act include requirements for honesty and
accuracy of the content of email messages, genuine identifying information about the sender
of the email messages such as address and contact information, and an opt-out method that
allows recipients to choose to no longer receive messages from a given sender. Harsher
sentences exist for those who send spam from an unauthorized location, such as from a botnet
on an unwilling person’s computer. In enacting the CAN-SPAM Act, Congress made the
following determinations of public policy, set forth in section 7701(b) of the Act:
1. There is a substantial government interest in regulation of commercial email on a
nationwide basis;
2. Senders of commercial email should not mislead recipients as to the source or content
of such mail; and
3. Recipients of commercial email have a right to decline to receive additional
commercial electronic mail from the same source.
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Based on these policy determinations, Congress, in sections 7704(a) and (b) of the CANSPAM Act, outlawed certain commercial email acts and practices. Section 7704(a)(1) of the
Act prohibits transmission of any email that contains false or misleading header or ‘‘front’’
line information. Section 7704(a)(2) prohibits the transmission of commercial email messages
with false or misleading subject headings. Section 7704(a)(3) requires that a commercial email
message contain a functioning return email address or similar Internet- based mechanism for
recipients to use to ‘‘opt out’’ of receiving future commercial email messages. Section
7704(a)(4) prohibits the sender, or persons acting on the sender’s behalf, from initiating a
commercial email to a recipient more than ten business days after the recipient has opted out.
Section 7704(a)(5) prohibits the initiation of a commercial email message unless it contains
three disclosures:
1. Clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an advertisement or
solicitation;
2. Clear and conspicuous notice of the opportunity to decline to receive further
commercial email messages from the sender; and
3. A valid physical postal address of the sender.
Additionally, section 7704(b) specifies four ‘‘aggravated violations’’ — practices that
compound the available statutory damages when alleged and proven in combination with
certain other CAN- SPAM violations 529. The Act authorizes the Commission to enforce
violations of the Act in the same manner as a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation
rule 530. Section 7706(f) authorizes the attorneys general of the states in the US to enforce
compliance with certain provisions of section 7704(a) of the Act by initiating enforcement
actions in federal court, after serving prior written notice upon the Commission when

15 U.S.C. 7704(B)
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feasible 531. The CAN- SPAM Act also authorizes providers of internet access service to bring
a federal court action for violations of certain provisions of sections 7704(a), (b), and (d) 532.
Since the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect in early 2004, efforts have been made to determine
its efficacy in limiting spam.

The CAN SPAM Act is enforced by the Federal Trade

Commission, which subsequently produced a report on the success of the Act to the Congress
in 2005 [Kigerl, 2009] 533. Contained in the report was the conclusion that spam has stabilized
since the creation of the CAN SPAM Act 534. The data used were the number of spam emails
received per day by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 535.
4.2.1.3. Unlawful Access to Stored Communications Act 536
Another US Federal Law on Cyber Crime and Security is the Unlawful Access to Stored
Communications Act, and its main focus is to protect email and voicemail from unauthorized
access. Section 2701 protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these
communications stored by providers of electronic communication services pending the
ultimate delivery to their intended recipients. The Section provides thus:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Section whoever… (1) Intentionally
accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and there obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this Section
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A charge under Section 2701 has four essential elements. These are (i) intentional
access (ii) without or in excess of authorization (iii) facility must be one that provides an
electronic communication service and (iv) the culprit must have obtained, altered, or prevented
authorized access to a communication in electronic storage. 537 A felony conviction requires
proof of one additional element which is that the act must have been done for commercial
advantage, malicious destruction or damage, private commercial gain, or in furtherance of a
criminal or tortuous act. 538
Section 2701 (c) provides three statutory exceptions to a violation. First, the section
does not apply to ‘the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communication
service.’ 539 The second exception is that the section does not apply to conduct authorized by a
user ‘with respect to a communication of or intended for that user.’ 540 And the third exception
is that the section does not apply to conduct authorized by other sections of the Act or the
Wiretap Act. 541 The Wiretap Act will be considered at a latter part of this dissertation.
4.2.1.4. Identity Theft Act 542
Another US federal law in relation to computer crime is the Identity Theft Act. The Act
is somewhat minimal in scope and provision; it primarily deals with fraud related to theft of
another’s identity using computers. Section 1028 criminalizes certain types of conduct
involving fraudulent identification documents or the unlawful use of identification information.
Another US law closely related to the above and often used to charge a person alongside the
Identity Theft Act is the Access Device Fraud 543. Prosecutors commonly bring charges under
Section 1029 in many types of ‘phishing’ cases, were a defendant uses fraudulent emails to
obtain bank account numbers and passwords, and ‘carding’ cases, where a defendant purchases,
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sells, or transfers stolen bank account, credit card, or debit card information [Tomilehin, 2015,
p.16]. 544 Penalties for violations of Section 1029 range from a maximum of 10 or 15 years of
imprisonment depending on the subsection violated. 545
4.2.1.5. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
With businesses engaging in increasingly more commerce over the internet, it is
important to understand the consequences of displaying, using and transferring another’s works
online [Markin, 2019] 546.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a 1998 United States Copyright Law
That implements two 1996 treaties of The World Intellectual Property Organization [Markin,
2019] 547. Markin, [2019] notes that the Act criminalizes production and dissemination of
technology, devices, or services intended to circumvent measures that control access to
copyrighted works which is commonly known as Digital Rights Management or DRM 548. The
Act also criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control whether or not there is actual
infringement of copyright itself 549. The DMCA is divided into five titles: title I make it
unlawful to manufacture or distribute products, services, or technological measures intended
to control access to copyrighted works, such as passwords and encryption 550. Title II contains
diverse “safe cover” for internet services providers (ISPs) that limit their liability for direct,
contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement. Title III creates an exemption from
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infringement liability for computer program copying conducted for the purposes of repair,
diagnosis, or troubleshooting. Title IV contains miscellaneous provisions for items such as
ephemeral recordings and the transfer of rights to motion pictures while title V on the other
hand creates a new form of protection for vessel hull designs. Under the DMCA, Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), Comcast Xfinity, and Verizon cannot be held liable for copyright
infringement when they neither know, nor have reason to know, that they are providing internet
services to a website that is engaged in copyright infringement. Under cybercrime law and
Intellectual Property Law, the DMCA is considered a laudable legal framework.
4.2.1.6. The Wiretap Act 1968
Another US federal law used for combating computer crimes is the Wiretap Act. The
federal Wiretap Act, as amended in 1986 by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986,
protects the privacy of wire, oral, and ‘electronic communications’, a broad term that includes
computer network communications. 551The Act is both procedural and substantive [Tomilehin,
2015, p.11]. 552 It prohibits not just law enforcement, but ‘any person’ from making an illegal
interception or disclosing or using illegally intercepted material. 553
The prohibition crux of the Wiretap Act is found in Section 2511(1)(a), which prohibits ‘any
person’ from intentionally intercepting, or attempting to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic
communication. From the aforementioned Section, it must be shown in an action that the
interception of the communication is intentional. In a civil Wiretap Act case, the Fourth Circuit
approved of the following familiar jury instruction defining ‘intentional’:
An act is done intentionally if it is done knowingly or purposely. That is, an act is
intentional if it is the conscious objective of the person to do the act or cause the result.
An act is not intentional if it is the product of inadvertence or mistake. However, the
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defendant’s motive is not relevant and the defendant needs not to have intended the
precise results of its conduct or have known its conduct violated the law. 554

Drawing from the above, it can be inferred that where an interception is done negligently by
any person, Section 2511(1) (a) will not apply. Section 2511(1)(c) of the Act also provides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who intentionally
discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral,
or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in
violation of this shall be punished as provided in subsection (4).
This Section provides for two mental state requirements: the act of disclosing a
communication must be done ‘intentionally’ and it must also be proved that the disclosing
individual knew or had reason to know that ‘the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection.’
[Emphasis supplied]
The Act also prohibits the use of intercepted communication. Section 2511(1)(d) provides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who… (d)
intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of
this subsection… shall be punished as provided in subsection (4).
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On the surface, ‘use of the contents’ of the intercepted communication appears
extremely broad. However, ‘use’ does require some ‘active employment of the contents of the
illegally intercepted communication for some purpose.’ 555 [Emphasis supplied]
While the Wiretap Act has provided for wide prohibitions in Section 2511(1), it has
also provided for many exceptions in subsection 2511(2). The exceptions that are particularly
relevant in the context of network crimes would be briefly discussed here. One exception is
where the consent of a party has been given. 556 Thus an interception is lawful if the interceptor
is a party to the communication or if one of the parties to the communication consents to the
interception [Tomilehin, 2015, p.18] 557.
Another exception provided by the Act is the exception given to providers of wire or
electronic communication services. Thus, it would not be unlawful for an operator of a
switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of a wire or electronic
communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his
service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that
a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or
random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks. 558
The section grants providers the right ‘to intercept and monitor communications placed
over their facilities in order to combat fraud and theft of service.’ 559 For example, employees
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of a cellular phone company could intercept communications from an illegally ‘cloned’ cell
phone in the course of locating its source. 560
Section 2511 (2)(g)(i) permits ‘any person’ to intercept an electronic communication
made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the
communication is readily accessible to the general public.
4.2.1.7. Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986 (ECPA)
In 1986, the US Congress enacted the ECPA, as an amendment to the Wiretap Act. The
ECPA contains many provisions already existing in the Wiretap Act; however, some novel
introductions were made by the Congress. In the Act, unless provided otherwise, it is a federal
crime to engage in wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, to process wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping equipment; to use or disclose information obtained through illegal
wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; or to disclose information secured through courtordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, in order to obstruct justice 561. The Act
retained the major purpose for which the Wiretap Act was initially enacted.
3.2.1.8. The Federal Information Security Management Act 2002
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was enacted in 2002 as
part of the E-Government Act, designed to modernize the inner workings of the US Federal
government. Prior to the emergence of FISMA, information security was largely neglected in
the government, particularly by the civilian agencies [McNicholas & Angle, 2021] 562. FISMA
requires that any information system used or operated by US Federal agency, including those
run by contractors and others on behalf of the government, follow a set of prescribed security
processes. These processes are not defined within the FISMA rather reference is made to other
pertinent standards and legislation, including the Federal Information processing Standards
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(FIPS) documents, National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) special publications,
HIPAA, and the Privacy Act of 1974. Additionally FISMA mandates that all Federal
information systems be reviewed to determine the types of data contained within the systems,
and then categorized based on the damage that could be caused if the system’s confidentiality,
integrity, or availability were to become compromised.
Arguments have been made around the fact that the FISMA and its web of related
standards are extremely complex [Taylor, 2013] 563. Although compliance with FISMA is
mandatory for federal agencies and contractors that operate IT Systems or infrastructure on
their behalf, there are no civil or criminal penalties for violating the law’s provisions. The
consequences for failing to comply with the FISMA or for weaknesses or deficiency findings
in audit reports may include even greater scrutiny of an agency’s IT or information security
management practices or conditioning approval of budget requests on adequate remediation of
noncompliant controls or practices. There is still no attention or discussion to improve the law
as it is in this regard. One argument has however been that failure to comply with the FISMA
may amount to liability under relevant provisions which have been referred to by the FISMA
[Taylor, 2013]. 564
4.2.1.10. The Cyber Security Research and Development Act
The Act is one laudable step by the US government to ensure greater secured use of the
internet as well as useful research [Orji, 2012] 565. The Cyber Security Research and
Development Act is a US Federal Law that authorizes funding for computer and network
security research and development [Orji, 2012] 566. It also provides funding for research
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fellowship programs, and for various purposes [US Legal, 2018] 567. The Act mandates the
development of a cyber security education program to help consumers, businesses, and
government workers keep their computers secure as well as mandate the National Science
Foundation to create new cyber security research centers, undergraduate program grants,
community college grants and fellowships 568. Section 7410 deals with the key requirements
that is necessary to be eligible for the grant. Since its inception, greater use of the internet to
drive positive research has been recorded in the United States. 569

4.2.2. Institutional Regulatory Mechanisms
4.2.2.1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security popularly known simply as the DHS is a blanket
regulatory mechanism in the US for all sought of emergencies and issues both related and
unrelated to cyber crimes and cyber security 570. The DHS was established in 2002 combining
22 different federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated cabinet agency 571. The
body secures the nation from the many cyber threats faced by citizens. Employees in the
institution range from aviation and border security expert to emergency response teams, cyber
security analyst to chemical facility inspector. The body is also responsible for aiding in the
implementation of federal laws in the nation to see to the fulfillment of its mission. It has only
one aim: to keep America’s internet space safe.
4.2.2.2. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).
The US-CERT is a partnership between the DHS and the Public and Private sectors,
established to protect the nation’s internet infrastructure. The institution coordinates defense
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against and responses to cyber attacks across the nation. The body is responsible for
coordinating the cyber security information that impacts every government agency, business,
and individual computer user in the US [Liska, 2015] 572. It provides security alerts,
vulnerability information and helpful tips for protection and organization for a home user. It
serves as a guardian to the citizens of the US as it relates to the issue of cyber crime.
Additionally, it also has numerous mailing lists which anyone in the US can join to find out
information about the latest threats on which the US-CERT is reporting 573.

4.2.3. Policy Mechanism
4.2.3.1. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
The National Strategy to secure Cyberspace is a component of the larger national
strategy for homeland Security 574. It was drafted by the Department of Homeland Security in
reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and released on February 14,
2003 575. The policy mechanism offers suggestions, not mandates, to businesses, academic, and
individual users of cyberspace to secure computer systems and networks. The plan advises on
a number of security practices as well as promotion of cyber security. It has three strategic
objectives: prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructures; reduce national
vulnerability to cyber attacks; and minimize damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that
do occur. 576
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4.2.3.2. The Comprehensive National Cyber security Initiative (CNCI)
The Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI) consists of a number of
mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major objectives designed to help secure the
United States in cyberspace: to establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate
threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities,
threats, and events within the federal government and ultimately with state local, and tribal
governments and private sector partners. Also, to defend against the full spectrum of threats by
enhancing US counter-intelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain
for key information technologies; to strengthen the future cyber security environment by
expanding cyber education, coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts
across the federal government, and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or
malicious activity in cyberspace [McNicholas & Angle, 2021] 577. The CNCI includes funding
within the federal law enforcement, intelligence and defense communities to enhance such key
functions as criminal investigation; intelligence collection, processing and analysis
[McNicholas & Angle, 2021] 578.
4.2.3.3. The Cyberspace Policy Review
The Cyberspace Policy Review is aimed at providing a trusted and resilient information
and communications infrastructure. It contains information on issues facing the federal
government in cyberspace. Currently, due to the lack of digital security in the network
infrastructure, the federal government’s online resources are at risk for potential cybercrime
[Tomilehin, 2015, p. 14] 579. In order to prevent this, policies and procedures must be researched
and implemented – this is what the Cyberspace Policy Review exists for.
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4.2.3.4. The United States International Strategy for Cyberspace
The State’s Department advances the goals laid out in the International Strategy for
cyberspace with diplomatic and development engagement intended to promote norms and build
international security, build global consensus regarding responsible state behavior in
cyberspace including the application of existing international law to enhance stability, ground
national security policies, strengthen partnerships, and prevent misinterpretations that can lead
to conflict. It is also intended to fight cybercrime; strengthen internet public policy and internet
governance; support internet freedom; perform cyber security due diligence and develop the
internet and informational and communication technologies for economic growth [Tomilehin,
2015, p.14]. 580

4.3. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, criminal law applies generally to all illegal acts, irrespective of
the medium or means used to commit the offence; 581 however, the insistent rise in cybercrime
has necessitated specific legal frameworks to address the problem of cybercrime as well as
create necessary institutional mechanisms to enforce same.
4.3.1. Legal Framework
4.3.1.1. The Computer Misuse Act 1990
The Computer Misuse Act is the only law that explicitly and specifically focuses
on computer crimes in the UK. The Act is the first comprehensive attempt to criminalize
the use of computers to commit crimes. The Act creates three main offences:
1. Unauthorized access to computer material, 582
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2. Unauthorized access to a computer system with intent to commit or facilitate further
offences, 583 and
3. Unauthorized modification of computer material. 584 Maximum sentences for these
offences range from six months imprisonment and/or a 500 Euros fine to ten years
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.
The Computer Misuse Act has been amended by the Police and Justice Act, 2006. The current
Police and Justice Act 585contain amendment to the CMA under the Section called
‘Miscellaneous Part 5 Computer Misuse amendments’. Clause 39 doubles the maximum jail
sentence for hacking into computer systems from five years to ten years.
4.3.1.2. The Terrorism Act 2000
The Terrorism Act was strictly enacted as a response to the insistent rise in terrorist
attacks against the UK. Notably, the UK Terrorism Act criminalizes not just terrorism carried
out using traditional means but also terrorism carried out using digital technologies, devices,
the internet as well as related facilities.
Part VI of the Terrorism Act, 2000 contains several offences that can provide the basis
for charging individuals who have used the internet to support terrorist activities. Section 54
makes it an offence to provide, receive or invite others to receive instructions or training in the
making or use of firearms, radioactive material or related weapons, explosives or chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons. Under section 57, the Act makes it an offence to possess articles
in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has such articles in
connection with the preparation, instigation or commission of an act of terrorism. In years
following the enactment of the Terrorism Act, the previous section has been used to
successfully prosecute several individuals who have been found in possession of items as
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diverse as hard drives, DVDs and instructional documents on how to make or operate items
such as mortars, suicide vests and napalm [Hemming, 2010, p.963] 586. Section 58 of the Act
has proven particularly useful in several cases in which authorities have needed to intervene
when there was no evidence that the individual was engaged in activity associated with
terrorism [UNODC, 2012] 587. The section makes it an offence to collect, make or have in one’s
possession, without a reasonable excuse, any record of information of a kind likely to be useful
to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism or to have possession of any document
or record containing such information. In the UK case of R v. K, 588 the court held that a
document falls within the scope of section 58, only if it is of a kind that is likely to provide
practical assistance to a person committing or preparing to commit an act of terrorism. The
subsequent sections in Part VI contains elements to be established to successfully bring a claim
under the Act. The Act has been amended in 2006 by the Terrorism Act, 2006 which introduced
novel offences aimed at enhancing the ability of authorities to take action in cases involving
statements by persons inciting or glorifying acts of terrorism or otherwise intended to support
the commission of such acts 589.
4.3.1.3. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000
According to Yaman Akdeniz, Nick Taylor and Clive Walker 590, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, signals both the importance of forms of surveillance as
techniques of policing and also the human rights apprehensions which those strategies
engender. In order to impose effective regulation upon the interception of communications,
section 1, makes it an offence “for a person intentionally and without lawful authority to
intercept, at any place in the United Kingdom, any communication in the course of its
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transmission…” 591 Where the interception is carried out under section 1(3) with the express or
implied consent of a person having the right to control the operation or the use of a private
telecommunication system but without lawful authority under the RIPA, then it shall be
actionable under civil law. Section 3authorizes certain kinds of interception where all parties
to a communication have consented to the interception (such as the overt use of a telephone
answering machine), or where the recipient consents and the communication is subject to
surveillance under Part II of RIPA (such as where a photographer is telephoning relatives of a
hostage) or where the interception arises from necessary conduct in relation to the operation of
postal or telegraphy services (such as the opening of an unaddressed letter or counter-measure
against interference).

The RIPA is a welcomed development in the provisions of the

Interception of Communications Act, 1985. Third parties, such as communications service
providers, may be required to assist in the interception process under section 11 592. The person
must take all reasonably practicable steps to assist and commits an offence if they fail to do so
[Akdeniz, Taylor & Walker, 2001, p.21] 593.

4.3.2. Institutional Regulatory Mechanism
4.3.2.1. The UK Computer Emergency Response Team
CERT-UK is the UK’s first national Computer Emergency response team 594. The team
has the duty to manage and prepare ahead for any form of national cyber security incidents;
take the lead in coordinating the management of national cyber security incidents and acts as
the UK central contact point for international counterparts in this field 595. It is expected to
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enhance the nation’s cyber resilience by working closely with industry, government and
academia which would reasonably include exercising with government departments and
industry partners, sharing information with UK industry and academic computer emergency
response teams and collaborating with national CERTs around the globe to enhance
understanding of the cyber threat 596.
4.3.2.2. The National Cyber Security Centre
The National Cyber Security Centre, known shortly as the NCSC is the UK’s ‘technical
authority’ for cyber incidents. It is an institutional body specifically designed to combat
cybercrime in the UK. It was formed in 2016 to provide a unified national response to cyber
threat and was created out of a number of pre-existing organizations which includes: GCHQ’s
‘Communications-Electronics Security Group’ (CESG); 597 CERT UK; 598 the Centre for Cyber
Assessment (CCA), also part of GCHQ; 599 and the cyber functions of the Centre for the
protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI). The NCSC acts as the single point of contact
and computer security incident response team in the UK 600.
4.3.2.3. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)
The Internet Watch Foundation is a registered company limited by guarantee and based
in Cambridge shire, England 601. The body is governed by a Board of Trustees which consists
of an independent chair, six non-industry representatives, three industry representatives plus
one co-opted independent representative with a specialist in human rights and its major aim is
“to minimize the availability of online sexual abuse content, specifically child sexual abuse
images and videos hosted anywhere in the world and non-photographic child sexual abuse
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images hosted in the UK” 602. If “flag-off content” is found in the open web, it traces where the
content is hosted (geographically) and either directly issues a notice to the hosting company to
remove the imagery (if hosted in the UK) or works with a network of hotlines and police around
the world who follow their own country’s process for removing the imagery. More than 99%
of all the child sexual abuse images found by IWF are hosted outside of the UK. In this instance,
whilst work to remove the imagery takes place, IWF places the web address on its URL List
for partners to block the content 603. The foundation is flagged as having removed more childsexual abuse-related content from the internet than there has ever been removed by anybody.604
Also, the IWF operates informal partnerships with the police, government, public, and internet
companies across the world and although it was originally formed to police suspected child
pornography online, the IWF’s has now been expanded to cover criminally obscene material
and has been doing a lot in partnership with reputable organizations to remove obscene
materials from the internet [ICO,2019] 605.

4.3.3. Policy Mechanism
4.3.3.1. The National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021
The UK government recently released its new National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021.
Recognizing that cyberattacks on the UK are a top threat to the UK’s economic and national
security, the strategy outlines visions and goals to create a UK that is secured and resilient to
cyber threats, as well as prosperous and confident in the digital world [Kriz, 2017] 606. The UK
has always strived in the provision of cybersecurity and its new strategy is an important
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contribution to (and model for) global efforts. The strategy lays out substantive set of goals,
actions and metrics mapped to three important pillars:
•

Defend: the government will strengthen its own IT defenses and work with industry to
ensure UK networks, data and systems are protected against evolving cyber threats.

•

Deter: the UK will strengthen law enforcement’s capabilities, including cyber skills, as
well as the country’s growing cybersecurity industry, to keep pace with cyber threats.

•

Develop: the government will help to develop the UK’s critical capabilities, and train
responsible organizations in this regard.

As part of the strategy, the UK created a new National Cyber Security Center (NCSC),
which is a single, central government body bringing together many of the government’s
cybersecurity functions, including CERT-UK 607. Also, the strategy aims to prevent and reduce
the impact of cyber attacks on the UK reflected in a new “Active Cyber Defense” program.
The UK’s prevention-focused calculus will change the dynamic that currently favors attackers,
tilting the balance to help the UK government, businesses and individuals better protect their
networks. The strategy envisions the development and deployment of automated cyber defense
in partnership with industry 608.

4.4. The People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China is a highly industrialized nation and is presently rated
as the most industrialized nation of the world [Orji, 2012, p. viii] 609. The implication of this is
the peak in internet use to carry out diverse transactions and its resultant use to committee
crimes. A window into the nature of China’s domestic cybercrime problem can be found in a

Kriz, D. (2017). A Global Model: UK’s National Cyber Security Strategy. Paloato, 2017
<www.securityroundtable.org/global-model-uks-national-cyber-security-strategy/
608
IWF. Internet Watch Foundation www.en.m.internetwatchfoundation.org/iwf/internet_Watch_Foundation
609
Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation. Wolf Legal Publishers Pg. VIII
607

135

report issued in 2017 by the “Network Hunt Platform” of the Beijing Public Security Bureau
[Cheng, 2017] 610. According to the report, the platform received 20623 reports of online fraud
with a total loss of approximately US$28.4 million 611. In China, many cybercrime issues are
covered in laws and regulations that refer to internet-related crimes. China does not have a
single over-arching national law that specifically addresses the collection, storage, and
transmission of data or the use of such data to commit crimes [Mayer & Brown, 2020] 612.
4.4.1. Legal Framework
4.4.1.1. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1997
Under the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, cybercrimes are mainly
provided in the section, “Crimes of Disturbing Public Order”. The Law was passed on March
14, 1997 to punish all forms of crime committed within China. Only few of the provisions of
the Act relate to cyber crime and cyber security. Article 285 provides that whoever violates
state regulations and intrudes into computer systems with information concerning state affairs,
construction of defense facilities, and sophisticated science and technology is to be sentenced
to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention. It is noteworthy
that using web crawlers may be regarded as invading conduct in violation of Article 285 if a
technical method were adopted to crack anti-crawling measure set by websites or to bypass
identity check processes set in a computer server. [Ning & Wu, 2020] 613
Under Article 286, whoever violates states regulations and deletes, alters, adds and
interferes in computer information systems, causing abnormal operations of the systems and
grave consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment
or criminal detention; when the consequences are particularly serious, the sentence to be not
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less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment. Whoever violates state regulations and deletes,
alters or adds the data or application programs installed in or processed and transmitted by the
computer systems, and causes grave consequences, is to be punished according to the preceding
paragraph. Whoever deliberately creates and propagates computer virus and other programs
which sabotage the normal operation of the computer system and causes grave consequences
is to be punished according to the above section. Article 287 provides that whoever uses a
computer for financial fraud, theft, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, stealing state
secrets, or other crimes is to be convicted and punished according to relevant regulations of
this law.
It is worthy of note that all of the above-mentioned offences have extraterritorial
application. First, if the criminal act or its consequence takes place within the territory of China,
the crime shall be deemed to have been committed within the territory of China. Second, the
Criminal Law is applicable to citizens of China who commit crimes prescribed in the Criminal
Law outside the territory of China; however, if the maximum penalty of such crime prescribed
in the criminal law is a fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, the offender
could be exempted from punishment. Third, if a foreigner commits a crime outside the territory
of China against the State or against Chinese Citizens, the offender may be convicted pursuant
to the Criminal Law if the Criminal Law prescribes a minimum punishment of fixed-term
imprisonment of not less than three years; however, the Criminal Law shall not apply if it is
not punishable according to the law of the place where it was committed [Cheng, 2017]. 614
4.4.1.2. The Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2017
The Law came into force on 1, June 2017 615. It covers various aspects of network security
and has laid the foundation for a comprehensive cybersecurity regulatory regime in China and
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recognizes the graded cybersecurity protection as the basic legal system to ensure network
security in China. So far, diverse specific measures aimed at facilitating the implementation of
the Cybersecurity Law have already been enacted, such as the Measures on the Security Review
of Network Products and Services, the National Emergency Response plan for Cyber security
Incidents, as well as the Provisions on Protection of Children’s Personal Information Online
[Cheng. 2017] 616. The Cyber Security Law specifically makes provisions which help Network
Operators understand their legal duties as it relates to cyber security incidents. These legal
duties are classified as follows:
1. Regular preventive work: network operators must adopt regular measures to prevent
cyber security incidents, including adopting technical measures to prevent
cybersecurity violations such as computer viruses, cyberattacks and network intrusions,
adopting technical measures to monitor and record the network operation status and
cyber security events, maintaining cyber-related logs for no less than six months;
2. Emergency measures for security incidents: network operators must develop an
emergency plan for cybersecurity incidents in order to promptly respond to security
risk, to take remedial actions immediately, to notify affected data subjects, and to report
the case to the competent authorities as required; and
3. After-action review: to keep communication with and assist the authorities in finishing
their investigation and review after an incident, such as providing a summary of the
cause, nature and influence of the security incident and improvement measures [Cheng,
2017] 617.
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4.4.1.3. The Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
Management Regulations, 1997
The above Regulation was approved by the State Council in December 11, 1997 and
promulgated by the ministry of public security on December 30, 1997. As stated in Article 1
of the regulation, it was established on the basis of the Computer information Network
Protection Regulation; the Temporary Regulations on Computer Information Networks and the
Internet and other laws and administrative regulations “in order to strengthen the security and
the protection of computer information networks and of the internet, and to preserve the social
order and social stability…”. Article 5 contains the kinds of information which no unit or
individual may use the internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit. Chapter II of the
Regulation contains detailed provisions on the responsibility of individual engaged in internet
business for the security and protection of their public security organization information, digital
content and other forms of data.
Chapter III deals with the responsibility of Public Security agency or Bureau as well as
city and county public security organizations to ensure the security, protection and management
of the internet. Chapter IV makes detailed provisions on legal responsibilities for the violation
of certain provisions of the regulation.
Article 24 contains additional provisions to wit: these regulations should be consulted with
regards to the implementation of the security, protection and management of computer
information networks connecting to networks in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
as well as with Taiwan and Macao Districts.
4.4.1.4 The Regulations on Safeguarding Computer Information Systems, 1996
The Chinese Regulations on Safeguarding Computer Information Systems was
promulgated on February 1996. The aim of the regulation is “to safeguard computer
information systems, to promote the application and development of computers, and to ensure
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smooth progress in socialist modernization” 618. In safeguarding computer information systems,
the regulations gives priority to the security of computer systems containing data on such
important areas as state affairs, economic construction, national defense, and state-of-the-art
science and technology 619. The regulation establishes a “Safeguard system” which includes
that computer information systems shall be established and applied in accordance with laws,
administrative rules and relevant state provisions 620. Chapter III mandates supervision of
bodies dealing in internet activities and this duty of supervision is placed on “Public Security
Organs” 621. The duties of the Public Security Organs also include informing units of any latent
hazards in computer information systems, and also advise on safety measures to be
instituted 622. Detailed legal provisions are contained in the regulation 623. Under Article 20, it
provides: In the event of any of the following violations of the provisions in these regulations,
public security organs shall issue warnings or shut down the computers for screening purposes:
1. Contravening the system of protecting computer information systems based on security
grades and jeopardizing the computer information systems;
2. Violating the registration system for internationally networked computer information
systems;
3. Failing to report incidents related to computer information systems within the
prescribed time frames;
4. Failing to take remedial action within the prescribed time after receiving notification
from public security organs mandating security improvement measures;
5. Other actions endangering computer information systems.
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620
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622
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There is also under this chapter 624, a punishment for government functionaries who abuse
their power to demand and take bribes or commit other illegal or delinquent acts while
enforcing these regulations 625.
4.4.1.5. The State Secrecy Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems on
the Internet, 2000
The Regulations took effect from January 1, 2000. It was promulgated to protect States
secrets of the People’s Republic of China and to strengthen the management of secrets in
computer systems and on the internet. 626 The duty of protecting States secrets in the
international networking of national computer information systems is placed on the State
departments for the protection of secrets while central government institutions, in the area of
their functions and powers, shall take charge of or guide the work of guarding secrets in the
computer systems on the internet within their own systems 627.
Chapter II contains diverse security mechanisms to protect state secrets. Particularly,
Article 6 provides: A computer information system involving state secrets shall not be
connected, either directly or indirectly, with the internet or other public information networks.
It must be physically separated. Other security mechanisms include, non storage, processing or
transmission of state secrets 628; principle of “whoever places materials on the internet takes
responsibility” 629; and adherence to the security system for any expansion or updating of
information on the internet 630.
Chapter III makes provision for the adequate supervision of activities aimed at
protecting state secrets. Policies are provided in the chapter to aid bodies and department in
strengthening their inspections of secrets in the international networking of computer
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information systems. According to Article 18, this regulation also deals with the management
of secrets in the areas of Hong Kong and the Macau Special Administrative regions, as well as
Taiwan.
There is little or no detailed institutional regulatory mechanism in place in the People’s
Republic of China for the enforcement of cybercrime laws. The two most important
organizations responsible for internal and external security are the Public Security Bureau
(PSB), which is responsible for the internal security, and the Ministry State Security (MSS),
which handles external security 631. These bodies are not strictly focused on cyber crime. The
responsibilities of the Public Security Bureau are formally codified in the Computer
Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations earlier
discussed above. The responsibility of maintaining internet security lies with the ISP’s (Internet
Service Providers) and violations by users will result in the cancellation of the ISP’s business
license and its network registration; fines and possible criminal prosecution of both the
company staff and the users 632. The absence of regulatory bodies and detailed policies stand as
a negative flag for China considering the estimates of technological development and internet
use in the State.

4.5. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The United Arab Emirates is a developing nation, and considering the manner in which
developing nations have approached issues of cybercrime and security one might assume that
the nation is doing little or nothing to combat cybercrimes. The overall internet penetration as
well as the use of cyber-based systems in critical infrastructure is growing with a never seen
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Articles 20-23, Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and Management
Regulations
631
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pace in the UAE just as in the rest of the world [Imranuddin, 2017]. 633Additionally, the UAE
has emerged to be at the forefront of many technological advances in the recent past. 634 Specific
and comprehensive legal frameworks have been developed over the years in the UAE in a bid
to see to the end of cyber crime and other menace related to it. Importantly, the UAE is one of
those nations having a specific law on cyber crime as against having provisions bordering on
cyber crime scattered in diverse unspecific laws. This aside, specific institutional regulatory
mechanisms as well as policy mechanism exist in the UAE to help strengthen cyber security
while at the same time working to reduce the existing cyber crime in the Nation.
4.5.1. Legal Framework
The UAE has the most detailed and comprehensive cyber-crime law in the Arabian
Gulf and wider Middle East. 635 In the United Arab Emirates, Cyber Crime is regulated majorly
by the Federal Decree Law Number 5/2012 on Combating Cyber Crimes. This law repealed
the Federal Law No. 2 of 2006 on Combating Cyber Crime. Under the Act, any illicit use of
the internet, computer network, electronic website or any other information technology is
prohibited and constitutes a cyber crime. 636Significantly, because the UAE is a religious nation,
computer-related offenses that would normally not be seen in some other jurisdiction are
considered cybercrimes in the UAE. For example, slandering of public officials using
computer, and insulting religions and Islamic Sharia Law are considered offences under the
Act. 637Also, forging electronic documents, reproducing credit card date, obtaining other’s
passwords for bank accounts or forging any medical data shall be constituted as cybercrimes
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when they are all done using a computer system or information technology or any other internet
device. 638
Notably also, offenses such as access to an electronic information system 639, electronic
communication without authorization 640, defamation through a computer network or via any
information technology means, or forgery on any electronic document 641 is punishable under
the Act. Like some other Acts on the subject matter of cyber crime, the Federal Decree Law
Number 5/2012 on Combating Cyber Crimes also extensively covers offences related to
cybercrime as it relates to banks and other financial institutions. In this regard, any person who
gains access to a credit or electronic card number or data to bank accounts, or bank account
numbers or any other data in relation to any electronic payment method via computer network
or any electronic information technology means shall be punished with imprisonment or
fine. 642
As stated earlier, unlike any other law, UAE’s law provides as follows:
Imprisonment and/or fine shall be imposed ranging from AED 250,000
to AED 1 million on any person who commits through a computer
network any of the following acts:
i.

Insults the Islamic rituals/sanctities

ii.

Insults the recognized celestial religions

Article 12 and 13
Article 2(1); Article 3, 4 & 5. This offence attracts a fine not less than one hundred thousand dirham (and not
in excess of three hundred thousand Dirham) and an imprisonment or either of these two penalties. Other
offences are as specified in Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the Act.
640
Article 5 & 6
641
Article 6. The punishment is imprisonment and a fine not less than one hundred thousand dirham and not in
excess of three hundred thousand dirham or either of these two penalties
642
Article 12. Specifically, the punishment shall be imprisonment for a period of at least six months and a fine
not less than one hundred thousand dirham and not in excess of three hundred thousand dirham or either of these
two penalties.
638
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iii.

Insults any of the sanctities or rituals of other religions where such
sanctities and rituals of other religions are inviolable under Islamic
Sharia law

iv.

Condoning, provoking or promoting sin 643

The UAE takes offences relating to terrorism and acts inciting hatred of the nation using
electronic means very seriously. Article 23 of the Act prohibits any person from establishing,
operating or supervising an electronic site for the purpose of organ or human trafficking and
punishes the same by temporary imprisonment and a fine of not less than AED 500,000 and
not exceeding AED 1,000,000. This is a laudable improvement from the penalty stipulated in
the 2006 Cyber crime Law, which previously criminalized human trafficking, by temporary
detainment. By Article 25, persons who operate an electronic site for the purpose of promoting
or trading weapons, ammunitions or explosives are punished. Also, Article 26, provides that it
is an offence to establish, operate or supervise an electronic site, or publish information online
for a terrorist group or any illegal group, association, organization or body. Offences relating
to creating or running electronic site or any information technology means that could deride or
damage the reputation or the stature of the state or any of its institutions is punished under
Article 29. Promoting demonstrations without a license 644; trade of antiquities without a
right 645; carrying out communication services online 646 and narcotics and money laundering 647
are further prohibited whenever it is carried out in the manner specified in the Act.
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4.5.2. Institutional Regulatory Mechanism
4.5.2.1. UAE CERT
The UAE CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) 648 was established to help the
Government sectors and educational sectors for cyber security information sharing and
improving the overall cyber security condition in the country [Imranuddin, 2017]. 649 This
institution is the first to report incidents of cybercrime and usually, they are responsible for
following proactive approaches to protect the systems. Their operations are carried out by
collaborating with different government and law enforcement agencies to design policies and
methodologies to counter cyber threats. Additionally, the CERT collaborates and shares data
with other countries’ CERT around the globe, which provides opportunities for researches to
improve the posture of information security [Imranuddin, 2017]. 650
4.5.2.2. UAE Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) 651
This body is above the Internet Service Provider (ISP). They operate by sending
government authorities policies which they can follow as well as security ratings. The body
does not have so many responsibilities as a body but then it specializes in the provision of
advice on matters relating to cyber security as well as seeking for ways to easily detect cyber
crimes. 652
4.5.2.3. NESA (National Electronic Security Authority) 653
The National Electronic Security Authority of the UAE is the single federal body in
charge of the country’s cyberspace. This body on the 25th of June 2014 announced the
publication of strategies, policies and standard to drive cyber-security efforts. The body is a
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body under the government with the duty of protecting critical information infrastructure. They
also have the duty of improving national cyber security to achieve the protection of the UAE’s
cyberspace. The NESA have produced a set of standard and guidance for government entities
in critical sectors [Imranuddin, 2017]. 654
4.5.3. Policy Mechanisms
4.5.3.1. Standard Information Security Policy (SISP) 655
The SISP is a set of guidelines that provides detailed expectations in regard to the
appropriate use of information and network infrastructures. The purpose of the policy is not to
put on the organization charged to follow its provisions, any burden or restrictions which might
be contrary to the organization’s culture of trust, integrity or openness but rather to ensure that
maximum protection is made available to the users of such organization’s cyber space against
illegal or damaging actions by individuals, either intentionally or unintentionally. The SISP
contains but is not limited to the following sub policies: Anti-Virus Policy; Password
Management Policy; E-mail usage Policy; Information Handling and Classification Policy;
Encryption Policy; Desktop & Laptop Usage Policy; Backup and Restoration Policy; Remote
Access Policy; Wireless Communication Policy; Mobile Phone Policy; Disposable of Media
Policy; Visitor Premises Policy; Physical Access for Data Centre Policy; Patch Management
Policy; Physical Access for Operation Centre Policy; Change Management Policy; as well as
Log Management Policy. 656

4.6. Nigeria
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Activities of cyber criminals have risen in Nigeria with the development of information
technology [Oke, 2012] 657. This situation has, in part, been aided by the absence of specific
laws to combat computer crimes in Nigeria. In recent times however, steps have been taken to
develop cybercrime and cyber security legislations in Nigeria. An attempt will now be made to
discuss the current legal and institutional regime on acts or omissions that constitute cybercrime
in Nigeria with the aim of identifying provisions that are relevant to fighting these acts or
omissions as well as make some comparisons with provisions of other jurisdictions that have
been discussed so far on cybercrime.
4.6.1. Legal Framework
4.6.1.1. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION
(ESTABLISHMENT) ACT 658
The EFCC Act was enacted to repeal the Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment)
Act, of 2002. The present Act establishes the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC). The major crux of the Act is that it imposes various duties on the EFCC on how to
combat cyber crimes and create a secured cyber environment for Nigerians.
Under section 5 of the Act, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of
enforcing and ensuring due administration of the Act, the investigation of all financial crimes,
inclusive of advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfer and
also the duty of prosecuting all offences connected with or relating to financial and economic
crimes, but in consultation with the Attorney General of the Federation. As expected, the
activities of ‘Yahoo boys’ whose activities are considered a threat to the continuous use of the
internet by the masses will fall under this economic crime [Tomilehin, 2015] 659. This section
has been the basis of diverse actions of the EFCC as it relates to combating economic and
financial crimes. One of the offences within the remit of the Act under Sections 14-18 is the
Oke, R. (2012). Cyber Capacity without Cyber Security: A Case Study of Nigeria’s National Policy for
Information Technology (NPFIT)’ (2012) The Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law’ Vol. 12, Page 21
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offence relating to false information. The definition under section 46 of ‘economic crime’
envisions crimes committed with the use of computer and the cyber and as such any of the
offences captured under this section which is committed with the use of computers will
reasonably amount to a cyber offence.
4.6.1.2. ADVANCED FEE FRAUD AND OTHER FRAUD RELATED OFFENCES
ACT 660
This Act was promulgated to punish and prohibit certain offences relating to advance
fee fraud. The Act contains provisions on ways to combat cybercrime and other related online
frauds.
Under section 2, which makes it an offence to commit fraud by false pretence, a
criminal could be prosecuted for committing cybercrimes like computer-related fraud, where
it is proved that the offender used an automation and software tool to mask criminals’ identities,
while using the large trove of information on the internet to commit fraud. Section 13 places
the onus of carrying out surveillance on unlawful activities of criminals, on industry players,
including internet service providers (ISPs) and cybercafé operators, among others. Through
what is described as due care measure, cybercafé operators and ISPs are now expected to
monitor the use of their systems and keep a record of transactions of users [Adomi, 2008,
p.290] 661. These details in question could include but are not limited to photographs of users,
their home address, telephone, email address, etc.
4.6.1.3. MONEY LAUNDERING (PROHIBITION) ACT 662
The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act is another law regulating internet scam
specifically as it deals with laundering of money. The Act makes it an offence to launder the
proceeds of crime or an illegal act. Under Section 10, financial institutions are mandated to
make compulsory disclosure to national Drugs Law Enforcement Agency in certain situations
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prescribed by the Act, including when the amount in a person’s account exceeds a particular
amount. Also, if it appears that a customer may not be acting on his own account, the financial
institution shall seek from him, by all reasonable means, information as to the true identity of
the principal [Adomi, 2008] 663. This enables authorities to monitor and detect suspicious cash
transactions and these sections can be used against criminals who use the internet as a means
to unlawfully transfer large amount of money from one account to another [Oriola, 2005,
p.241] 664.
4.6.1.4 CRIMINAL CODE 665
The Criminal Code is the major law punishing all forms of crimes in Nigeria and
sanctioning same, whether or not it is committed with the use of the internet. The Code does
not specifically mention cybercrime, however, crimes such as betting, theft and false pretence
performed through the aid of computers and computer networks is a type of crime punishable
under the criminal code [Imranuddin, 2017] 666. Section 239(2) (a) and 240A of the Code
prohibits betting and public lotteries respectively. Under Section 418, false pretence is defined
as ‘any representation made by words, writing, or conduct of a matter of fact, either past or
present, which representation is false in fact and which the person making it knows to be false
or does not believe to be true’. It is unfortunate that the criminal code is a reflection of the
British legacy which predates the internet era and understandably does not specifically address
email scams 667. A look at Section 419 of the Criminal Code would show that computer-related
fraud is criminalized, however, the fact that a suspect cannot be arrested without a warrant,
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unless found committing the offence, does not reflect the crime’s presence or perpetration in
cyberspace 668.
4.6.1.5 NIGERIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 2011 669
This Act repealed the old Evidence Act of 1945. The major change which this act made
as it relates to the use of the internet is that it allows for the admissibility of digital and
electronic evidence. Section 84(1)-(5) introduces the ‘admissibility of statements in documents
produced by computers’. Section 84(5) (c) can be relied on by lawyers to prove that information
via mobile phones and other gadgets/devices are admissible. The provisions of Section 93
allows for the use of electronic signatures.
4.6.1.6 Cybercrime Act, 2015
This is the most specific, and comprehensive legislation on cybercrime and cyber
security in Nigeria. The Act prohibits, prevents, detects, provides response and prosecutes
cybercrimes and other related matters. It is divided into 8 parts: Part I contains the objectives
and the scope of application of the Act; under Part II, provision is made for the protection of
critical national infrastructure, part III provides for offences and their penalties, part IV makes
provisions for duties of service providers so as to ensure a secured cyber space, Part V contains
provisions on administration and enforcement, Part VI contains provisions on search, arrest
and prosecution; jurisdiction and international co-operation is provided for in Part VII while
PartVIII contains provisions on miscellaneous.
Prior to the enactment of the Cybercrimes Prohibition Act, there was no unified legal
framework for the regulation of cybercrime in Nigeria and also the provision of cyber security.
This Act has come a long way in addressing these issues. The Act takes into cognizance the
nature of information and communication in Nigeria and provides for the designation of certain
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computer systems or network as critical information infrastructures. 670It is also further
provided that the President may (on the recommendation of the National Security Adviser)
designate certain computer systems, networks and information infrastructure vital to the
national security of Nigeria as constituting National Information Infrastructure. 671 This
provision enhances national security and the protection of critical information infrastructure.
Particularly, offences against critical national information infrastructure are provided
for under section 3, to the effect that such person who commits any offence against any critical
national infrastructure would be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than
fifteen years and without an option of fine. 672 The punishment is made more stringent where
the offence results in grievous bodily injury 673 or where the offence results in death, he will be
liable to a death sentence without an option of fine. 674
Critical national information infrastructure is defined as those assets (real and virtual),
systems and functions that are vital to the nations that their incapacity or destruction would
have a devastating impact on national economic strength, national image, national defiance and
security, government capability to functions and public health and safety. 675Progressively,
critical national infrastructure is an indispensable asset to the nation and the provisions of
Section 5(1) will go a long way in ensuring national security in the nation’s cyber space.
Additionally, it is an offence to unlawfully access a computer; the crime is punishable
with a term of imprisonment of not less than two years or to a fine of not less than five million
naira or both. 676It is further provided for, that where the crime of unlawful access to a computer
is committed with the intent of obtaining and securing access to any computer data, program,
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commercial or industrial secrets or confidential information, the offender shall be liable to a
term of imprisonment of not less than three years or to a fine of not less than seven million
naira or such offender shall be liable to both fine and imprisonment. 677 These penalties have
acted as major deterrent to cyber criminals who hack into systems to obtain information.
Also, the provisions of the Act contain punishment for unlawful interception of
communications, and the punishment is attached where such person intercepts “intentionally
and without authorization or in excess of authority” [Emphasis supplied] 678. The punishment
is imprisonment for a term of not less than two years or to a fine of not less than five million
naira or both fine and imprisonment 679. The aim of this section is to ensure that the internet
which is a collection of data, and information is highly protected and that the privacy of
individuals is not infringed upon in the process of using information on the net.
Numerous other crimes are also established under the Act, including but not limited to:
unauthorized modification of a computer program or data, 680 system interference, 681 misuse
of devices, 682 computer-related fraud, 683 identity theft or impersonation, 684 cyberstalking,685
and cybersquatting. 686
Under Section 17, cyber terrorism is an offence to the effect that any person, who
accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system for the purpose of committing a terrorist
act as defined under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 as amended, commits cyber terrorism
and is liable upon conviction to life imprisonment. The Act creates two classes of offence to
criminalize child pornography. The first is the use of a computer network for the purpose of
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possessing, producing, and/or distributing materials depicting a minor, a person appearing to
be a minor, or images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 687Secondly,
the use of ‘information and communication technologies’ to engage in such acts as luring and
meeting (the crime here requires two elements before an offender can be convicted:
communicating with a child online followed by an in person meeting) with a child for the
purpose of engaging in sexual activities or recruiting a child to participate in a pornographic
performance. 688 The penalties for the offences range from a five to ten year prison term or fines
ranging from ten to twenty million naira, or both, depending on the particular offense. 689
Using computer system to distribute racist or xenophobic materials is also an offence
under Section 18 of the Act, and upon conviction, the offender would be subject to a sentence
of at least five years in prison and or a minimum of ten million naira fine.
Under Part IV of the Act, detailed provision is made on the duties of service providers. It
mandates all service providers to retain and make available to government agencies customer
information, including traffic data as well as subscriber information. 690 A lump fine has been
attached for cases where a service provider fails to cooperate with a government agency in this
regard. 691
The legislation also affords law enforcement officers broad search, arrest, and seizure
powers, including some that do not require judicial oversight. This occurs when there is what
the legislation calls a ‘verifiable urgency’ that a cybercrime is about to be committed or that
there is an ‘urgent need to prevent the commission of an offence,’ and obtaining a warrant
would take time and be prejudicial to public safety order. 692The Act also grants authority to
law enforcement officers to enter any premises or vehicle that they reasonably suspect is being
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used or likely to be used for the commission of a crime or that contains evidence of the
commission of a crime. 693 Once the officer is in control of the premises or vehicle, the officer
does not have to wait to obtain a warrant; he may conduct searches, seize items, or arrest
persons he ‘reasonably suspects’ to be connected to the crime. 694 The jurisdiction to try
offences under this Act is vested in the Federal High Courts under section 50of the Act.
4.6.1.7. The Nigerian Communications Act (NCCA) 2003
The Nigerian Communications Commission Act was signed into law by President
Olusegun Obasanjo on the 8th of July 2003. The Act establishes the Nigerian Communications
Commission695 headed by the executive Vice Chairman 696in a bid to develop and protect the
communications sector in the Nation. The Act provides an elaborate and comprehensive legal
regime for the establishment, control and Management of telecommunication services in the
Country [Kabir, 2012] 697. Section 71 empowers the commission to make rules on diverse
subject heads; enjoins it to hold a public enquiry on the rule made and to take into cognizance
the findings of the inquiry in the making of the regulation. This provision is an attempt to curb
the wide discretionary powers which the Act grants to the Commission and it is a welcomed
development especially given the fact that the public are given a chance to participate in the
protection of their own data and communication by airing their views on rules made.
Additionally, the Act, under section 73 provides that “the Commission shall have powers to
resolve disputes between persons who are subject to this Act, regarding any matter under this
Act or its subsidiary legislation”. This provision, asides from fostering the growth of alternative
dispute mechanism also provides an avenue to allow persons skilled in the art of
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communication and its technology resolve disputes in this regard rather than leaving it to the
Federal High Court whose judges might not be skilled in this regard. Since the passing into law
of the NCCA, there has been concerted effort in the fight to protect the privacy of people’s
communication on the internet. This has been largely achieved via the numerous roles given to
the NCC, the cyber offences penalized, the responsibility of Service Providers and the sanctions
attached.

4.6.2 Institutional Regulatory Mechanism
4.6.2.1 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC)
The EFCC was established under the EFCC Act to investigate financial and economic
crimes, inclusive of advance fee fraud and money laundering, whether or not committed with
the use of the internet. Under the Act, the body is empowered to investigate, prevent and
prosecute offenders who engage in offences already discussed under the EFCC Act.
Additionally, the commission is responsible for identifying, tracing, freezing, confiscating or
seizing proceeds derived from terrorist activities. An example is the case in 2005 where the
EFCC confiscated at least hundred million dollars from spammers and other defendants
[Olukanmi, 2011] 698. It is pertinent to state that in the fight against all forms of corruption, the
EFCC has an excellent working relationship with major law enforcement agencies all over the
world, inclusive of the United Nation on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Council of Europe.
4.6.2.2 NIGERIAN CYBERCRIME WORKING GROUP (NCWG)
In 2004, the Nigeria Cybercrime Working Group (NCWG) was set up with the aim of
realizing the objectives specified in the National Cyber security Initiative (NCI) [Maska,
2009]. 699 The objectives of the NCI include public enlightenment of the Nigerian populace on
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the nature and danger of cybercrime, criminalization through new legislation of all on-line
vices, establishment of legal and technical framework to secure computer systems and
Networks, and protection of critical information infrastructure for the country [Maska,
2009]. 700 The group was created to deliberate on and propose ways of tackling the malaise of
internet fraud in Nigeria [Tomilehin, 2015]. 701
4.6.2.3 The National Information Technology Development Agency
The NITDA is a public service institution which was established in 2007 by the NITDA
Act. The body is a policy implementing arm of the Federal Ministry of Communication in
Nigeria and it has the sole responsibility of developing programs that cater for the smooth
running of ICT related activities in Nigeria. The body is also saddled with the responsibility of
implementing policies and the guideline for driving a safer ICT space in Nigeria. Additionally,
it plays advisory role in copyright law by verification and revision of applicable laws in tandem
with the application of software and technology acquisition 702. It has the backing of trained
staffs, government functionaries and frequently engages in workshops to better strengthen its
abilities in the sector.
4.6.3 Policy Mechanism
4.6.3.1 National Cyber Security Policy 2014
The National Cyber Security Policy (NCP) 2014 is a strategic attempt at protecting the
nation’s space from cyber risks and additionally prioritizing relevant needs, curbing the
increasing cyber risks exposure. In Part 1.3 of the Policy, an identification of Nigeria’s national
cyber-security threats which poses challenges to Nigeria and is believed to be inimical to the
growth and security of Nigeria is attempted:
a) Cybercrime
Maska, M. U. (2009). Building National Cyber security Capacity in Nigeria: The Journeyso Far. Regional
Cyber security Forum for Africa and Arab States, Tunis<http://www.itu.int/ITUD/cyb/events/2009/tunis/docs/maska-nigeria-cybersecurity-june-09.pdf
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b) Cyber-espionage
c) Cyber conflict
d) Cyber Terrorism
e) Cyber online Abuse and Exploitation.
The policy contains unique strategic benefits 703: engendering global confidence in the
nation’s digital economy; safeguarding the nation’s presence in cyberspace; building
stakeholders confidence and trust in the nation’s ICT sectors and infrastructures; ensuring
national safety and protection of national critical Infrastructures; creating positive impacts on
economic growth and enhancement of the nation’s competitive advantage; promoting national
values, dignity, identity in cyberspace and improvement of national image; stimulating foreign
direct and indirect investment flows into country; promoting a vibrant and safe environment
for social interactions and ecommerce transactions; enabling the country address emergent
security challenges, building the nation’s capacity to detect, analyze, respond and manage
cyber security incidents; reducing prevalence of cybercrime activities while inducing safety
and security consciousness among the public; assuring the provision of a comprehensive
national security strategy for immediate and future engagements; and consolidating the leading
and functional roles of Nigeria at regional and global levels on matters relating to cyber
security.
Additionally, the policy educates citizens on what is needed to understand, respond and
collectively deter cyber threat activities. It is made up of eleven parts 704, the Policy seeks ‘to
develop national guidelines and criteria for profiling information infrastructure with a strategic
intent

of

determining,

identifying,

and

classifying

critical

national

information
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infrastructure’. 705 This policy will enable a strategy for addressing vulnerability of nation’s
Critical Information Infrastructure. 706 The measures contained should make room for the
adaptation of measures to the national cybersecurity standards and guidelines as provided for
in the National Cyber security Strategy. 707 The dynamism of cyber threat and the adverse
impact on Critical Information Infrastructure will be addressed through continuous engagement
of stakeholders from organized privates sector.
Part 4 of the Policy states the National Cyber security Roadmap which contains the
Policy’s Vision and Mission. The Policy envisions a ‘safe, secured, vibrant, resilient and trusted
community that provides opportunities for its citizenry, safeguards national assets and interests,
promote peaceful interactions and proactive engagement in cyberspace for national
prosperity.’ 708 The Policy’s Mission is ‘to foster harmonious, sustainable and integrated
Nigeria’s national cyber security readiness and coordination capacities towards addressing
and mitigating the nation’s cyber risks exposure in cyberspace’. 709The aim of the Policy is to
chart a course towards an assured and trusted presence in cyberspace. 710
Other specific objectives are to develop a national benchmark for regular statistical data
and situation report on Nigeria’s cyber security status; to develop a framework for inter-agency
collaboration on combating cybercrime and cyber security; to establish multi-stakeholder
partnerships, cooperation and leadership advisory mechanisms for information sharing,
intelligence gathering and coordinated response. Additionally, to promote the infusion of the
culture of cyber security and promotion of adherence to principles, standards and guidelines in
the country; to develop a coordinated national awareness strategy, capacity building, and
structured cyber security professional cadres across all national constituents; to develop
Part 5.2.4 on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)
Part 5.2.4 on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP)
707
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national criteria for the development of cyber security manpower, to facilitate institution of a
unified National Strategy on Cyber security to provide guidance, initiatives and measureable
action plan in the development, implementation, and sustainability of a national cyber security
roadmap. The policy is also posed to develop a national mechanism for the establishment of
Nigeria’s National Cyber security Coordination Center (NCCC) to serve as the focal point for
cyber security incident monitoring and response; coordinate and regulate Sectoral Computer
Emergency Response Team (S-CERT) and establishment of a National Digital Forensic
Laboratory (NDFL) in the country 711.
Another important provision of the Policy is Part 6 which contains the Principles on
Incident Management and Cert Ecosystem. Hence, the Policy in order to ensure resilient
national cyberspace, seeks a coordinated incident management capability necessary to manage
cyber security incidents 712.The Policy states that there shall be one national Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) which shall function as a central coordinating unit under
the NCCC to manage all cyber-incident activities within the national cyberspace that may affect
national security. 713 Part Seven contains the Vision of Nigerian Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NCIIPP) 714.
The specific objectives peculiar to NCIIPP are enunciated in Part 7.3 of the Policy. They
include detecting, identifying, discouraging, disrupting and preparing for threats and cyber
hazards to Nigeria’s critical information infrastructure; reduce vulnerabilities of critical assets,
systems and networks to deliberate, unintentional and natural threats. Mitigate the potential
consequences to critical infrastructure of incidents or adverse events that do occur through
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advance planning and mitigation efforts to save lives and ensure prompt recovery of essential
services. Sharing important and actionable information among the critical infrastructure
community in order to build awareness and provide a risk-informed decision making; as well
as promote learning and rapid revision of NCIIPP during and after incidents.
Part 7.5 of the Policy delineates the Critical Infrastructure Sectors. They are Communications
Sector, Government Facilities Sector, Manufacturing Sector, Dams Sector, Defense Sector,
Chemical Sector {Oil and Gas}, Power and Energy Sector, Commercial Facilities Sector,
Financial Services Sector, Food and Agriculture Sector, Emergency Services Sector,
Transportation Systems Sector, Public Health and Healthcare Sector, Water and Waste Water
systems, and Information Technology Sector 715.
4.6.4 Recent Legal Development on Cybercrime and Security in Nigeria
4.6.4.1 Computer Security and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Bill 2005
This Bill is expected to provide adequate response to the continuous threats on
information infrastructure in the nation as well as complement preceding legal framework
already in place for this purpose. Sections 11 and 12 of the draft Bill deals with identity theft,
and data retention and protection respectively. The Bill is also a move to provide privacy
protection for data and information that are state based. Section 4 of the Bill provides that any
data retained, processed or retrieved by the service provider at the request of any law
enforcement agency under this Act or pursuant to any regulation under this section, shall not
be utilized except for legitimate purposes. In this regard, the use of the data is deemed to
constitute legitimate purpose only with the consent of individuals to whom the data applies or
if authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction or other lawful authority.
4.6.4.2 Data Protection Agency Bill, 2010
Nigeria has no specific and comprehensive data information law. This discussion will
of course be irrelevant but for the continued development in the internet world giving rise to
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the increasing publication and incidental mishandling of information by the global audience.
An understanding of these issues spurred the sponsorship of the Data Protection Bill, by Hon.
Yakubu Dogara, a member of the Federal House of Representatives, Nigeria. The aim of the
bill is to reduce unauthorized processing and use of personal data and information without prior
consent of the data subject 716.Section 1 contains the provision on how personal data should be
handled. Sections 2-5 deal with the right of access to personal data; right to prevent processing
likely to cause damage or distress; right to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing;
and rights in relation to automated decision taking, respectively. The Bill, if eventually enacted
will ensure the protection of personal and private data and information within and outside
Nigeria 717. Under section 1(3), the Bill prevents unauthorized and unlawful processing, transfer
or use of personal data. The bill is posed to strengthen the fundamental rights of individuals as
regards rights to private life 718 as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 section 37. The problem of identity and information theft will largely be reduced
with the bill containing provisions that penalize such acts. Section 6 deals with failure to
comply with certain requirements of the law. Section 9 prohibits production of certain records.
The Bill contains laudable provision which gives legal backing to individuals, corporate
organizations and public agencies thereby enhancing performance of e-commerce activities in
Nigeria as it is predicted to improve customer relations, improve ability to market lawfully,
improve data quality and data security [Sanni, 2016, p.9] 719.
4.6.5

Building Stronger Legal Responses to Cybercrime and Cyber Security in Nigeria
The discussion so far recognizes that Nigeria has come far in combating cybercrime in

Nigeria with its legal framework. It suffices to say that the Nigerian internet space is safer today
than it was years before attempts came into place to provide regulatory frameworks for the
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Section 4
718
Section 2-5
719
Sanni, A. (2016). The Nigeria Data Protection Bill: Appraisal, Issues, and Challenges. Peer-Reviewed
Academic Journal (Vol. 9, No. 1) p.9
716
717

162

internet space. However, putting into consideration the various legal and policy frameworks as
well as the institutional mechanism that have been critically discussed in the select jurisdictions
above, Nigeria still has a long way to go to eventually reach the apex of cyber security. In this
section recommendations will be made on how to achieve this by drawing out comparison from
major cybercrime laws in the select jurisdictions.
To begin with, unlike America, the Cybercrime Act does not specifically provide for email
spam [Tomilehin, 2015, p.8] 720. Section 15 of the Act only provides for the crime of sending
messages that are grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, false for the purpose of causing
annoyance or with intent to harm any person, property, reputation or with intent to extort.
Section 42, which is the interpretation Section, defines cyberstalking to include:
(i) the use of the Internet or other electronic means to stalk or harass an individual, a
group of individuals, or an organization. It may include false accusations, monitoring,
making threats, identity theft, damage to data or equipment, the solicitation of minors
for sex, or gathering information in order to harass; (ii) sending multiple e-mails, often
on a systematic basis, to annoy, embarrass, intimidate, or threaten a person or to make
the person fearful that she or a member of her family or household will be harmed.
This does not extend to email spam. Email spam involves sending large amount of
unsolicited commercial email, which could occur even in the absence of any intent to annoy,
threaten or annoy the receiver. In our current age, spam could even contain various malware
threats that the sender of the mail might not even know about. Therefore, it is suffice to say
that the Cybercrime Act is not comprehensive enough in relation to cyberstalking as opposed
to the American legal regime that specifically provides for email spam by virtue of its CAN
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SPAM Act under Section 1037 [Tomilehin, 2015, p.8] 721. The Act also provides for sanction
that ranges from one to five years, depending on aggravating factors and prior convictions.
Also, the Cybercrime Act as opposed to the American Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
does not allow victims who suffer specific types of loss or damage as a result of violations of
the Act to bring civil actions against the violators for compensatory damages and injunctive or
other equitable reliefs. Section 31 of the Cybercrime Act only provides for the forfeiture of the
assets to the Federal Government of Nigeria. Under the CFAA, by virtue of Subsection
1030(g), a victim could bring a civil action for any equitable relief in certain situations. The
Cybercrime Act thus neglects the interests of victims that are affected by the acts of
cybercriminals and does not provide them with adequate protection.
Furthermore, although Section 24(3) of the Cybercrime Act provides that law
enforcement, security and intelligence agencies should undergo training programmes, the fact
that the judges are not included among the people required to undergo training programmes
would likely affect the effective implementation of the Act [Sanni, 2016, p.9] 722. The
Provisions in the NCCA which grants the NCC original jurisdiction to try offences arising
under the Act is a laudable one because it allows for expertise review of situation under the
Act, a skill and knowledge that might not be possessed by the Courts. This situation under the
NCCA is not being proposed in the Cybercrimes Act because a recurrent criticism has recently
arisen as to the rising number of subject matters that are taken out of the original jurisdiction
of the Courts and given to legally established bodies, which, according to these critics, is
gradually making the Courts insignificant. Rather, it is recommended that training should be
extended to the judicial arm having the jurisdiction to try offences under the Act. Also, it is
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proposed that the issue of cybercrime is almost always an extra territorial issue and the absence
of an extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Federal High Court having jurisdiction to try matters
under the Act, as is the case in the United Kingdom, China and South Africa, is a major flaw.
The Act needs to define its administrative body. The Act does not state who is in charge
of its enforcement. This is necessary to avoid conflict between the several law enforcement
agencies such as the EFCC, the Police Force, the National Security Organization, etc. Also,
this is necessary to ensure efficient prosecution of offences under the CPPA [Tomilehin,
2015] 723. It is also recommended that the Data Protection Bill be passed into law promptly to
compliment the efforts being made under the Cyber Crimes Act to provide a safer internet
environment for Nigerians.

4.7

Conclusion
This Chapter has critically discussed the efforts being made by some nations to combat

cybercrime and ultimately, ensure cyber security. In every case, nations are not taking the
issues concerning cybercrimes likely and as such majority of the laws that have been discussed
above, are indeed commendable steps in ensuring a secured cyber space for the world,
eventually. However, it is my observation that the internet is not averse to novelty: everyday,
new ways to make the world a smaller global space is being sought through technological
innovations. It is therefore pertinent that nations do not rest on their laurels in the enactment
and amendment of some of these laws, to introduce and accommodate these new technological
innovations, aimed at combating cybercrimes. It is important to mention that the Countries,
whose legal and policy frameworks on cybercrimes have been discussed here, are nations
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whose laws stand out in providing solutions to the subject matter of this paper as well as provide
prospects on a safer cyber space partially. Although these nations are not without their own
flaws in enhancing cyber security, but it begs mentioning that they are doing lots more than
nations, who have taken no step at all in the fight against cybercrime, largely because of the
challenges which the subject matter breeds. These challenges are given due consideration in
the next chapter.
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5.1

Introduction
Without doubt, nations are working towards a better cyberspace. However, this is not

without its own challenges. The issues militating against the fight of cybercrime are unique as
they are numerous. Largely, mechanisms and strategies mostly adopted to circumvent the
activities of cybercriminals have constantly been adopted by these criminals in turn to further
perpetuate their activities. The Onion Router (Tor) which was originally developed by the
United States Naval Research Laboratory to enable anonymous access, communication and
information sharing online as well as protect intelligence, is today now being used by
cybercriminals to anonymize and mask their identity as well as circumvent government
surveillance of online activities [UNODC, 2019]. 724 This is only a pinch of the troubling
narrative. In India, it has become almost impossible to keep track of surveillances, geared at
cyber security for the single reason that activities of cyber criminals within the past 3 years,
have exponentially increased using the same tactics developed to prevent cybercrimes [IANS,
2020]. 725 Ukraine on the other hand is doing commendably well in this battle however,
cybercriminals are pulling its efforts three times backwards [Council of Europe, 2020]
. 726Other nations are not left out. Significantly, a thorough understanding of the problems
militating against the fight of cybercrime becomes necessary for the effective development of
strategies, policies, laws and mechanisms to fight this menace as well as an in-depth
appreciation of the proposals made in the last chapter of this dissertation.
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This chapter gives detailed analysis of the impediments faced in combating cybercrime
globally, and enforcing global cybersecurity. Particularly, it espouses that in light of these
issues, traditional methods for fighting crimes are no longer effective against cybercrime. In
adumbrating these challenges, regard is had to issues affecting certain nations or regions in
particular. In the same vein, regard is had to issues that are general to all nations, as well as the
international space and emphasis is placed on greater need for cyber-experts in diverse fields,
at which efforts against cybercrime are being made. A conclusion is thereafter drawn.
5.2 Identity of Cybercriminals
One of the greatest impediments against global efforts towards stemming cybercrimes
remains the anonymous nature of the identity of cybercriminals [Ajayi, 2016, pp. 1-12]. 727
There is no one way of identifying a cybercriminal largely because the global information
system is free and there is no prerequisite that must be fulfilled before a user can login to
connect with anyone anywhere in the world. Because of this masked use, there have been
growing debates to end the anonymity in the use of the internet by the mandatory introduction
of identification as a prerequisite to using the internet [Kabay, 1998]. 728Human rights activists
have however opposed this vehemently on the basis that it violates individuals’ rights to
privacy [Clarke, 1997]. 729
Assuming that the debate on the removal of anonymity from the internet in fact scales
through, one cannot totally exclude the possibility that technologies developed to introduce
anonymity into the internet space, can also be manipulated by cybercriminals, to by-pass
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identification on the internet. If we stretch our imagination further, and a nations cyber security
unit is well equipped and effective, and in fact traces the IP address of a cybercriminal to a
particular location, the next hurdle cannot be scaled as the identity (physical looks, body build
or gender) of a cybercriminal is undisclosed to the owner or operator of the Internet service
provider [Ajayi, 2016]. 730
The above argument aside, presently, cybercriminals use anonymity networks to
encrypt (block access) traffic and hid their internet protocol address or other internet-connected
digital device in an effort to conceal their internet activities and locations [UNODC, 2019].731
Popular amongst these anonymity networks are Tor and Freenet. According to the IOCTA
report, 2015 and 2016 [Europol 2019], 732cybercriminals such as child sex offenders, producers,
and cyber terrorists make increasing use of the Darknet and other similar areas largely because
it offers them great anonymity. This portends grave problems for victims who suffer grossly
without any hope of fighting for their right largely due to the anonymous nature of
cybercriminals.
A most notable case is that of an Annapolis, Maryland woman who was mail bombed
after she warned other writers about extortionate fees from an author's agency; her name, phone
number and address were posted on all sex groups on the USENET and resulted in floods of
offensive phone calls. There is still no trace of the mail source or the IP address that posted her
information on the internet [Kabay, 1994]. 733 In another case, an anti-spam activist, 734 Jim
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Youll of new media group, was mail bombed in mid-May and then his servers were hijacked
to send out thousands of junk e-mail messages, which in turn led to a huge inflow of abusive
complaints from the people being spammed, while the identity of the perpetrator was never
found [Europol, 2019]. 735An innocent Florida businessman Bruce Hovland, was harassed by
thousands of phone calls from angry strangers, who complained about junk e-mail that
threatened to bill their credit cards for almost $200, in return for non-existent pornographic
videos, they had never ordered and did not want [Europol, 2019]. 736In 2021, the US
cybersecurity professionals could barely keep up with ransomware attacks, the hack of the
software company Kaseya, and the most pervasive ransomware attacks ever that effected more
than 1,500 organizations. These faceless criminals behind it operate with impunity.
In developing nations in the African region, these issues present special challenges,
further aggravating the existing problem. Reports show that when individuals suffer internet
crimes, there is less efforts to actually trace these criminals, as there are efforts in developed
nations such as the UK, US, England, Germany, Canada, Russia and so on. In 2014 for
example, it was reported that cyber crime was increasing in Africa than in anywhere else
primarily because technologies and cyber knowledge, needed to detect and track down cyber
criminals, were non-existent [Shaw, 2018]. 737 This is one of the greatest banes in the fight
against cybercrime in Africa in particular and will be given more attention in the latter part of
this paper.
The difficulty in identifying cybercriminals breeds further issues. In these situations,
the country with jurisdiction is often unclear, assuming the location of a cybercriminal is found
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to be away from the detecting State [Europol, 2019]. 738 In the same vein, the legal framework
that should regulate the collection of evidence or the use of special investigative powers
becomes problematic [Europol, 2019]. 739This problem speaks to the possibility of enforcing
the laws existing to prevent cybercrimes, because only a cybercriminal, who can be found, can
be criminalized. As the dictum of Lord Denning goes, ‘you cannot put something on nothing
and expect it to stand’. 740 The point being made is that so long as the identity of cybercriminals
remains elusive, the law, no matter how well-crafted, cannot work; the law does not work in
vacuum.
5.3 Sovereignty, Extradition and Jurisdictional Issues
Every international treaty, regional law and national law makes provisions for the
sovereignty of States [UN, 2021]. 741 The implication of sovereignty for each State is that every
State has a right to decide matters within its territory, independently and to the non-intervention
of other nations. As a result of this, conflict of laws between different States become
unavoidable since laws are being made from different jurisdictions and different
circumstances/perspective. This raises issues in the fight against cybercrimes especially along
jurisdictional lines.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power of a court or judge to entertain an action, petition
or proceedings. 742The issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental that it forms the basis of any
adjudication, stated otherwise; it goes to the roots of any matter before the courts. 743 The trend
of this discourse mandates that a distinction be drawn between the use of jurisdiction in extra-
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territorial and intra-territorial situations. The former is our concern because it considers the
competence of a Court when its judgment is sought to be enforced outside its forum.
Jurisdiction has so many faces, but in the fight against cybercrime, two issues are
earmarked; geographical jurisdiction and jurisdiction in personam. 744 Geographical
jurisdiction addresses the fundamental issue as to if a Court has the power beyond the territory
where it is situate, while jurisdiction in personam deals with whether a court is empowered to
hear and determine a case of a cybercriminal not within its jurisdiction [Ajayi,
2016]. 745Essentially, the cyberspace has no geographical boundaries; there is no way to
decipher where a particular person is using the internet from or from what territory certain
information is being sent. 746Cybercrime is peculiar in nature, and it exists as a class of its own.
In particular, cybercrime is unique and distinct in character unlike traditional terrestrial crimes
which are committed in particular location. What this means is that a cybercriminal could sit
in the comfort of his abode and with just a desktop, tablet, phone, laptop or any device
connected to the internet, he could carry out an activity that could be felt hundred meters away
– beyond his immediate territory. A very good example is the case of the ‘I LOVE YOU’ virus
that attacked more than half of the internet users in Philippines in 2000 even though the sender
had been miles away [Lokwani, 2020]. 747Sieber puts it more aptly when he says:
‘The ubiquity of information in modern communication systems makes it irrelevant as
to where perpetrators and victims of crimes are situated in terms of geography. There is no
need for the perpetrator or the victim of a crime to move or to meet in person. Unlawful actions
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such as computer manipulations in one country can have direct, immediate effects in the
computer systems of another country’. 748
To give context to the above point, in 2014, it was confirmed by Barrack Obama that
the internet attack that hacked Sony Entertainment Pictures in the United States thereby
releasing the personal information and pictures of employees came from North
Korea. 749Although it was denied by North Korea, but this gives a glimpse of how much
unconventional and frightening cyber crime can be. Very recently, it was alleged that Russia
hacked the system of the Democratic National Committee during the 2016 US Presidential
Election. Secret emails were published and relationships between nations were strained [Gala,
2017]. 750
The above cybercrime examples herald technical jurisdictional issues. Assuming the
problem of identifying the cybercriminal is solved and it happens that he/she is situated in
another country different from where the victim of the crime is domiciled, it becomes quite
dicey as to who should have jurisdiction to try the offence [Ajayi, 2016]. 751Some international
laws exist on this subject matter. The Budapest Convention, 2001 also known as the Council
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime deals with criminal offences committed against or with
the help of computer networks such as the Internet as was discussed in chapter three of this
dissertation. The Convention deals primarily with offences related to infringement of
copyright, 752 computer-related fraud, 753 child pornography 754 and offences connected with
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network security. 755 It also covers a series of procedural powers such as searches of an
interception of material on computer networks. The main aim of the Convention as set forth in
the preamble is to pursue, “a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against
cyber crime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international cooperation.”
The Budapest Convention on Cyber crime suggests certain guidelines in relation
to jurisdiction in respect of cybercrimes. A country has jurisdiction if the cybercrime was
committed:
E. In its territory;
F. On board a ship flying the flag of the country;
G. On board an aircraft registered under the laws of the country;
H. By one of the countries nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was
committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State. 756
But, even the above provision falls short in providing a definition of what is meant in
Article 22(1)(a) above by ‘In its Territory’. Particularly does this mean that a nation has
jurisdiction when the victim of the crime is in that Territory or when the IP address
communicating the attack or information is in that territory or when the cybercriminal is in that
territory? If the nature of cybercrime as we have discussed it so far is anything to go by, then
all these places can qualify as the territory in which a cybercrime is committed.
Furthermore, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime states that when more than one
signatory country claims jurisdiction in respect of an offence, the countries should consult to
determine the most appropriate jurisdiction for a prosecution. 757The country in which most of
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the elements of the crime were committed or the country that was affected the most by the
crime could be decisive. The location of witnesses could also be an important factor to take
into account. The problem with the Budapest Convention is that it is only applicable to
contracting States under the Convention and discouragingly, only 64 countries had ratified the
Convention as at 2020 [Daskal & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020]. 758This takes us back to the problems
highlighted about jurisdiction prior to the discourse on the Budapest Convention. Putting the
Budapest Convention aside, what the above presupposes is that in a situation where a
cybercriminal commits an offence and his/her victim is situated in a country away from where
the cybercriminal is domiciled; the right of jurisdiction would naturally tilt in favor of the
country where the victim of the cybercrime is domiciled. This is primarily because international
laws support that only the jurisdiction of the victim would give out adequate punishment
commensurate to the crime committed by a criminal. However, even this principle raises
further challenges in fighting cybercrime – issues of extradition.
Extradition is the process of returning somebody accused of a crime by a different legal
authority for trial or punishment. 759 The Oxford Dictionary 760 defines it as the surrender by one
State to another of a person accused of committing an offence in the latter. A look at the
definition of extradition gives the idea that if a person is alleged to have committed a
cybercrime in one jurisdiction and escapes to another country, all that needs to be done by the
country where the cybercriminal is domiciled is to expeditiously return the said criminal to the
requesting country, to face trial; however, it is not this simple [Ajayi, 2016, pp. 1-12]. 761 On
the one hand, it might be difficult for the domiciling State to find the exact location of the
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cybercriminal in the State; on the other hand, assuming the cybercriminal is found, the principle
of State independence and sovereignty earlier explained gives States the autonomy to decide
whether or not to turn in the criminal.
Under international law, there is no instrument that imposes on sovereign nations an
obligation to automatically return cybercriminals to another State for trial. What the Budapest
Convention provides for in Article 2 is extraditable offences. It provides that an offence is
extraditable if punishable under the laws in both contracting parties by imprisonments for more
than one year or by a more severe penalty. 762 This is in tune with the double criminality rule
which stipulates that the conduct be an offence in both the requesting State and the requested
State. There is nothing in the Budapest Convention or any international treaty that mandates
States to extradite offenders; Article 24 merely provides for mandatory grounds upon which
extradition request may be refused. In effect, countries where cybercriminals are situating, for
different reasons, more often than not, refuse to extradite cybercriminals and this development
presents an insurmountable challenge to the enforcement of cybercrime laws across the
globe. 763
So many issues come to play in extradition. On the one hand, there are diverse
exceptions created by States to the rule of extradition in a bid to protect their citizens and on
the other hand, there is the sovereignty of States that allows nationals to decide if or not they
want to extradite a criminal whether or not the circumstances is one bordering on the
exceptions. Article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention (EHRC) prohibits deportation
or extradition of persons if there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of
treatment contrary to Article 3. It was particularly emphasized by the Court in Soering V The
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United Kingdom 764that where a German national alleged to have committed murder in the US,
fled to the UK, that the fear of degrading punishment and torture of a criminal is enough reason
to deny extradition request. Flowing from this, Courts have always emphasized that nationals
who take upon themselves the jurisdiction to try criminals from another State should abide by
the cardinal principles of fair hearing as well as ensure that such criminals are humanely
treated. 765 Essentially, if death sentence is likely to be the faith of the criminal when extradited
then some countries such as Australia 766, Canada 767, New Zealand and most European
nations 768 would refuse extradition irrespective of the offence such citizen might have
committed. Furthermore, when the alleged offence is classified as political, extradition of the
criminal may be refused [Ajayi, 2016]. 769 Pure political offences are excluded from the realm
of extradition [Bassiouni, 1999]. 770 The problem this poses is that it becomes difficult to decide
what ‘pure political offences’ are as it relates to cybercrime. For example, if an expert brings
down a website used for propaganda of political falsehood about a particular government’s
activities and the said expert flees to another country, would his alleged offence be political or
purely criminal? [Ajayi, 2016] 771
From another perspective, some nations by their laws have jurisdiction to try within
their State offences committed abroad by their citizens; this poses another problem on the
possibility of extradition and by extension, enforcement of cybercrime laws. Some of such
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nations having such laws include but are not limited to: Austria 772, Brazil 773, The Czech
Republic 774, France 775, Germany 776 and Japan. 777There have been arguments surrounding the
propriety of conducting trials by countries regarding their nationals but this paper posits that
considering the unconventional nature of cybercrime, justice would not be met. Particularly,
some nations do not consider offences of cybercrimes as critically as other nations do, and
because of this, it slopes the manner in which nations would prosecute the offence if given the
opportunity to do so.
Asides from all these issues enumerated above, the processes of returning criminals are
overly cumbersome, time consuming and costly. When one considers these issues alongside
the exemptions clogging expedition, it makes the processes of enforcing cybercrimes laws both
in national and international space very difficult.
5.4 Lack of Adequate Legal Frameworks on Cyber Security
The absence of adequate legal frameworks for cyber security is a problem particular to
certain nations. The problems of ineffective cybercrime laws transcend the international space
and as such are mostly pitched on developing nations especially in Africa. The next discourse
will be focused on these issues.
5.4.1 Conflict of Laws
Conflict of laws occurs when there are several possible laws that could apply, and those
laws mandate different results [Alexis, 2021]. 778 For example, if an accident occurs within a
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State, State laws usually apply. If both parties were residents of a different State however, an
argument could be made that the law of the State in which they live applies; this is what conflict
of laws portend [Alexis, 2021]. 779
One challenge beclouding the fight of cybercrime is the absence of any unifying law in
any particular region. For example, Legal frameworks vary between countries in Europe,
making effective cross-border investigation and prosecution of cybercrime extremely
challenging [Niram, Gisbon &Maralis, 2021]. 780 The main differences relate to which conduct
is criminalized as cybercrime and how investigations may be conducted. Following the clamor
to fight this issue in certain regions, efforts have been geared towards unifying the cybercrime
laws in some regions. In 2014, the African Union’s Convention on Cyber Security and Personal
Data Protection was introduced in East Africa; 781however, the problem remains unsolved.
Academics have espoused that the nature of cybercrime is one that demands a universal
framework to tackle the recurrent issues bordering on jurisdictions as well as extradition issues
[Ajayi, 2016]. 782 This argument is hinged on the rationale that cybercrime respects no
jurisdiction or geographical demarcation so that a criminal could be seated in Nigeria and
commit a crime that would affect an individual in Lebanon. In this instance, the problem then
becomes the law that would suffice or be applicable. Even if the African region succeeds in
enacting a regionally applicable legal framework for the entire African Region, the issue would
still not be solved because then again a criminal could be seated in Europe and commit a crime
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that would affect an individual in Ghana and the server (IP address sending the attack or
information) might be hosted in Russia. These portend very complex issues and a national,
regional or sub-regional law will not be sufficient to proffer solutions to this problem.
The majority of laws bordering on cybercrime as we have highlighted in the preceding
discourse are majorly national or regional laws. For all intents and purpose, the only
international law bordering on cybercrime in the international scene is the Budapest
Convention which from all indications unsuccessfully deals with the issue bordering on
jurisdiction and not necessarily all issues militating against the fight of cybercrime.
What we begin to see in practice are cases where nations are at loggerheads on what
laws to apply when cybercrime becomes transnational. On the other side of the narrative, if in
fact an international law bordering on cybercrime is drafted and a considerable number of
nations do not ratify same, the problem of conflicts of laws continue. However, it is better the
world is faced with a problem of non-ratification of an existing comprehensive international
law bordering on cybercrime and security than the non-existence of such law. The problem of
non-ratification is likely surmountable.
5.4.2 Laws Falling Behind in Context and Time
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Africa and
Asia have the least effective cybercrime and security laws largely because the trends reflected
in these laws are not in tune with global efforts. 783Closely related to this problem is the absence
of any cybercrimes or security laws in some jurisdictions. The UNCTAD reports that about
13% of the nations of the World lack cybercrime laws. 784 These issues when cumulated portend
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retrogression in the global efforts being taken to ensure that cybercrime is reduced to the barest
minimum.
Laws falling behind in context suffer the absence of rising new offences in the cyber
space. In Zanzibar for example, the offence of child pornography is not explicitly an offence.
What is provided for instead is child grooming which relates more to activities aimed at
attracting minors into illegal business and not necessarily with exposure of nude or sexual
images of minors on the internet [Haji]. 785Identity theft, cyber ware, phishing and email
spamming are growing offences which have not been considered as offences in numerous
jurisdictions. In nations such as India, there is no clear-cut definition of what constitutes
cybercrime, thereby leaving the numerous laws bordering on the subject matter to diverse unconnected interpretations [Kaundal, p.68]. 786 In largely underdeveloped nations, offences such
as email spoofing and identity theft are still not considered offences even though cybercrime
laws exist in these States. It is almost impossible to be extradited, tried or charged of cyber
crime in Bosnia and Albania principally because the framework for same is nonexistent
[Monnik, 2017]. 787Other nations falling back in cybercrime and security laws include Mongoli,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Congo and Mozambique. Until 24, May 2017 hacking and
Cybercrime was not an offence in Ireland [FitzGerald, 2017]. 788
In the same vein, Eastern Block European countries have little laws [FitzGerald, 2017].789
Furthermore, nations such as Nigeria allow for 419 scams without much chance of capture or
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arrest. 790Additionally, there is the problem of inadequate sanctions in these laws [Ajayi,
2016]. 791 On the other side, some nations such as the UK have gone as far as introducing
technologies that are in tune with the structure of cybercrimes today. Some of these include the
mandate of a chip-and-pin technology for banking transactions to limit internet fraud. Another
commendable policy in the UK is the provision of cybercrime hot lines for emergency
[Monnik, 2017]. 792While some nations merely stopped at cyber stalking as an offence, India
has gone ahead to make cyber flirting and voyeurism 793 an offence [Mahawar, 2021]. 794 Further
challenges are associated with new and emerging technologies such as quantum computing and
artificial intelligence. Whilst presenting opportunities for law enforcement and the private
sector in detection and mitigation, there is also the potential for criminal misuse to fuel
cybercrime [Niram, Gisbon & Maralis, 2021]. 795African nations are still backwards in all these
developments and narrative and extensively this militates against the fight of cybercrime and
the provision of cybersecurity globally. The fight against cybercrime, if commendable on a
national level thereby leaving out some nations, nothing is in fact being done. As already
enunciated, cybercrime respects no geographical demarcations.
5.4.3 Challenges of Drafting National Criminal Laws
Numerous issues surround the draft of a comprehensive legal framework bordering on
cybercrime and security. For instance, why now? Are there any peculiar motivations in
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enacting the law now? Will the law itself, the length and breadth of it improve the life of the
ordinary citizen? Does the law pass the constitutionality test? These are however minor
questions, most often, the question borders on if there is in fact the expertise amongst the
drafters to understand on the one hand, the nature of cybercrime and the emerging trends in
cybercrime offences so as to incorporate same in the law. If ever these issues are surmounted,
one might begin to ask if in fact the drafters of the law, however knowledgeable they may be
about the nature of cybercrime understand the need to allocate commensurate sanctions for
offences. In the same vein, there is need to avert our minds to mechanisms of justice in drafting
such laws.
Essentially, the draft of national cybercrime laws would have to consider as well
strategies on cyber security. Effectively, the law has to stand out to not only criminalize
cybercrime but as a mechanism for ensuring cyber security. This would require expert
understanding of internet technologies. One problem that this presents in underdeveloped
nations is the absence of funds to pull in experts to educate existing cyber experts further on
strategies. This is perhaps one of the reasons why laws of some jurisdictions such as Nigeria
are mostly imported without reflecting the peculiar nature of the Nigerian economy in such
laws.
5.5 The Question of Attributability and Responsibility for Wrongful Conduct
National and regional laws bordering on cybercrime prescribe responsibilities for
certain conducts in the event of a cyber offence but often times, the nature of cybercrime makes
direct attributability and responsibility for an offence difficult and often times, these offences
overlap. The manner in which cybercrime laws are drafted today portend that in more cases
than not, internet service providers now have responsibilities imposed on them as well as to
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some extent, companies and organizations that deal with large amount of customers’ data.796
In these instances, when cybercrimes are committed and the criminal cannot in fact be found
but the nature of the crime is one that has affected the system of an organization who has in
fact complied with the law as to the provision of certain cyber security measures and this has
in turn affected the customers of the organization, the question of who is held responsible
comes up. On the face of it, the cyber criminal is definitely the person to be held responsible,
however, the cyber criminal cannot be found and the victim has suffered from the act. In this
case, the question of whether the organization should be held liable becomes a tricky one; on
one side, it would be unfair to make the organization pay for damages to a victim when it had
in fact not caused the damage. The narrative would of course have been different if the
organization had not complied with the law as regards (for example) the appointment of Data
Compliance Officers or the structuring of certain cyber security measures. This is however just
a part of the narrative in the problem of attributability and responsibility for wrongful conducts.
Where a code of ethics (i.e., guidelines covering right and wrong conduct to inform
decision-making) exists, it often includes what cybercrime investigators and/or digital
forensics professionals should do at all times and what these individuals should never do under
any circumstance. For instance, the International Society of Forensic Computer Examiners
(ISFCE) includes a code of ethics for its members to abide by to ensure that standards are being
met and the results of the digital forensics process are accurate and trustworthy [UNODC,
2019]. 797 This code of ethics includes the behaviors that members must engage in (e.g., abiding
by legal orders and conducting a comprehensive examination of the evidence according to
existing laws, standards, procedures, and guidelines) and prohibited behaviors (e.g.,
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withholding evidence, engaging in biased analyses or reporting of evidence, and
misrepresenting qualifications) [UNODC, 2019]. 798 In instances where cybercrime is
committed without identifying the cybercriminal and the Code of Ethics are not dully followed
thereby further aggravating the crime, does the forensic investigator bear all the brunt of the
crime (penalty for his mistakes and penalty for the cybercriminal’s crime) or does he just pay
for his own penalty? The nature of cybercrime makes it almost impossible to fix the offence on
any particular person. Where there is just one cybercriminal and there are other factors enabling
the cybercriminal’s activities to what extent are the latter factors (persons enabling these
factors) held responsible for the crime? For example, where a criminal uses another’s device
to commit an offence and the latter person is unaware of this and it happens that the
cybercriminal is not found, who bears responsibility for the crime? These issues are quite
numerous and it takes the efforts against cybercrime a little too further than what is existent on
the surface.
5.6 Challenges Arising from Admissibility of Computer Generated Evidence
One other impediment to the enforcement of cybercrime laws wherever attempts are
made anywhere across the globe, is the nature of evidence available in the custody of
prosecution and the admissibility of same, during the course trial of cybercriminals [Ajayi,
2016]. 799 Evidence is that which tends to prove the existence of some alleged facts and may
consist of testimony, documentary evidence, real evidence as well as when the evidence can
be admissible. The law of evidence comprises all the rules governing the presentation of facts
and proofs in proceedings before a Court, including in particular the rules governing the
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admissibility of evidence and the exclusionary rules. 800 Essentially, evidence could be
circumstantial, conclusive, direct, extrinsic, primary, secondary etc. but its purview as it relates
to cybercrimes is the application of science to decide questions arising from crime or litigation
known as forensic. 801
The problem of computer generated evidence as it relates to enforcement of
cybercrimes laws is a stifling one and it is specific to certain jurisdictions such as Nigeria. In
Nigeria, section 258 of the Evidence Act, 2011 defines computer generated evidence to include
Books, Maps, Plans, Photographs, video, Disc, Tape etc, provided they were derived from any
device used for storing and processing information. This immediately settles the argument that
only documents gotten directly from a computer can be tendered as evidence under the Act
[Abubakar, 2017]. 802 However, when the discourse on the admissibility of computer generated
evidence arises under cybercrimes, it is often fraught with many other difficulties which affect
the enforcement of cybercrime laws as well as the provision of justice for the victim of a
cybercrime. Particularly, section 84(2) contains certain condition before a document generated
from the computer can be tendered as evidence. It provides:
A. That the document containing the Statement was produced by the computer during a period
over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes
of any activities regularly carried on over that period, whether for profit or not, by anybody,
whether corporate or not, or by any individual;

Oxford Dictionary of Law, 2002
Microsoft Encarta Dictionary
802
Abubakar, R. (2017). Appraising Institutional Capacity for Implementation of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act
2015. Proceedings on Big Data Analytics & Innovation (Peer-Reviewed), Volume 2, 2017, pp.59-80
<https://www.academia.edu/26325623/Admissibility_of_Electronic_Evidence_under_Section_84_of_Evidence
_Act_2011_Examining_the_unresolved_Authentication_Problem1>
800
801

187

B. That over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of
those activities information of the kind contained in the Statement or of the kind from which
the information so contained is derived;
C. That throughout the material part of that period the computer was operating properly or, if not,
that in any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that
part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of
its contents, and
D. That the information contained in the Statement reproduces or is derived from information
supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities.
Oftentimes, people and in fact Nigerian Courts have interpreted this provision to mean
that such computer-generated evidence must be accompanied by a certificate of compliance
flowing from the above section. Counsel who remember to file this certificate often have their
computer-generated evidence discarded on the basis that the ‘certificate’ does not properly
comply with the provisions of section 84(2) and does not in fact prove that the computer was
constantly in use during the period the evidence was gotten. The effect of this is that the case
drags on for years with counsel seeking for better ways to comply with the said section.
However, the Supreme Court, per Chima Centus Nweze, J.S.C (Pp. 23-24, Paras. A-E) in
Dickson V. Sylva &Ors 803has reiterated that in tendering a computer generated evidence, that
a computer complied with the provisions of section 84(2), by given orally evidence say by
calling a witness who can give evidence that the computer was working well as at the time the
evidence was gotten. This was replicated in the case of R v. Shepherd. 804
The above, however, does not answer some other questions stemming from computergenerated evidence for example, if the certificate is replicated on the document that is the
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evidence itself can this still be admissible? And where there is no witness available to give oral
evidence, what then is the specific format for the certificate of compliance? These uncertainties
portend grave problem to the enforcement of cybercrime laws in Nigeria considering in
particular that about 85% of evidence needed at any time to succeed in a cybercrime suit are
computer-generated evidence.
5.7 Weak Institutional and Regulatory Capacities
In the fight against cybercrime, putting in place effective institutional and regulatory
bodies is as important as having effective cybercrime laws and policies. Diverse areas of the
world today suffer dearth of institutional and regulatory capacities for the enforcement and
regulation of cybercrime and projection of cyber security. While some nations are doing
exceptionally well in doubling their regulatory capacities to beat the growing threats to the
internet space, some nations are simply sitting on the fence and some others are nowhere near
the discourse. In the US for example, there are established specific institutional and regulatory
bodies dealing with specific aspects of the internet and providing advice and support to the
public and organizations in this regard. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 805 as
well as the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 806are some of
such bodies in the US. The UK is also doing commendably well in this regard [Gisbon,
2014]. 807In another narrative, a survey conducted in Nigeria, showed an unremarkably 65.3%
of security agents opining that there was insufficient institutional capacity to fight cybercrime
in the nation [Abubakar, 2017]. 808Particular, the case is not one of absence of these institutional
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bodies but rather a dearth in expertise needed to drive the needed change. Nations such as
Lebanon, Indonesia, and Mozambique have worse figures.
Interestingly, the international space is committed to changing this narrative by
providing more support to weak nations in the fight against cybercrime. What we begin to
notice however is that while some nations are willing to open their gates in a welcoming
gesture, some States are not. The latter is largely due to the nonchalance that some nations pour
into matters relating to cybercrime and security. Without doubt, cybercrime is a threat in some
nations than it is in some other nations but then again, we have reiterated in this paper that
cybercrime respects no geographical barrier and as such, no nation, however lackadaisical or
strong their stance against cybercrime and for cyber security is, is safe. It becomes pertinent
therefore that the fight against cybercrime is made more collective than individual.
5.8 Lack of Effective Reporting and Dearth of Data
Drawing from the discussions so far, especially as it relates to the fact that the fight
against cybercrime is weaker in some nations/regions than some others, it reveals that there is
huge reluctance to report cybercrimes when it in fact occurs. The reasons for reluctance to
report cybercrime are as diverse as there are different aspects to the issues on cybercrime faced
by nations.
For nations in Africa where base-line vulnerabilities is still an issue, victims of crimes
are often reluctant to report matters on cybercrime largely because they do not have the cost to
follow up on these crimes as well as the emotional or mental strength to deal with the suit. The
absence of interest in this regard does not necessarily mean that such victims have not grossly
suffered from the fallout of the crime, rather it comes from the notion that the stress poured
into fighting for one’s right is never commensurate to the damages or punishment meted out to
the victim at the end. In the case of organizations, they are often reluctant to draw attention to
190

their business considering that publicity of the suit would mean that the public would lose its
confidence in the organization to protect their information or secure their transactions [Ajayi,
2016]. 809 Big companies are often careful in this regard to do any damage to their reputation
or goodwill [Ajayi, 2016].. 810 This is particularly understandable considering that business are
in a competitive environment and would not want to seem vulnerable which would in turn
erode confidence in its services or goods.
Essentially, the mode of investigating cybercrimes and perpetrators is a very difficult
one and unless a nation shows concerted efforts towards establishing capable agencies that can
deal with these issues, it loses the trust of its citizenry in this regard. The absence of trust in the
prosecution and Court process as well as process of investigation affects the report on
cybercrime. In order to buttress apathy to the reporting of incidences of cybercrimes, an
empirical survey carried out by a consultancy firm, Ernst and Young [Young, 2003], 811showed
that for over a decade, only one quarter (1/4) of frauds was ever reported to the police
worldwide and further, that only about 28% of those reported were properly investigated. In
another survey by a globally renowned firm, KPMG, 812 the reasons afore-stated for
unwillingness to report cybercrimes were also replicated; particularly, to minimize further
business losses that would most likely occur while following up the cyber event, as in
investigation and prosecution of same. In most African nations, such as Nigeria, this
unwillingness is caused by the tardiness of the Judiciary. On an average, a criminal suit in
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Nigeria takes a minimum of 2 years [Eke, 2013]. 813 During these years, an ordinary citizens
fighting for their rights spends nothing less than 500,000 Thousand Naira 814 on costs,
investigations, lawyer fees, transport. All these do not include the tips given once in a while to
the police to keep the investigation open considering on the one hand that the Nigerian police
are abysmally under-paid and lacking in the needed expertise to take up certain investigations.
This is apart from the problem of lack of awareness among citizens on the particular bodies in
charge of investigating cybercrimes in their nations. 815
In more advanced nations, the reluctance to report cybercrimes are more specific in
nature. Reluctance mostly stem from the difficulties in identifying the cybercriminal and
prosecuting same. Citizens in such nations understand this and as such are often reluctant to
follow up on the issue. In another narrative which reflects in every jurisdiction, bodies that are
charged with certain responsibilities under a national Act to carry out certain responsibilities
to ensure cyber security in their organizations or business environment are often reluctant to
report any cyber crime affecting their organization. The reasons for this stem from the fear of
being sanctioned for not having followed the law to the letter which might have caused the
cyber attack [Ajayi, 2016]. 816
The reluctance to report cybercrime directly affects the availability of data needed to
fight cybercrime. Impliedly, it is only when cybercrimes are reported that data about the same
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can be collated and published. Apart from this, legislative changes such as the Global Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) means that most law enforcement may be denied access to data
or may only be able to access very limited data as part of a criminal investigation. Particularly,
increasing technological development and internet use also presents a challenge for law
enforcement, resulting in extremely large amounts of data where it is difficult to distinguish a
specific user [Niram, Gibson &Miralis, 2021]. 817 Encryption is another tool used by criminals
to stop incriminating data from getting into the hands of law enforcement, whilst the use of
crypto currencies such as Bitcoin allows criminals to deal in the proceeds of crime with a
relative level of anonymity [Niram, Gibson &Miralis, 2021]. 818
Principally, the lack in data has bred absence of awareness on the subject matter of
cybercrime and this has further shrouded the extent of the problem to which mankind is
presently exposed.
5.9 Cost of Investigation and Lack of Effective Investigative Instruments
The nature of investigation in cybercrimes is a very technical one. Investigations in
cybercrime require forensics, the cost of this as a scientific crime solving approach as opposed
to gathering of evidence in terrestrial crimes is not particularly cheap. This cost is further
elaborated by high-tech equipment, materials and expertise involved in carrying out such
investigations. In some cases, nations have to seek expertise from other nations to carry out
such investigations and it incurs its own costs. When cybercrimes rare its head, it is often a
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herculean task for enforcement authorities to unravel. All the issues afore-stated, militate
against the efforts of enforcement authorities to properly fight cybercrime.
During investigation, numerous tasks have to be surmounted such as wading through
numerous files, breaking encrypted codes to sieve out clues that were intentionally hidden or
destroyed; these are all very exorbitant processes. This is worsened if the identity of the
criminal seems very difficult to find and made worse if the cybercriminal has multiplied his
location perhaps by hosting his IP address in another State. If the process of identification of
the cybercriminal is successful and the cybercrime is extra-territorial, many issues further stem
up. This would include additional costs for investigation in the country such as air travels
(where it is expedient that investigators have to be physically present in another jurisdiction),
costs of accommodation, feeding, transportation entertainments and other miscellaneous costs
[Ajayi, 2016]. 819 Where they do not necessarily need to be physically present, then fees would
go into telephones, and teleconferences. There is also the problem of time difference which has
to be taken into cognizance when these calls are being made. In some cases, the services of an
interpreter might be needed if the representatives of the other country are speaking in a
language that the investigators cannot understand. Very close to this problem is also the
difference in culture, attitude and perception of countries to the discourse on cybercrime. These
issues push back the willingness to prosecute cybercrime in such nations and this might portend
additional stress for the investigator from another country.
5.10 Dearth of Experts in Cybercrime Prosecution
Closely related to the above issue is the absence of experts who can in fact handle issues
bordering on cybercrime. It is a fact that even if the investigators have done a commendable
work at the litigation stage, expertise of prosecution attorneys is still very important to secure
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the conviction of cybercriminals as it is incumbent on prosecution to prove his case beyond
reasonable doubt [Ajayi, 2016]. 820 Unfortunately, this is often a herculean task considering that
there is always a dearth in savvy prosecutors in government justice departments, and when
resort is had to private attorneys reports have always shown that there is dearth of lawyers who
are well read in cybercrimes and security law even among such private lawyers. 821 There is
also the problem of cost when getting the representation of private attorneys. The difficulties
faced by investigators in deciphering the identity of the criminal, alongside every other issue
afore-stated also becloud the efforts of the prosecutor.
5.11 General Impediments
As already noted, the challenges militating against the fight of cybercrime are specific
to some nations or regions while some are general to every nation. Top of this list is the absence
of a comprehensive international law bordering on the issue of cybercrime. Additionally, the
international law bordering on cybercrime that has been highlighted so far lacks the requisite
enforcement mechanisms. With specific reference to cybercrime, the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime otherwise known as the Budapest convention 822 is a well-known
subsisting treaty that has the status of international application with entry into force on 1st July
2004.The point being made is this; if a State is a party to the treaty, but refuses to enforce
provisions of the same in its territory, what can other States in the comity do to ensure
compliance of the erring State? [Ajayi, 2016] 823When in fact a comprehensive global
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framework is put out, what then becomes the mechanism for enforcement of the law or the
body for such enforcement? Asides from these global issues on a comprehensive legal
framework for cybercrime, most other issues on cybercrime, as have been highlighted, are
mostly specific to certain jurisdictions.
5.12 Conclusion
The fight against cybercrime is not individual. If our discourse so far is anything to go
by, the fight against cybercrime is beyond a nation or any region. It is a fight that must be made
global and collective. The nature of the challenges militating against the fight of cybercrime
has proven this. It therefore becomes pertinent that an understanding of these challenges guide
the global scene into making better policies, strategies and legal framework to tackle
cybercrime and ensure cyber security. The next chapter would highlight some of these
proposals to better fight cybercrime and ensure cyber security.

CHAPTER SIX: LEGAL, REGULATORY AND POLICY PROPOSALS TO FIGHT
CYBERCRIME AND ENHANCE CYBERSECURITY
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Legal, Regulatory and Policy Proposals to Enhance Cyber security in Africa
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6.2.1

Legal Strategies

6.2.2

Capacity Building

6.2.3

The establishment of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)

6.2.4

The Establishment of Fraud Complaints Units

6.2.5

Addressing Base-line Vulnerabilities Constituting Threat to Cyber Security in Africa

6.3

Legal, Regulatory and Policy Proposals to Enhance Global Cybersecurity

6.3.1

The need for International Court on Cybercrime under the International Criminal Court

6.3.2

Stricter and correctional punishments on cybercrime offenders

6.3.3

Cybercrime Education

6.3.4

The Need for a Global Legal Framework on Cyber security

6.3.5

Cyber Diplomacy

6.3.6

Enhancing Global Capacities for Incident Management

6.4

Summary and Conclusion: Towards the Collective Responsibility of States for Global
Cybersecurity

6.1. Introduction
The discussion so far has centered on strides being taken in the national and
international space to fight cybercrime and the impediments preventing such strides. This
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chapter makes an attempt to discuss proposals to combat cybercrime and better the cyber space
for the African continent and ultimately, for the world. Specifically, it espouses policies as well
as technologies which are aimed at cybersecurity and the policies allowing their
implementation.
If the discussion so far is anything to go by, the problem of cybercrime cuts across
territorial borders thereby creating a new realm of illegal human activities and undermining the
feasibility and legitimacy of applying laws based on geographic boundaries 824. Territoriallybased law making and law-enforcing authorities find the issues of cybercrime and its heralding
causes very threatening particularly because it makes the already difficult fight more difficult.
Arguments have ensued in this regard on the need to curb the development in technology
enabling these crimes vis-à-vis arguments arising to rather develop better policies and feasible
proposals to secure the internet space. This chapter proposes the latter. This chapter espouses
measures which could be put in place through laws, policies and regulations to strengthen
cybersecurity specifically by developing remedial technologies in this sense.
Considering also that this chapter discusses measures to better cybersecurity and
combat cybercrime in Africa and globally, and also that the question of cybercrime can often
times cut across territorial borders, this chapter will also be looking at the issue of extraterritorial offences related to cybercrime and how laws and policies have been developed to aid
criminalization of extraterritorial cyber offences as well as policies and proposals being put in
place to regulate issues of extra-territorial cybersecurity.
At the end of this chapter, it should be understood that jurisdictions that have little or
no legislative regime for cybercrime and cyber security are major targets by malicious actors
in the cyber community for the perpetration of their offences. However, this chapter will also
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look at the possibilities of making States responsible for cyber offences which are extraterritorially based as a means to force States to take the problems of cybercrime seriously and
provide better measures for combating it.
6.2 Legal, Regulatory and Policy Proposals to Enhance Cyber security in Africa
6.2.1 Legal Strategies
Statistics show that more than half nations in the African region already have laws to
combat cybercrime and ultimately provide cyber security 825. This stride is perhaps largely due
to the fact that cyber criminals most often take advantage of countries that do not have
comprehensive and specific national laws on cyber crime and cyber security [Orji, 2012,
p.71] 826. A very typical example is the case of Philippines: in 2000, Onel de Guzman (a Filipino
computing student, at the AMA Computer University in Manila, Philippines) created the “I
LOVE YOU” Virus and spread the virus worldwide through the Internet infecting over 45
million computers and causing businesses billions of dollars in losses, however, law
enforcement authorities in Philippines could not successfully prosecute him because the
country lacked laws criminalizing the creation and spread of computer virus at that time.827
Researchers say this is a major reason why Onel chose Philippines as location for committing
his offence. This goes to reinforce the indispensability of legal measures in criminalizing
cybercrime activities as well as providing cyber security.
These issues are now being solved in the regional and sub-regional space of Africa and
the measures taken are not only to explicitly criminalize malicious acts, but also to create the
requisite framework for harmonization and international cooperation in the enforcement of
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cyber security laws [Orji, 2012, p.71] 828. A good prompter of these legal measures showing
international cooperation is the principle of dual criminality 829 under which an extradition
request can only be granted in accordance with an extradition treaty between two countries
where both countries have criminalized the criminal conduct for which an extradition request
is sought and the crimes are punishable by one year imprisonment or more [Olayemi,
2014] 830.This aside, there have been recurrent discussions on the enactment of a comprehensive
cybercrime law and cyber security policy in the African region [Olayemi, 2004] 831.
A legal strategy addressing the issues of cyber crime in Africa as well as providing for
a comprehensive strategy to enhance cyber security should be poised to enhance international
cooperation and harmonization, as well as address the minimum standards recognized in
international legislation models on cybersecurity [Orji, 2012, p.66] 832. The African Union has
taken steps to develop an explicit regulatory framework on cyber security through the
establishment of the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal
Framework for Cybersecurity in Africa 833. This aside, the African multilateral organizations at
the sub-regional levels such as the Economic Community of West African state, the Southern
African Development Community and the East African Community have also made attempts
to develop regulatory initiatives on cybersecurity [Orji, 2012, p.66] 834. These attempts in
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Africa’s multilateral organizations are however yet to yield any vital legal or institutional
framework on cyber security [Orji, 2012, p.66] 835. A look at some of these attempts is pertinent.
6.2.1.1 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection
Discussions on the establishment of this legal framework began since 2009 when a
directive, the Oliver Tambo Declaration, was given by the African Union [Percy, 2014] 836. In
2013 however, a draft African Union Convention on the Confidence and Security in
Cyberspace (AUCC) was finally made pursuant to the resolution of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the African Union 837.
The AUCC is an attempt to harmonize African cyber legislations on electronic
commerce organization, personal data protection, cyber security promotion and cyber crime
control. The Draft tries to give vivid analysis of the stakes and challenges faced by African
nations in the realm of cybercrime and in the provisions of cyber security as well as the
challenges faced in establishing a comprehensive legal strategy for cyber security in Africa 838.
The Draft provides that the major challenges faced by Member States of the African Union in
this regard are the need to:
•

Achieve a level of technological security adequate enough to prevent and effectively control
technological and informational risks;

•

Build an information society that respects values, protects rights and freedoms, and guarantees
the security of the property of persons, organizations and nations;

•

Contribute to the knowledge economy, guarantee equal access to information while stimulating
the creation of authentic knowledge;

•

Create a climate of confidence and trust, that is a climate:
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o Predictable in terms of prevention and resolution of disputes; and evolving because it takes into
account the continued technological evolution;
o Organized: covering the relevant sectors;
o Protective: of consumers and intellectual property of citizens, organizations and nations;
o Secured: striking proper balance between legal and technological security;
o Integrated into the international order: providing meaningful articulation between the national,
regional and global levels 839.
Bearing all these challenges in mind, the Convention has as its major objective and goal
the preservation of the institutional, human, financial, technological and informational assets
and resources put in place by institutions to achieve their objectives 840. The Convention also
embodies the treatment of cybercrime and cyber security in its strict sense as it exists in the
African region, but is not confined solely to these elements. Under Article 1 of the Convention,
detailed definition is given to concepts of cyber security such as cryptology activity,
enciphering, electronic commerce, secret conventions, cryptology tools, direct prospection and
so on.
The Convention makes detailed provision for the contractual responsibilities of an
electronic provider of gods and services. 841Article I (4) compels a person or corporation
engaging in electronic financial transactions to provide full identity information as prescribed
in the clause such as his/her name, identification number, and contact information among other
information. This provision has been flagged off as being capable of putting personal
information at risks [Percy, 2014] 842. This assertion is based on the fact that very few African
countries have comprehensive data protection laws and as such the kind of abuse that can occur

Paragraph 2
Paragraph 3; Notably also, the Convention is a laudable attempt to discuss as well as provide solutions to the
problems associated with a formidable cyber security policy and framework
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given this provision in the Convention is one that nations that fall into this category will be
unable to control. Recently, for example, a number of Kenyans were unknowingly registered
with various Kenyan political parties without their consent; Safari.com, a major African
telecom suggested that M-PESA agents might have sold M-PESA registration and transaction
records to the political parties with whom this data was found [Percy, 2014] 843.
A large part of the Convention contains provisions on data protection and the language
is in uniform with what is developed by the European Union in this regard. Under the
Convention, each member state of the African Union is required to have a national data
protection authority (DPA) — an independent administrator to ensure the processing of
personal data is conducted in accordance with the Convention 844. Data can only be processed
for a specific legitimate purpose; however, no definition of legitimate purpose is given 845.
Processing and storage are limited to the time necessary for the purpose, for which the data
were collected or processed, with exceptions for “the public interest, especially for historical,
statistical or scientific purposes” 846.
The section in the Convention that covers cyber security makes specific protection for
human rights 847. Under Article 25(3) Governments “shall” ensure their new laws uphold the
“African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and other basic rights such as freedom of
expression, the right to privacy and the right to a fair hearing, among others”. This inclusion
on privacy is a welcomed development given that the provisions on privacy are not explicitly
found in the African Charter. 848Additionally; civil societies are expressly included as part of
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multistate holder and public-private partnerships 849 and the cyber security culture 850. The
cybersecurity rules also support the rule of law: The Convention insists that governments sign
mutual legal assistance agreements (MLATs) to establish standards for international data
sharing in an efficient way 851. Importantly, member states must pass laws protecting data
security and notifying users of risks to their data 852, and of data transfers to third parties 853, a
provision which should apply to data breach and unlawful transfers.
There have been many criticisms against the Convention [Orji, 2015, p. 43] 854. Under
Articles 24 – 27 for example, the Convention, while encouraging public/private partnerships
on cyber security, fails to put safeguards into the sharing of information between companies
and governments. This aside, the Convention requests broad cyber security authorities for
regulators without clarifying limits to the regulator’s power 855.It is important, for data to be
adequately protected, data protection standards be made to have a place even in cyber security
contexts. According to Ephraim Percy, the framing of the basic mandate on governments to
develop “a national cyber security policy which recognizes the importance of Critical
Information Infrastructure (CII)” takes the wrong approach to cyber security [Percy, 2016] 856.
He adds that Member States should note their reservations about these provisions and signal
their intention to put individual users at the center of data security efforts rather than ill-defined
CII [Percy, 2016] 857. Also, the combined provisions of Article 28 (1) and (2) seems to show
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that the Convention establishes a blanket requirement for the application of the double
criminality principle between Member States, without creating a legal basis or framework on
which States while relying on the principle can base their extradition or mutual legal assistance
requests in the absence of an existing international agreement between the requesting Member
State and the Member State to whom such request is being made to [Orji, 2015, p.33] 858.
We cannot also completely state that the Convention comprehensively addresses the
concerns as it relates to cyber security in the African region [Downig, Maurushat& Clough]859.
For one, the change of name to the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal
Data Protection meant a shift in focus from just cyber security to issues on personal data; a
large part of the Convention addresses issues of personal data protection [Percy, 2016] 860.
While this change or inclusion is not a negative development, it is desirable that enough
provisions are made available in the Convention to harmonize the framework on cyber security
in Africa as must as is available for the protection of personal data in Africa. This is in fact not
impossible. The first draft of this Convention contained numerous contentious provisions such
as those that allowed infringement on right to privacy and the lack of limitations on judicial
power, and although these concerns were addressed, it still leaves a lot of issues in the final
draft of the Convention yet unattended to [Percy, 2014] 861. The Convention also bans use of a
computer to “insult” someone for reasons of race, color, national/ethnic origin, religion, or
political opinion but no definition is given of what is meant by “insult” which leaves this
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subjective provision to criminalize speech instead of a criminal act. There are also provisions
on computer fraud and journalism which are not comprehensive and do not provide a solution
to the enhancement of cyber security in this regard [Percy, 2016] 862. Irrespective of these
issues, which is hoped will be addressed soon; at least 15 countries have signed the Convention.
6.2.1.2 The ECOWAS Directive on Fighting Cybercrime
The ECOWAS Council of Ministers on August 2011 adopted the Directive
C/DR.1/08/11 on Fighting Cybercrime at its Sixty Sixth Ordinary Session at Abuja 863. Under
Article 2 of the Directive, it imposes obligations on Member states to criminalize cybercrime
and also to establish a framework to facilitate international cooperation on cyber security. To
this effect, Article 33(1) provides:
“Where Member States are informed by another Member State of the alleged
commission of an offence as defined under the Directive, such Member States ‘shall
cooperate in the search for and establishment of that offence, as well as in the collection
of evidence pertaining to the offence” 864.
The Directive further provides that “such cooperation shall be carried out in line with
relevant international instruments and mechanisms on international cooperation in criminal
matters” 865. ECOWAS instruments on international cooperation, applicable in this regard
include: the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 866 and the
ECOWAS Convention on Extradition 867.
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The ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters establishes a
broad framework for the rendition of mutual assistance amongst ECOWAS States where there
is an absence of applicable international agreement between them on the basis of a reciprocal
legislation. The implication of this is that there is an obligation on an ECOWAS State to render
mutual assistance to all other ECOWAS States where such assistance is requested with respect
to an offence that constitutes a crime in both the requesting and requested Member States 868.
The ECOWAS Convention on Extradition requires Member States to render extradition
requests on basis of dual criminality regardless of the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty
between the requesting and requested Member States 869.
As contained in Article 3 of the Directive, the Directive shall be applicable to all cyber
crime-related offences within the ECOWAS sub region as well as to all criminal offence whose
detection shall require electronic evidence. Chapter II of the Directives contain offences
specifically related to information and communication technologies. The Directives
criminalizes fraudulent access to computer systems 870; fraudulently remaining in a computer
system 871; interfering with the operation of a computer system 872; fraudulent input of data in a
computer system 873; fraudulent interception of computer data 874; fraudulent modification of
computer data 875; computer data forgery 876; obtaining benefit from computer related fraud 877;
fraudulent manipulation of personal data 878; use of forged data 879; obtaining equipment to
commit an offence 880; participation in an association or agreement to commit computer
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offences 881; production of child pornography or pornographic representation 882; threat through
a computer system 883 as well as abuse through a computer system 884. Chapter III incorporates
traditional offences into information and communication technology offences; chapter IV
provides for sanctions and chapter V contains rules of procedure. The ECOWAS Directives is
a welcomed development in the West African Sub Region.
6.2.1.3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Model
Cybercrime Bill
The COMESA Model Cybercrime Bill 885 was established in October 2011 to provide
a uniform framework that would serve as a guide for the development of cyber crime laws in
Member States, however, the bill does not establish any binding obligations on Member States
to criminalize cyber crimes [Orji, 2015, p.24] 886. The Bill largely covers majority of what is
provided for in terms of language and the model of legal instruments in the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime and the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation and also
establishes an elaborate guide for the development of general framework to facilitate
international cooperation 887, extradition 888, and mutual assistance 889 as well as provides for the
establishment of national 24/7 points of contact 890. Unlike what is contained in the ECOWAS
Directive, the COMESA does not have any existing legal framework to facilitate mutual
assistance and extradition among members. The implication of this is that COMESA Member
States that use the Bill to develop their national laws still have to enter into separate bilateral
arrangements with other Member States in order to obtain any form of international cooperation
or mutual assistance.
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6.2.1.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law on
Computer Crime and Cybercrime
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law was adopted in
March 2012 891 to serve as a guide for the development of cyber security laws in SADC member
States. It has as its main objective, the criminalization and investigation of computer network
related crime in member states. Part I of the Law contains provisions on the goals of the Law
as well as the definition of key concepts. Under Part II, offences such as illegal access to
computers; illegally remaining on a computer; illegal interception; illegal data interference;
data espionage; illegal system interference; illegal devices; computer-related forgery and fraud;
child pornography and pornography; identity related crimes as well as racist and xenophobic
materials are all made offences. Part III deals with the issue of Jurisdiction while Part VI
addresses the issues of Liability.
This law does not impose any obligations on Members to establish cyber crime laws
and also does not establish any provisions to guide the development of international
cooperation regimes in Member states or international cooperation obligations between
Member States [Orji, 2015] 892. However, members can rely on the SADC Protocol on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 893 and the SADC Protocol on Extradition 894 to obtain
international cooperation from other members. Under the SADC Protocol on Mutual
Assistance, Member States are required to provide each other with “the widest possible
measure of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters” 895. The Protocol on Extradition

SADC Model Law on Computer Crime and Cybercrime Version 2.0, Adopted 2 March 2012
Orji, U.J. (2015). Multilateral Legal Responses to Cyber Security in Africa: Any Hope for Effective
International Cooperation?.African Centre for cyber Law and Cybercrime, p. 24
;Maurushat, A. (2010). Australia’s Accession to the Cybercrime Convention: Is the Convention Still Relevant in
Combating Cybercrime in the Era of Botnets and Obfuscation Crime Tools?.University of New South Wales
Law Journal, p. 431-432; Gercke, M. (2011). 10 Years Convention on Cybercrime. Computer Law Review
International, p.142 -147; Clough, J. (2012). The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Deﬁning
“Crime” in a Digital World, 23Criminal Law Forum, p.363.
893
SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Luanda, 3 October 2002)
894
SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance on Extradition (Launda, 3 October 2002)
895
Article 2(1)
891
892

209

however requires that SADC States can only obtain cooperation amongst themselves on the
basis of dual criminality 896.
6.2.2 Capacity Building
In light of the discussions above on the efforts in the African region to adopt legal
measures to fight cybercrime and strengthen cyber security, the discussions on capacity
building as one of the proposals to better the fight against cybercrime becomes pertinent.
Cyber Security capacity building represents one approach to fostering ICT-led growth and
stability in developing countries. Unlike other developmental approaches, it is concerned
primarily (although not exclusively) with security-related issues [Kimburg & Zylberberg,
2012; Clough, 2012] 897. There are three principle reasons why capacity building in cyber
security is likely to grow in importance. The first is that it is becoming increasingly clear that
a key factor in economic and social development is access to cyberspace; in turn, cyber security
becomes a key ingredient for promoting this access, and ensuring that it is not jeopardized
through predatory criminal behavior [Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012; Clough, 2012]898.
Secondly, given the nature of the Internet, if countries in the rich industrialized world are to be
able to respond to cyber-threats from their own citizens, increasing cooperation needed with
the developing world – which increasingly hosts the infrastructure and indeed the actors behind
malicious cyber activity; such cooperation can be possible only if basic cyber security
institutions and skills are present in partner countries – which is very much in the direct interest
of donor countries [Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012; Clough, 2012] 899. Thirdly, the increasingly
politicized global struggle dominance over governance of the internet makes the issue of
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overriding importance within international relations [Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012; Clough,
2012] 900. The idea of capacity building for cyber security cuts across legal, regulatory and
policy framework for cyber security; capacity building for business organizations and also the
internet and technical dimensions [Orji, 2012, p.75] 901.
For cyber security capacity building in legislative and regulatory institutions, it is
pertinent that legislators have a vivid understanding of cyber security issues as they exist in the
Africa region and sub regions in order to enact informed laws in these areas [Orji, 2012]902.
What this means is that legislators who sit to legislate on matters bordering on cyber security
at the national, regional or international level need to be well trained and updated on emerging
issues in cyber security and ultimately, this should help in addressing the issues of unnecessary
legislative delays that has hindered the time of passage of cyber security laws in many African
countries [Orji, 2012] 903. Importantly, the judiciary and prosecutors will also have to undergo
constant institutional and human capacity building to keep up with developments in cyber
security law, the handling of electronic evidence and other related issues in the judicial
enforcement of cybercrime law [Orji, 2012] 904.
Enhancing security among donor and partner countries through coalitions of likeminded states is a viable capacity building strategy for cyber security in Africa [Kimburg &
Zylberberg, 2012; Clough, 2012] 905. In a study for the OECD, it was noted that ‘Vulnerabilities
in software developed in one country and installed in a second can be exploited remotely from
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a third’ 906. Cyberspace ignores international borders and allows anyone anywhere to attack
anyone anywhere else. A compromised device (computer, mobile, wearable device) in, say,
Malaysia (or Germany, or Kenya) can be used to attack a computer in Washington DC, with
the true attacker remaining hidden. Cybercriminal gangs (like the legendary Nigerian 419scammers) can wage international campaigns that know no borders, while avoiding prosecution
because their own governments lack the necessary resources.[Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012;
Clough, 2012] 907 Attackers aiming at more lucrative targets in the governments and private
sector of the industrialized world might first seek to compromise partners in the developing
world. The potential list is unending, but the point is simple: militating against such cyber-risks
often require governments in the developing world to have two principal capabilities. Firstly,
well-developed national standards for information assurance purposes, with legal requirements
on specific critical infrastructure to take basic minimal precautions, such as the use of basic
cyber security products or something similar; secondly, the ability to respond operationally
(assisted by CERT or similar organizations) to international requests for assistance in dealing
with cyber security issues, both from the security services and the wider community itself.
[Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012; Clough, 2012] 908Neither of these capabilities can be developed
in a vacuum: they are influenced and formed by various interests, many of which breaks along
ideological and political lines. [Gercke, 2011, p. 363] 909
User education and awareness is a key component of cyber security governance.
Computer users are usually the weakest link in the cyber security chain as such it is
recommended that end-user education on computer security should be integrated into any
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capacity building programme to promote cyber security in African States [ITU, 2011] 910. One
way of achieving this is imposing a legal requirement on the manufacturers of IT products and
electronic communications service providers to integrate end-user education components in
their products and services [Orji, 2012] 911. Another feasible idea could be to develop policies
that will encourage institutions such as universities, NGO’s, and other stake holders to create
user awareness on cyber security [Orji, 2012] 912. Such policies could also create incentives for
institutions that are engaged in the research and development of measures to enhance end-user
awareness on cyber security [Orji, 2012] 913.
In the discussions on cyber security capacity building, development and
implementation of technical protection solutions constitute very vital aspect of cyber security.
These technical protection solutions are technological creations aimed to act as self-defense
mechanism such as firewalls, anti viral protection and intrusion detection mechanisms: these
mechanisms actual guarantee computer security against threats such as viruses, worms and
other malicious programmes [NAP, 2000] 914. According to Uchenna Jerome, the development
and implementation of adequate technical protection measures should be integrated as legal
obligations in manufacturing and marketing of IT products and services; thus, manufacturers
and marketers of IT products should be under legal obligations to integrate technical protection
measures in such products before making them available to end-users [Orji, 2012] 915. In this
regard also, it has been aptly recommended that software writers could be asked to write better
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software, with less vulnerability, and therefore less need for frequent patching and updating to
plug exploitable holders [Liliam, 2007, p.1] 916. Obligations could also be imposed on Internet
service providers to scan the data traffic going to and from computers attached to their networks
for unusual patterns of traffic, and then to cut those likely zombies off from the internet until
they can be de-zombified [Clough, 2012] 917.
Business organizations are usually the major targets of cybercrime either from
employees within their organizations [Kesar, 2006, p.25] 918 or by criminal actors located
outside [Orji, 2012] 919. The implication of this is that capacity building in cyber security builds
organizational and technical capacities to deter cybercrime [Kesar, 2006, p.25] 920. These risks
arise in businesses mostly because most business organizations do not build any cyber security
around their cyber presence or virtual business environment. To change this, laws specifically
mandating that technical protection be put in place by business organization should be enacted
[Orji, 2012] 921. Organizations also need to commit the resources to educate employees on
security practices, develop thorough plans for the handling of sensitive data, records and
transactions, and incorporate robust security technology such as firewalls, anti-virus software,
intrusion detection tools, and authentication services throughout the organization’s computer
systems [McConnell, 2000] 922.
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6.2.3 The Establishment of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
CERT structures are vital operational components of cyber security. The European
Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) memorably described CERTs
as ‘a fire brigade, the only ones which can react when security incidents occur [ENISA,
2013]’ 923. There are significant differences in the capabilities of CERTs: they can range from
NOC/SOC configurations with ability to ‘pull the plug’ if needed, to purely advisory
components with limited operational roles [ENISA, 2020] 924. Some ‘national’ CERTs are
tasked only with defending government networks (if allowed: many governmental CERTs
cannot override decisions taken by sectoral CERTs) while some have a truly national role,
directly helping to protect their countries’ critical infrastructure [Kimburg & Zylberberg,
2012] 925. The only key component that all ‘national’ CERTs must have is the ability to serve
as an authorized point of contact for technical issues – for major incidents, but much more
likely for the day-to-day fight against cybercrime [Kimburg & Zylberberg, 2012] 926.
What the establishment of a CERT body in the African region guarantees is the timely
response to cyber security threats in a coordinated manner. The establishment of well equipped
CERTs is a vital prerequisite for ensuring cyber security and securing a country’s national and
economic security. The African Forum of Computer Incident Response Teams (AfricaCERT)
plays this role. It aims to propose solutions to the challenges for internet health in Africa
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internet ecosystem as well as promote cyber security in Africa [AfricaCERT, 2020] 927. The
objectives of the body include:
1. Fostering and supporting education and outreach programs in ICT Security in and among
African Countries. It also is expected to assist its members that do not have the necessary
technical skills, knowledge and experience, to be able to conduct effective computer
emergency response;
2. Strengthening the relationships amongst CSIRTs in Africa and with other stakeholders all over
the world. This will be achieved through building cooperation, trust and confidence amongst
members and also with other international stakeholders, for the effective coordination and
management of security incidents;
3. Encouraging information sharing in ICT Security which includes findings from reported
incidents and case studies, so that vulnerabilities can be rapidly identified and its risks
neutralized. It is envisaged that Africa CERT members will especially share experiences and
jointly develop measures to deal with large-scale security incidents and emergencies;
4. Promoting good practices and experiences sharing among members to develop a
comprehensive framework for cyber security including better addressing legal regulatory
issues related to information security, and for the prevention of cybercrimes; while acting in
strengthening multilateral and bilateral cooperation and initiatives on such matters;
5. Assisting African CERTs in improving cyber readiness and enhancing the resilience of ICT
infrastructure and developing contingency plans;
6. Promoting collaborative technology research, development and innovation in the ICT security
field 928.
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6.2.4 The Establishment of Fraud Complaints Units
Africa does not yet have a single fraud complaints unit 929. However, the Africa
Development Bank has an Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigation Unit which provides
services to residents in the African region to report issues relating to trans-territorial fraud. The
body also has secured telephone numbers specific to each country in the African region that
could be called by residence to report fraud issues 930. In each country in Africa, it is important
that regulatory measures are established to impose obligations on organizations that are
engaged in the provision of electronic communications services to establish complaints units
in order to enable individuals that use such communications services to timely report incidents
of computer-related fraud, spamming, and other forms of cybercrime [Orji, 2012] 931.

6.2.5 Addressing Base-line Vulnerabilities Constituting Threats to Cyber Security in
Africa
The major factor adduced for the rise in cybercrime in Africa is unemployment, poverty
and incessant quest for wealth. [Button, Nichols & Kerr, 2014] 932 These are base-line threats
which make nations more vulnerable to surviving technical-based threats such as cybercrime.
Nations such as Lesotho, Mozambique and India are constantly competing on the borderline of
poverty while nations such as Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Ghana are constantly
fluctuating between rise in economic development and degeneration in the level of living of its
citizens [UNCTAD, 2018]. 933 The latest data on unemployment level in Nigeria from the
National Bureau of Statistics showed that as at 2011, about 164 million Nigerians were
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unemployed; and following the pandemic, the statistics have become worse [Stella, 2017].934
The implication of this is that youths largely resort to indiscreet means to generate wealth and
in recent times, cyber crime seems the easiest and most covert means. There are diverse ways
which citizens resort to making money via cyber crime in Africa [Zingerle, 2014]. 935
Specifically, in 2004, the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, was
tricked by fraudsters to the tune of millions of Naira equivalent of MTN recharge cards. The
perpetrators called the Inspector General on his mobile phone and pretended to be Rtd. General
Ibrahim Babangida (a former Nigerian Head of State), hence requesting recharge cards biweekly for a period of close to six weeks. It was the General’s aides who eventually cautioned
him that the General would not personally be requesting recharge cards in this absurd manner.
The fraudsters were eventually located and arrested [Balogun & Obe, 2010]. 936It was reported
recently that some Nigerian fraudsters sold a non-existent airport for $242 million to a Brazilian
bank in 1995 [Dawkins, 2018]. 937Emmanuel Awude who is the mastermind behind the whole
plan was reputed as an unemployed but technologically-sound graduate of a university in
Nigeria [Dawkins, 2018]. 938 The World Bank flags low cost of living, absence of basic utilities
and health facilities, discrimination, lack of education, poverty as well as unemployment as the
major causes of cyber crime in Africa [World Bank, 2011]. 939This is primarily because nations
whose wheel of development is clogged by base-line vulnerabilities such as those stated above
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do not necessarily consider issues not falling under these vulnerabilities as priority. On the
contrast, developed nations such as the UK, Germany and US when threatened with cybercrime
from citizens are faced with situations where citizens try to manipulate and bypass
technological protocols as against using it as a primary means of generating wealth or fighting
poverty [World Bank, 2011]. 940
According to the International Labor Organization, economic growth has been a key
driver of poverty reduction in Africa. 941 While nations such as Kenya, South Africa, Morocco
and Ghana are on track in ensuring economic growth, most African nations are way below the
threshold required to pull Africa from the clutches of poverty and unemployment, and
ultimately cybercrime. In Ghana for example, a recent move was made to make Ghana the
African hub for the growth of technology with the establishment of a Twitter office in Ghana
[Erezi, 2021]. 942 This has transformed into opening of diverse foreign investment opportunities
and automatically job opportunities in Ghana. 943Morocco is now poised to generate huge
revenue, employment and economic development by leveraging on the solar potential on the
deserts around it to increase electricity production [Erezi, 2021]. 944 South Africa and Kenya
are leveraging on their involvement with China to plough foreign investment in areas such as
technology, biothermal and co-generational energy generation in the nation [ADB, 2021]. 945
International bodies are also not relaxing in ensuring that Nations are pulled out of
poverty especially given the COVID-19 pandemic plaguing the world of business. The World

World Bank. (2011). Combating Cybercrime – World Bank Document. World Bank Group
<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en
941
International Labor Organization. (2021). Tackling Poverty Through Decent Work for Africa’s Sustainable
Development. ILO<www.ilo.org/africa/media-centre/pr/WCMS_482713/lang-en/index.htm>
942
Erezi, D. (2021). Why Twitter is Opening African Office in Ghana.
Guardian<https://m.guardian.ng/news/why-twitter-is-opening-african-office-in-ghana/>
943
Erezi, D. (2021). Why Twitter is Opening African Office in Ghana.
Guardian<https://m.guardian.ng/news/why-twitter-is-opening-african-office-in-ghana/
944
Feukeng, L. (2019) .Morocco: Ongoing discussions with AFDB on implementing ‘Desert to Power.
Afrik<www.google.com/amp/s/www.afrik21.africa/en/morocco/-ongoing-discussions-with-afdb-onimplementing-desert-to-power/amp/>
945
African Development Bank. (2021). AfricanEconomic Outlook 2021.
AFDB.<https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook>
940

219

Intellectual Property Organization in celebrating the World IP day on April 26, 2021 focused
the theme of its celebration on helping SMEs the world over boost visibility, revenue and
longevity by proffering ways in which IP can be utilized by SMEs for the better. 946 These ideas
are important for nations such as Nigeria whose citizens leverage massively on
entrepreneurship as a means of survival. According to Director General of ILO, Guy Ryder, if
we are serious about the 2030 agenda and want to finally put an end to the scourge of poverty
perpetuating across generations, then we must focus on the quality of jobs in all nations. 947 The
key areas to focus on to end poverty and also enable mass employment are: tackling lowproductivity traps (this is considered as lying in the heart of poverty); 948 Strengthening rights
at work and enabling employer and worker organizations to reach the poor; 949 Alleviating
poverty through well-designed employment and social policies; 950 Reinforcing governments’
capacity to implement poverty-reducing policies and standard; 951 boosting resources as well as
involving the ILO in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals for each
country. 952
6.3 Legal, Regulatory and Policy Proposals to Enhance Global Cyber security
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The idea of a global cyber security cuts across the responsibility of every state actor. In
Janet Reno’s words, “we are all going to have to think of new ways to structure (…) our
relationships with other nations so that people (criminals) know there is no safe place to hide953.
Cyber space, being the fifth common space, after land, sea, air and outer space, is in great need
for coordination, cooperation and legal measures among all nations. It is necessary to make the
international community aware of the need for a global response to the urgent and increasing
cyber threats [Stein, 2012] 954.
6.3.1 Stricter and Correctional Punishment on Cybercrime for Offenders
National and International laws on cybercrime are majorly couched with pecuniary
language as punishment for offenders as well as imprisonment of cyber criminals. A look at
the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 955 (CFAA) would show that victims of cybercrime can
bring civil actions to recover for the loss occasioned by cybercriminals; 956 beyond
imprisonment and pecuniary punishment, the language of punishment in these laws do not
serve as deterrence enough. The same compensatory language is found in the cyber crimes
laws of the UK and other developed nations.
The African narrative is quite different; the laws on cyber crime in Nigeria for example
and in fact in most African regions mostly have a prosecutory undertone so that offenders are
subjected to imprisonment and victims are rarely able to bring civil actions against offenders. 957
More problematic is the fact that imprisonment does not exceed 5 years at most and there is
always an option of fine. Where pecuniary punishment is provided for, the money often goes
953
Reno, J. (2000). Speech to the Virginia. Journal of International
Law<http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2000/4100aguva.htm>
954
Stein, J. (2012). Recommendations for Potential New Global Legal Mechanisms Against Global Cyber
Attacks and Other Global Cybercrimes. A Paper for the East West Institute (EWI) Cybercrime Legal Working
Group 2012
955
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.)
956
CFAA, Ss 1030(g)
957
Advanced Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, CAP A6, LFN 2010; Also see Money
Laundering (Prohibition) Act Cap M18, LFN 2010; Criminal Code Act CAP 38, LFN 2010

221

to the government so that individuals who are victims of the crime get nothing. A very good
example is the case of Nigeria 958 and the United Arab Emirates. 959
What this long research proposes is that punishment on cybercrime should be made
more stringent and corrective in nature as this will serve more as deterrence to persons who
would want to venture into cyber crime in the future. In the first place, punishment for cyber
crime should be made not less than 10 years. The United Arab Emirates has made considerable
progress in this regard; being a religious State, it punishes offences of cybercrimes that are
targeted at religious leaders, deities or public officers for more than 7 years; 960 and
significantly, the UAE is reputed as having the most detailed and comprehensive cyber-crime
law in the Arabian Gulf and wider Middle East [Imranuddin, 2017]. 961
In the same vein, there is need to increase the pecuniary punishment imposed on
offenders such that pecuniary punishment should not be less than a million in the different
currencies of nations having cybercrime laws. This is already a trend in the US, UK and the
United Arab Emirates. Additionally, there is need to amend national laws to enable victims of
cybercrimes institute civil actions and recover damages for offences. The advantages of this
recommendation is quite obvious: the government cannot always detect all acts constituting
cybercrime so as to prosecute cybercriminals involved, however citizens who suffer these
cybercrimes are more likely to track down its origin, commence actions to recover damages
and also notify government officials to enable the latter commence criminal proceeding. 962
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Notably, the USA is now agog with the story of Judge Michael Cicconetti of Ohio in
Painesville and Judge Carlos Moore of the Clarksdale Municipal Court who give correctional
and creative punishment to offenders. Judge Carlos calls it the ‘Do Better Accountability
Alternative Sentencing Program’ and tries it out on offenders who plead guilty to misdemeanor
offenses. According to him:
“For the 18 year old college freshman who made all Bs this semester, she has to pull at
least one B up to an A next semester. For the 20 year old dental assistant student, she must
successfully graduate community college next semester. For the 27 year old aspiring fireman,
he must enroll in fire academy and graduate in top 5 of his class next semester. I will see them
all back in my court in May of 2021 to see how they did. Hopefully they meet or exceed the
challenges and avoid hefty fines and a criminal record of any type”. [Reneau, 2020] 963
In the same vein, instead of subjecting cyber criminals to financial punishment and
imprisonment, this researcher proposes that cyber criminals should instead be placed on
probation for a specific period within which they must come up with specific technological
project(s) on cyber security; one that will reduce cyber crime. For such corrective punishment,
an option of imprisonment, only, would be attached so as to ensure that the aim behind the law
is fully achieved: to deter people from cybercrime. This is proposed particularly because
statistics have shown that majority of persons who engage in cyber crimes are intellectually
sound in cyber matters and the technologies related to it [Atta-Asamaoh, 2009]. 964 A good
example is the case of Onel de Guzman (a Filipino computing student, at the AMA Computer
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University in Manila, Philippines) who created the “I LOVE YOU” Virus. 965Statistics also
show a very high intelligence quotient (IQ) amongst cyber criminals particularly in the manner
in which they map out and execute cybercrimes [Atta-Asamaoh, 2009] 966; this could be put
into good use by the society if cybercrime punishments are made more corrective.
Interestingly, persons who were subjected to correctional punishments by Judge
Michael, when interviewed, said they preferred it to imprisonment because no one wants a
prison experience or a criminal record trolling behind them as against a correctional
punishment that afforded them the opportunity to give back to the society as well as get popular
for doing something good for their nation or district. 967Additionally, correctional punishment
is considered a very important tool in national development in light of diverse changes to the
world of crime and its effects on citizens.
To enable the introduction of correctional punishment in cyber crime laws feasible, it
is important that cyber offenders are placed on probation during the period of correctional
punishment and that they are given periods within which to report back to the court on the
progress of their activities. Importantly, each cyber offender must see their own cyber project
to an end and so, a cyber correctional project commenced by one criminal cannot be continued
by another unless in very critical situations such as where the first cyber criminal becomes
incapacitated or dies. Also, correctional punishment should be given based on the type of cyber
crime committed. It could be a task as simple as educating teenagers about the dangers of
cybercrimes in high schools or writing a kids’ educational book on cyber security. Significantly
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also, the existence of correctional punishment should not exclude the right of victims of cyber
crime to commence civil actions against such cyber criminals for the recovery of damages.
6.3.2 The need for International Court on Cybercrime under the International
Criminal Court
It is important that a criminal investigation and prosecution based on international law
and under the international criminal court be established for cybercrime. The international
Tribunal should have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the most serious violations
of international cybercrime law, in accordance with the provisions of the present draft statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for cyber space [Stein, 2012] 968. The existence of an
international criminal court has been called a ‘missing link’ in the international legal system
mostly because many serious global cyber attacks will go unpunished without a criminal court
or tribunal in action. The establishment of an International criminal Court or Tribunal will bring
about the global enforcement of the principle of individual criminal accountability [Stein,
2012]. 969 The move to establish this Court will necessarily arise from the existence of an
international cybercrime law which will then give jurisdiction to the international cybercrime
court or tribunal to persecute offences in the international cybercrime law. This move will be
a signal from the United Nations and indeed the global community that global cyberattacks are
no longer tolerated [Stein, 2012] 970. Diverse factors will necessitate the establishment of an
international court on cybercrime. For one, cloud computing and multi-jurisdictional crimes
may challenge the traditional way of investigation and prosecution, and need an international
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court or tribunal for the court proceedings 971. Data in the “clouds” is data that is constantly
being shifted from one server to the next, moving within or access to different countries at any
time. Also, data in the “clouds” may be mirrored for security and availability reasons, and could
therefore be found in multiple locations within a single country or in several countries.
Consequently, not even the cloud computing provider may know exactly where the requested
data is located. 972These problems may only be solved through a global treaty that includes
jurisdictional provisions for the most serious cybercrimes of global concern.
To make this feasible, additional provision should be included in the list of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. An alternative
solution may be to establish a special International Criminal Court for Cyberspace as a
subdivision of the ICC in The Hague. The most obvious alternative is a separate International
Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC) based on a United Nations Security Council decision
[Orji, 2012] 973. An International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace may be seated in The
Hague, since it is a natural choice with all international courts inside, or in the urban area of
the city [Stein, 2012] 974. Considering that the INTERPOL Global Complex (IGC) has been
established and operational in Singapore since 2014, especially with the aim to enhance
preparedness to effectively counter cybercrime, Singapore may be an alternative seat for an
international Criminal court for cyberspace [Stein, 2012] 975. This would open up a possibility
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of assistance and cooperation with an outstanding investigation institution that would enable
global justice system to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international
cybercrimes do not go unpunished [Stein, 2012] 976. Investigations and prosecutions of
international law need an international criminal court for the independent and efficient
proceedings of the most serious cybercrimes of global concern 977. Alternatively also, an
International Criminal Court for Cyberspace may be established as a Subdivision of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and seated in The Hague [Stein, 2012] 978. As a Subdivision
of the ICC, an International Criminal Court for Cyberspace shall be governed by the Rome
Statute. The treaty has provisions on investigation, and prosecution that also will be
implemented on a Subdivision. The Prosecutor, as an independent organ of the Court, may
after having evaluated the information made available, initiate investigation also on exceptional
basis based on a pre-trial decision [Stein, 2012] 979.
6.3.3 Cyber Education
Data on cyber security only exists amongst the educational space. Beyond schools,
organizations and public offices dealing in cyber security, there is little or no education on
cyber security amongst the public [Rahman, 2015]. 980 This aside, there is not enough
information in the public domain on the harms that internet use portend. Although internet has
vast potential and benefits for everyone, the excessive use of the internet may be harmful as it
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may lead to cyber risks such as cyber addiction, [Annasingh &Veli, 2016] 981 gaming and
gambling addiction, 982 cybersex 983, pornography 984 and personal information exposure. 985 The
aim of cyber security education is to educate the users of technology on the potential risks they
face when they use internet communication tools such as social media, chat, online gaming,
email and instant messaging [Rahman, 2015]. 986
The recurring challenges faced in cyber security education include lack of expertise,
funding and resources [Rahman, 2015]. 987 However, it has been proposed that theoretical
knowledge without providing practical explanations is enough to make a head way at cyber
security education. In launching cyber security education in schools, there is need to make use
of video cartoons for kids in elementary class and for children in high school, exposing them
to debates and public speaking competitions on cyber crimes and security is a starting point.
For students in college, allowing them work on cyber security projects as an undergraduate
thesis would go a long way in inculcating knowledge about cyber crime and security. In the
USA for example, a cyber security education program called GenCyber is a summer camp
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program for American grade school students [Rahman, 2015]. 988 But then again, these ideas
are only for persons who can afford the expenses of education.
The public who do not have the advantage of being educated in an educational
institution can be educated through TVs and Radio stations. Projects on cyber security and its
importance can be broadcasted frequently on national TV and Radio stations. Governmental
agencies can launch campaign on cyber security in markets, offices, and schools. Comical
images can also be made into flyers to represent the idea of cyber security. For developing
nations in Africa, cyber security education will go a long way in helping the younger generation
understand the threats that cybercrime pose.
6.3.4 The Need for a Global Legal Framework on Cyber Security
None of the global challenges facing the modern international community can be
adequately addressed by any single international actor, irrespective of how powerful that actor
may be. Whether one thinks of climate change, international terrorism, or cyber threats, all
such challenging contemporary phenomena necessitate a framework for international cooperation. It is international law that ‘affords [such] a framework, a pattern, a fabric for
international society’. 989 In order to implement a true global approach to cybersecurity
governance that will eliminate lawless digital havens in the global information society, the need
for the establishment of an international legal framework on cyber security cannot be
overemphasized [Orji, 2012]. 990 The formulation of a United Nations Treaty on cyber security
will create the most appropriate framework for integrating developing countries that have not
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established legal frameworks on cyber security in the global harmonization of cyber security
laws [Orji, 2012]. 991
At present, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (known also as the
Budapest Convention) is at present the main international instrument on cybercrime, however
the Convention fails to address recurrent issues in the area of cyber security coupled with the
fact that nations (such as Russia, China, India) have refused to ratify the Convention on the
basis that it infringes on their sovereignty [Kakmeh, 2017]. 992A specific international treaty
comprehensively addressing the issues of cyber security as separate from cyber crime is
pertinent for diverse reasons. According to Solange, such a treaty will enhance a better
understanding of all aspects of cyber security and facilitate the development and deployment
of measures that can help to increase resilience to the impacts of cyber threats and also increase
the effectiveness of international cooperation [Ghernaouti-Helie, 2010].

993

. According to

Uchenna Jerome, the formulation of a United Nations Treaty on Cyber security based on a
global consensus will help in eliminating the disparities that presently exist in the
criminalization of cybercrime activities in different countries [Orji, 2012] 994. Solange also adds
that such a treaty will also enhance the creation of an appropriate cyber security culture and the
development of efficient measures for raising awareness amongst the Population [Hakmeh,
2017] 995.
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6.3.5 Cyber Diplomacy
As against cyber war and cyber defense, there is need for nations of the world to develop
mechanisms and policies for cyber diplomacy with a view to addressing or protecting common
cyber security interests [Orji, 2012] 996. In the last decade, dozens of foreign ministries have
been creating offices exclusively dedicated to cyberspace and appointing “cyber diplomats” in
order to respond to the growing politicization of cyber space and broader techno-geopolitical
dynamics [Barinnha, 2020] 997. This move by many nations has concentrated more international
cyber policy activities in foreign affairs ministries who to a very large extent understand the
workings and relationship of their nation with other nations and which is very important for
the furtherance of a highly protected cyber space. In a world in which more countries are
acquiring offensive cyber capabilities, cyber diplomacy is needed to prevent escalation or
wrongful attribution of cyber attacks by maintaining a constant dialogue between peers and
ensuring channels of communication remain open, even in times of crisis [Downing, 2005] 998.
It also is necessary for developing binding and non-binding norms of responsible state behavior
in cyber space and addressing the most acute divergences between stakeholders in this area
[Downing, 2005] 999. This can be possible through multilateral bodies such as the GCE and the
OEWG, regional efforts like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
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confidence-building measures, and bilateral agreements such as the 2015 USA – China Cyber
Agreements [Downing, 2005] 1000.
Principally, in a cyber space that used to be predominantly regulated by IT experts and
engineers, cyber diplomats are now actively navigating between trying to generate consensus
among stakeholders and, as a last resort, building bridges between fundamentally different, if
not incompatible visions [Downing, 2005] 1001. The former demands an acceptance of the
lowest common denominator, possibly sacrificing core values in the name of a stable
international order of cyberspace; the latter entails recognition of the failure to maintain a
homogenous cyber space and the acceptance of less interconnected networks [Downing,
2005] 1002. It will be very important, as conflicting visions for the future of the global internet
inevitably collide, that cyber diplomats will have to be put into existence in all nations of the
world to negotiate these difficult choices.
6.3.6

Enhancing Global Capacities for Incident Management
Enhancing global capacities for incident management is important and will be feasible

if it entails strengthening the information sharing capacities of international institutions such
as the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) 1003, the NATO
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Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence 1004 and the 24/7 Network of Contacts1005.
Strengthening institutions dealing with critical cyber information on the basis of common
interests or collective security will enhance the ability of member states to share information,
resources, and best practices on cyber security. This will help a lot in no small measure to
facilitate timely warnings and responses to transnational cyber incidents [Orji, 2012] 1006.
6.4 Summary and Conclusion: Towards the Collective Responsibility of States for
Global Cyber security
Fighting cyber security on a global scale is never the sole responsibility of the
international or regional community such as the UN, EU or the AU; it is the responsibility of
every State to see to the enhancement of global cyber security. The responsibility of states in
regards to cyber security cuts across the establishment of organizations amongst some States
to tackle problems of cyber crimes and enhance cyber security amongst these States, and it
goes beyond this also. When we talk of collective security, one example is the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and its military arm SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe). As a collective security organization, the premise of NATO is that an attack
on one country is an attack on all and therefore NATO will respond on behalf of all member
countries 1007. This could exist to tackle the issues of cyber crime amongst States.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is responsible for conducting research and
training in cyber defence. In accordance with NATO’s collective security agenda, the major objective of the
cyber defence centre is to help member states achieve collective self defence in the cyber space by defying and
countering threats of cyber war fare and cyber terrorism.
1005
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designate a point of contact available on a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week basis, in order to ensure the
provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminaloffences
related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of electronic evidence regarding a criminal offence
under the Convention.
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To some extent, the norm that states may be held responsible for acts and omissions
within their territories which produce trans-boundary harm in other countries can also be
applied for the purpose of promoting global cyber security 1008. The implication of this is that
where a State fails to promote cyber security by not establishing appropriate regulatory
mechanisms to deter malicious cyber conducts which gives rise to the existence of a safe haven
for cyber criminals, then such State should be held responsible for any trans-boundary harm
that arises from the perpetration of cybercrimes in that safe haven 1009. Simply put, a State
should be held responsible where failure to establish deterrent regulatory measures within its
territory has permitted the perpetration of cybercrimes that affected other states or individuals
or organizations located in other States.
Also, the need for effective cross-border cooperation on the legal and technical aspects
of cyber security cannot be overemphasized. This requires the harmonization of cyber security
laws, the enhancement of cross-border legal and technical assistance, and the effective
participation of the IT industry and the aiding of developing countries to improve their
technical capacities for the regulation of cyber security. In order to achieve the collective
responsibility of states for global cyber security even in the face of the “digital divide” 1010, it
is imperative that all states must ensure the establishment of laws and regulatory mechanisms
that will eliminate safe havens for cyber criminality.
Notably, what this paper has tried to achieve is a breakdown of the concept of cybercrime and
cyber security and the incidental issues attached to its existence. It points to the fact that the
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existence of the concept of cyber security is necessitated primarily by the continuous threat to
cyber space by cyber criminals. An attempt was made to give a detailed breakdown of
international legal responses, policies, regulations and proposals on cyber security while
looking also at the development of legal responses in different regions of the world. It was
espoused that the issues of cyber crime and cyber security are more recurrent and dealt with
more or not at all in some nations when compared to other nations of the world and this paper
gave detailed analysis of the legal, regulatory and policy mechanisms against cybercrime and
for cyber security in these five nations. Notably, the fight against cyber crime and the
development of cyber security measures as well as legal frameworks has been stalled and is
still being hampered by some major problems; this paper discussed these impediments as well
as provided practicable solution in each case. In this last chapter, a detailed approach was taken
towards discussing the policy and legal framework of cyber security on an international level.
Diverse proposals were made in this regard on developing cyber security in the world,
including the establishment of an international cybercrime court under the International
Criminal Court, as well as the development of an international legal framework on cyber
security and more concentration on cyber diplomacy as against cyber war.
The world is still evolving in terms of technological development and the adoption of
proposals in this dissertation will go a long way in ensuring that such internet and technological
development does not herald the end of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. A/RES/56/121. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/482/04/PDF/N0148204.pdf
2. Aaron, A. (2019). A legal Analysis of Cybercrime and Cyber Torts: Lessons for Nigeria. [LL.B
Thesis, University of Lagos], p.6
235

3. Aboki, Y. (2009). Introduction to Legal Research Methodology (2nd ed, Zaria:Tamaza
Publishing Co Ltd 2009) p. 3.
4. Abraham v. County of Greenville, 237 F.3d 386 at 391 (4th Circuit, 2001)
5. Abubakar, S. (2016). The Nigeria Data Protection Bill: Appraisal, Issues, and Challenges PeerReviewed Academic Journal Vol. 9, No. 1. Page 9
6. Abubakar, R. (2017). Appraising Institutional Capacity for Implementation of the Nigerian
Cybercrime Act 2015. Proceedings on Big Data Analytics & Innovation (Peer-Reviewed),
Volume

2,

2017,

pp.59-80

<https://www.academia.edu/26325623/Admissibility_of_Electronic_Evidence_under_Sectio
n_84_of_Evidence_Act_2011_Examining_the_unresolved_Authentication_Problem1>
7. Access Device Fraud: Title 18 United States Code, S. 1029
8. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts
of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, European Treaty
Series

-

No.

189,

,

available

from

https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId
=090000168008160f
9. Adeyemi, A. (2018). Liability and Exemptions of Internet Service Providers (ISPs): Assessing
the

EU

Electronic

Commerce

Legal

Regime.

SSRN

Electronic

Journal<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321838066_Liability_and_Exemptions_of
_Internet_Service_Providers_ISPs_Assessing_the_EU_Electronic_Commerce_Legal_Regim
e
10. Adomi, E., ‘Combating Cybercrime in Nigeria’ (2008) The Electronic Library Vol. 26(5), Page
290
11. Advanced Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, CAP A6, LFN 2010
12. Advocate General Opinion – Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v.
TelefónicadeEspaña

18.07.2007,

available

from

http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006C0275:EN:NOT#top.
13. AfricaCERT. (2020). Vision. Africa Cert.<www.africacert.org/about-us/>
14. African Development Bank Group. (2020). Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigation Services:
Contact

AFDB

<www.afdb.org/en/about-organisational-structure-integrity-and-anti-

corruption/anti-corruption-and-fraud-investigation-services-contacts>
15. African

Development

Bank.

(2021).

African

Economic

Outlook

AFDB.<https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook>
236

2021.

16. African

Union

Convention

on

Cyber

Security

and

Personal

Data

Protection,

(EX.CL/846(XXV)) (27 June 2014),.
17. African Union Study on the Harmonization of Telecommunication and Information and
Communication Technologies Policies and Regulation in Africa: Draft Report (2008).
18. African Union, Oliver Tambo Declaration, Extra-Ordinary Conference of African Union
Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information Technologies, Johannesburg, South
Africa,( 5November 2009).
19. AIMS Education. (2019). The Impact of Technology In Healthcare. AIMS Education.
<https://aimseducation.edu/blog/the-impact-of-technology-on-healthcare>
20. Ajayi, E.F. (2016). Challenges to Enforcement of Cyber-crimes Laws and Policy. Journal of
Internet and Information Systems Vol. 6(1), pp.1-12
21. Ajetunmobi, R.L. (2015). Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc. Act 2015: A Review”
(2014-2015) NIALS Journal of Intellectual Property, 17 p.171.
22. Akdeniz, Y., Taylor, N., Walker, C. (2001). State Surveillance in the Age of Information
and Rights. Criminal Law Review, p.21
23. Akintunde, K. (2012). The Regulator and the Regulated: An Examination of the Legal
Framework for Telecommunication in Nigeria (Research gate, 2012) SSRN Electronic
Journal<www.researchgate.net/publication/256013714_The_Regulator_and_the_Regulated_
An_Examination_of_the_Legal_Framework_for_Telecommunication_in_NIgeria>
24. Alade V Alemuloke (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 69) 207
25. Aldo, S., Darje, S. (2013). Cybercrime in the Perspective of the European Legal Framework.
Mediterranean

Journal

of

Social

Sciences,

Vol.

4

No

9

file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/1082-4318-1-PB.pdf p.328
26. Alex, C. K, (2009) ‘CAN SPAM Act: An Empirical Analysis’, 2009 Vol.3 (2) International
Journal of Cyber Criminology. Page 567
27. Alex, G, (2014, December, 11). Coming Soon: Another Country to Ratify the Budapest
Convention.

CFR

blog.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/coming-soon-another-country-ratify-

budapest-convention
28. Alexis, W. (2021). What are Conflicts of Laws? Wise Geek. <https://www.wisegeek.com/what-are-conflict-of-laws.htm
29. Allan, L. (2015). CERTs, ISACs, and Intelligence-Sharing Communities. Science Direct
<www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/computer-emergency-readiness-team>
30. Amalie M. W. (2003). The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. Berkeley
Technology Law Journal, vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 425-46 at p. 443; Xingan. L. (2007). International
237

Actions against Cybercrime: Networking Legal Systems in the Networked Crime Scene.
Webology, Vol. 46, no. 3.
31. Annasingh, F., Veli, T. (2016). An investigation into risks awareness and e-safety needs of
children on the internet. Interactive Technology and Smart Education, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 147165
32. APEC Leaders’ Statement on Fighting Terrorism And Promoting Growth, Los Cabos, Mexico,
on 26 October 2002. Regarding national legislation on cybercrime in the Asian-Pacific region,
see: Urbas, Cybercrime Legislation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2001, available from
http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/other/urbas_gregor/2001-04-cybercrime.pdf..
33. ASEAN Group consists of: Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia;
Myanmar; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet Nam. See http://asean.org
34. Atta-Asamoah, A. (2009). Understanding the West African cyber crime Process. African
Security Studies, 18(4), 2009, 105-11
35. Ayswariya, G. K, Aswathy, R. 2018. A Comparative Study on the Difference Between
Conventional Crime and Cybercrime. International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics,
Vol.

119

No.

17

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337824114_A_Comparative_Study_on_the_Diffe
rence_Between_Conventional_Crime_and_Cyber_Crime
36. Balogun,V. F., Obe, O. O. (2010). E-crime in Nigeria: Trends, tricks, and treatment. The
Pacific Journal of Science and Technology11, 2010, 343, 355.
37. Barrinha, A. (2020). The Emergence of Cyber Diplomacy in an Increasingly Post-Liberal
Cyber Space. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/emergence-cyberdiplomacy-increasingly-post-liberal-cyberspace>
38. Bassiouni., M. C (1999) . The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A
Theoretical Framework. International Criminal Law 3-126; Cheng V Governor of Pentonville
Prison (1973) A.C. 931, 945 H.L.;ExParteSchtraks (1964) AC 556, at 583 HL; and Schtraks
V Government of Israel (1964) AC 556, 582-584.
39. Berr, J. (2017). WannaCry Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach $4billion. CBS News.
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/>
40. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed., p.427
41. Brenner, W. S., Koops, B. Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction. Journal of High Technology
Law, Vol. IV No. 1, PP 6-7

238

42. Broadhurst, R.G. (2006). Developments in the global law enforcement of cyber-crime.
Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Vol. 29(3) (2006)
408-433
43. Brush,

H.M.

(2008).

Encyclopedia

Phreaking.

of

New

Media.

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/phreaking>
44. Budapest convention (Convention on Cybercrime ETS No. 185)
45. Button, M., Nicholls, C. M, Kerr, J &Owen, R. (2014). Online frauds: Learning from victims
why they fall for these scams. Australian & New Zealand journal of criminology (2014)47(3),
391-408.
46. Carl

Vinson

Institute

(2014).

The

Difference

between

Torts

and

Crime.

<https://www.georgialegalaid.org/resource/the-difference-between-torts-and-crimes>
47. CCDCOE.

G7

Recognizes

Emerging

Challenges

of

Responsible

State

Behavior.<https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/g7-recognises-emerging-challenges-ofresponsible-state-behaviour/
48. CCG NLU Delhi, Budapest Convention on Cybercrime – An Overview, 03 March 2016
available

from

https://www.legallyindia.com/views/entry/budapest-convention-on-

cybercrime-an-overview
49. Сhernukhin, E. (2011). Cybercrime: New Threat and Global Response, (Presentation to
Expert Group on Cybercrime, Vienna, slides 21, 26
50. Clarke, R. (1997). Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of
Terms. <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html>
51. Clough, J. (2012). The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Deﬁning “Crime” in a
Digital World, 23 Criminal Law Forum, p.363.
52. CNII Portal available at <http://cnii.cybersecurity.org.my/main/about.html> accessed 2
September 2020
53. Combating Criminal Misuse No 1, UN Doc A/RES/55/63; Combating Criminal Misuse No 2,
UN Doc, A/RES/56/121., para. 2
54. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Enabling International Cooperation
against Cybercrime through Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building, UN ESCOR, 22nd
sess, Agenda Item d 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/L.16 (2 April 2013) paras 3–4.
55. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Strengthening International
Cooperation to Combat Cybercrime, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc d
E/CN.15/2013/L.14 (2 April 2013) para 3.
239

56. Committee II Rep, eleventh UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
BKK/CP/19 (2005).
57. Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and Management Regulations
58. Convention on Cybercrime , Council of Europe, Details of Treaty No.185 available from
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185
59. Cooke, J. (2009). Law of Tort. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, p.3
60. Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24.02.2005 on attacks against information
systems, recital 5.
61. Council of Europe, Acceding to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Benefits, Version 15
May 2017 available from https://rm.coe.int/cyber-buda-benefits-v6/168072bddc
62. Council

of

Europe,

T-CY

Plenaries,

available

online

at

https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/t-cy-plenaries
63. Council of Europe. (2020). Cyber-East Interview: On Legislative Development and Training
Activities

on

Cybercrime

in

Ukraine.

Council

of

Europe

Portal.<https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/-/cybereast-interview-on-legislativedevelopment-and-training-activities-on-cybercrime>
64. Council of Europe. A Conceptual Approach for Setting a Standard of Care for Cross-Border
Internet’, discussion Paper of the Council of Europe Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Cross-border
Internet for Workshop 6
65. Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes,
A/RES/73/187 (14 January 2019)
66. Creation of a global culture of cyber security and taking stock of national efforts to protect
critical information infrastructures, A/RES/64/211 ( 17 March 2010)
67. Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Information
Infrastructure. A/RES/58/199 (30 January 2004).
68. Criminal Code Act CAP 38, LFN 2010
69. Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Belarus
70. Crootof, R. (2018). International Cyber Torts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace.
Cornell Law Review, 103, p. 588
71. Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention etc) Act 2015
72. Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), T-CY Guidance Note # 3 Transborder access to
data (Article 32), T-CY (2013)7 E, Adopted by the 12th Plenary of the T-CY (2-3 December
2014),

available
240

from

https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId
=09000016802e726a
73. Cybercrime Law, People’s Republic of China <www.cybercrimelaw.net/China.html> accessed
2 September 2020
74. Cyber Security Observatory (CSO). Why are Data Breaches Rising at a Rapid
Pace?.https://cyberstartupobservatory.com/why-are-data-breaches-rising-at-a-rapid-pace/
75. Daniele Kriz, ‘A Global Model: UK’s National Cyber Security Strategy’ (Paloato, 2017)
<www.securityroundtable.org/global-model-uks-national-cyber-security-strategy/> accessed
16 August 2020
76. Daskal, J., Kennedy-Mayo, D. (2020). Budapest Convention: What is it and How is it being
Updated?.Cross Border Data Forum. <https://www.crossborderdataforum.org/budapestconvention-what-is-it-and-how-is-it-being-updated/>
77. Dawkins, F. (2018). How Nigerian Fraudsters Sold a Non-existent Airport for $242 million to
a Brazilian Bank in 1995. Face 2 Face Africa<www.facetofaceafrica.com/article/hownigerian-fraudsters-sold-a-non-existent-airport-for-242-million-to-a-brazilian-bank-in1995/amp>
78. Deflem. International Police Co/operation — History of, in The Encyclopedia of Criminology,
New York, 2005 pp. 795-798.
79. De Groot, J. (2020, December 1). A History of Ransomeware Attacks: The Biggest and Worst
Ransomware

Attacks

of

All

Times.

Digital

Guardian’s

Blog.

<https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-ransomware-attacks-biggest-and-worstransomware-attacks-all-time
80. Dennis,

M.A.

(2020).

Cybercrime.

Britannica

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/cybercrime/identity-theft-and-invasion-of-privacy
81. Diakonia. (2020). What Should a State do if it Violates International Law.
<https://www.diakonia.se/en/IHL/The-Law/Internationl-Law1/Enforcement-of-IL/Whatshould-a-state-do-if-it-violates-IL/>
82. Directive 2005/0182/COD of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communication networks and amending directive
2002/58/EC O.J.
83. Downing, R. W. (2005). ‘Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers Around the World
Need to Consider in Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat Cybercrime. Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law, p.43
241

84. Doyle, C. (2020). Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute
and

Related

Federal

Criminal

Laws.

Congressional

Research

Service

<http://www.fas.org.sgp/crs/misc/97-1025.pdf>
85. Doyle, C. (2012). Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress – Congressional Research Service.
86. Dr. Bryen, S. (2002). A Collective Security Approach to Protecting the Global Critical
Infrastructure. ITU Workshop on Creating Trust in Critical Network Infrastructure. ITU.
87. Draft International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism
88. Draft Proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, COM(2007) 650 O.Js.
89. Dunn, M. (2005). A Comparative Analysis of Cybersecurity Initiatives Worldwide. (A paper
presented at the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) Thematic Meeting on
Cybersecurity, ITU: Geneva) . p. 4
90. Economic And Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2002, Cap E1 LFN, 2010
91. Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Commission for Africa Declaration of Addis
Ababa on the Harmonization of Cyber Legislation in Africa, (June 2012) paragraph 10, p. 2.
92. Economic Commission for Africa, ICT Ministers call for harmonized policies and cyber
legislations

on

Cybersecurity

(Press

Release)

(2012)

http://www1.uneca.org/ArticleDetail/tabid/3018/ArticleId/1934/ICT-Ministers-call-forharmonized-policies-and-cyberlegislations -on-Cybersecurity.aspx
93. ECOSOC Resolution 2004/26, International cooperation in the prevention, investigation,
prosecution and punishment of fraud, the criminal misuse and falsification of identity and
related crimes.
94. ECOSOC Resolution 2007/20, International cooperation in the prevention, investigation,
prosecution and punishment of economic fraud and identity-related crime, available from
<http://www.un.org/ecosoc/docs/2007/Resolution%202007-20.pdf>
95. ECOWAS Commission, ECOWAS Capacity Building on Cybercrime. Paper presented at First
African Forum on Cybercrime (16 October 2018) available from <https://rm.coe.int/3148afc2018-ws3-ecowas/16808e853f>
96. ECOWAS Convention on Extradition (A/P1/94) (6 August, 1994 Abuja, Nigeria); Economic
Community of West African States, Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers:
Directive C/DIR. 1/08/11 on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS (August 2011)
(‘Directive on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS’).
242

97. ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (A/p1/7/92) (29 July, 1992,
Dakar, Senegal)
98. ECOWAS Directive C/DIR.1/08/11 on Fighting Cybercrime, adopted at the Sixty Sixth
Ordinary session of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers at Abuja, Nigeria (August 2011).
99. Edward, M., Kevin, A. (2020). USA: Cyber security Laws and Regulations 2020 (Ropes &
Gray, 2020) <www.iclg.com/practice-areas/cybersecurity-laws-and-regulations/usa>
100.

Eke, C. (2013). Crime and Criminal Investigation in Nigeria: A Study of Police

Criminal Investigation in Enugu State. International Journal of African and Asian Studies An Open Access International Journal Vol.1 (2013)
101.

Eleventh UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Measures to Combat

Computer-related Crime, A/CONF.203/14 2005.
102.

Ellison, L., Akdeniz, Y. (1998). Cyber-stalking: the regulation of Harassment on the

internet. Criminal Law Review, December Special Edition: Crime, Criminal Justice and the
Internet, pp29-48.
103.

ENISA. (2013). ENISA Calls for Better Data Sharing and Interpretability among

Digital Fire Brigades to Mitigate Cyber Attacks in New Report; Detect, Share, Protect. ENISA
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/enisa-calls-for-better-data-sharing-andinteroperability-among-certs-to-mitigate-cyberattacks>
104.

Erezi,

D.

(2021).

Why

Twitter

is

Opening

African

Office

in

Ghana.

Guardian<https://m.guardian.ng/news/why-twitter-is-opening-african-office-in-ghana/
105.

European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the

Council on Attacks against Information Systems and Repealing Council Framework Decision
2005/222/JHA, Doc No COM(2010) 517 final (30 September 2010), 6–7.
106.

European Treaty Series - No. 185,

107.

European, Mediterranean & Middle Eastern conference on Information Systems (2010)

Abu

Dhabi,

UAE

<https://www.academia.edu/RegistertoDownload#ChooseAccountChecklists>
108.

Europol. (2019). Common Challenges in Combating cybercrime. Eurojust and Europol

Joint Report Public Information
109.

Extradition Act 1988 <www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ea1988149/>

110.

Feukeng, L. (2019) .Morocco: Ongoing discussions with AFDB on implementing

‘Desert to Power. Afrik<www.google.com/amp/s/www.afrik21.africa/en/morocco/-ongoingdiscussions-with-afdb-on-implementing-desert-to-power/amp/>
243

111.

Final Declaration of the 2009 G8 ministerial meeting of Justice and Home Affairs,

Rome,

p.

7,

available

from

http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/declaration1giu2009,0.pdf.
112.

FitzGerald, M. (2017). New Hacking and Cybercrime Offences.Lexology.

<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cfff4793-1ff7-437e-81d2-41b10c9b1744>
113.

Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,

A/RES/60/177 (20 March 2006).
114.

Francesco, C. (2014). The European Legal Framework on Cybercrime: Striving for an

Effective

Researchgate.

Implementation,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227301292_The_European_legal_framework_on_c
ybercrime_Striving_for_an_effective_implementation.
115.

Freedom

from

Fear

Magazine.

(2020).

Global

Cybersecurity

Agenda<http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=350
116.

French

Constitutional

Council,

Decision

No.

2009-580

(10

June

2009)

<www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2009580DC2009_58>
117.

G8 Conference On Dialogue Between the Public Authorities and Private Sector On

Security and Trust In Cyberspace,. Final Press Release, Paris, France (May 15-17, 2000),
available from http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/crime/paris2000.htm
118.

G8 Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, available from

http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/renewed-commitment-for-freedomanddemocracy.1314.html.
119.

G8 Justice and Home Affairs Communiqué, Washington DC (11 May 2004).

120.

G8 Ministers of Justice and Interior, Press Conference on the Results of the G8 Justice

and

Home

Affairs

Ministerial

Moscow,

(June

16

2006)

available

from

<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/justice/justice2006.html>.
121.

G8 Officials and the Private Sector Meet to Discuss Combating Computer Crime G8

Government/Private Sector High-level Meeting on High-tech Crime (May 24th 2001) (Press
Release) available from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/high_tec/conf0105-3.html
122.

G8 Summit Declaration on Counter-Terrorism, (July 15, 2006), available from

http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/3723
123.
out

Gabey. G. (June 11, 2013), ‘INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation: Interpol lays
response

blueprint

for

global
244

cybercrime

war.

Digital

News

Asia.https://www.digitalnewsasia.com/security/interpol-lays-out-response-blueprint-forglobal-cybercrime-war
124.

Gala, J. (2017). How Cybercrime Affects International Relations. Stanford

Management,

Science

and

Engineering<https://mse238blog.stanford.edu/2017/07/jugal23/how-cyber-crime-affectsinternational-relations/
125.

Gene, M. (2019). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Scope, Reach, and Safe

Harbors.

The

National

Law

Review,

2019

<https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.natlawreview.com/article/digital-millenniumcopyright-act-scope-reach-and-safe-harbors%3famp>
126.

Gercke. (2008). National, Regional and International Approaches in the Fight against

Cybercrime. Computer Law Review International, 2008, Issue 1, p. 7 et seq.
127.

Ghernaouti-Helie, S. (2010). Need for a United Nations Cyberspace Treaty. WISIS

Forum 2010-High-Level Debate on Cyber Security and Cyber Space (ITU: Geneva, 10-14
May, 2010) p. 1.
128.

Global

organizations,

Association

of

Southeast

Asia

Nation.

(2012

https://www.cybercrimelaw.net/ASEAN.html
129.

Gov.Uk. (2018). UK Launches First National CERT (UK Government, 2018)

<www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-launches-first-national-cert>
130.

Greg Masters. (23 April 2010). Global Cybercrime Treaty Rejected at UN. SC

Magazine(online),http://www.scmagazineus.com/global-cybercrime-treaty-rejected-atun/article/168630/ .
131.

Griffiths, M.D., Kuss, D. (2015). Online addictions, gambling, video gaming and social

networking. The Handbook of the Psychology of Communication Technology, Chichester:
John Wiley, pp. 384-406
132.

Haji, A. Cybercrime and Analysis of Laws: A Case Study of Zanzibar Legal

Issues.<http://repository.out.ac.tz/591/1/FAKI.pdf>
133.

Hakmeh, J. (2017). Building a Stronger International Legal Framework on

Cybercrime.

Chatham

House.<www.chathamhouse.org/2017/06/building-strong-

international-legal-framework-cybercrime>
134.

Hathaway, O.A. et al. (2012). The Law of Cyber-Attack. 100California Law Review.p.

817, at 834

245

135.

Hayro. (2019). The Three Goals of Cyber Security-CIA Triad Defined. Preferred

Group.https://www.preferreditgroup.com/2019/08/27/the-three-goals-of-cyber-security-ciatriad-defined/
136.

Hemming, S. (2010). The Practical application of counter-terrorism legislation in

England and Wales: A Prosecutor’s Perspective’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4; P. 963
137.
138.

Henkin, L. (1978). How Nations Behave. Columbia University Press, 2nd edn. 5

139.

Hensler-McGinnis, N. F. (2008). Cyberstalking Victimization: Impact and Coping

Responses

in

a

National

University

[Doctorate

Sample

Dissertation]<http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8206/1/umi-umd-5402.pdf>
140.

Herjavec, R. (2019, July 17). Cybersecurity CEO: The History of Cybercrime, From

1834 To Present.Cybercrime Magazine<https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-ceothe-history-of-cybercrime-from-1834-to-present/>
141.

Homeland Security. (2020). About DHS. Homeland Security. <www.dhs.gov/about-

dhs>
142.

IANS (2020).37% Increase in Cyberattacks in India in Q1 2020: Report. The

Economic

Times

<https://ciso.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/37-increase-in-

cyberattacks-in-india-in-q1-2020-report/75962696>
143.

ICO. (2016). The Role of the National Cyber Security Centre (ICO, 2016)

<www.ico.org.uk/for-organisaions/the-guide-to-nis/the-role-of-the-national-cyber-securitycentre-ncsc/>
144.

Identity Theft: Title 18 United States Code S 1028(a)(7)

145.

Ido,

K.,

Itamar,

M.

(2016).

Towards

a

Cyber-Security

Treaty.

Just

Securityhttps://www.justsecurity.org/32268/cyber-security-treaty/
146.

Imranuddin, M. (2017). A study of cybercrime in the United Arab Emirates. Rochester

Institute of Technology <https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses>
147.

International Labor Organization. (2021). Tackling Poverty Through Decent Work for

Africa’s

Sustainable

Development.

ILO<www.ilo.org/africa/media-

centre/pr/WCMS_482713/lang-en/index.htm>
148.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2003). World Summit on the

Information Society, Declaration of Principles: Building the Information Society: A Global
Challenge in the New Millennium. (Document No WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E, 12
December 2003), p. 40.
246

149.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2011). ICT Facts and Figures. ITU.

https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf&ved
150.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2014). Understanding Cybercrime:

Phenomena,

Challenges

and

Legal

https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-

p.125,

Response,

D/Cybersecurity/Documents/cybercrime2014.pdf
151.

International

Telecommunication

Union,

Global

Cybersecurity

Agenda

http://www.cybersecurity-gateway.org/pdf/new-gca-brochure.pdf.
152.

International Telecommunication Union, World Summit on the Information Society,

‘Tunis Agenda for the Information Society’, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E ,( 18
November 2005) 40.
153.

International Telecommunication Union. (2021). Measuring Digital Development

Facts and Figures 2021.ITUPublications: Geneva, 2021 iii. https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2021.pdf.
154.

Internet World Stats. (2011). The Internet User Population data are estimates of June

2011. Internet Usage Statistics for Africa, 2011<http://www.internetworldstats.com/statslhtm>
155.

INTERPOL European Working Party on Information Technology Crime (EWPITC) –

Project on cloud computing, 2011
156.

Interpol,

Supporting

collective

actions

against

Cybercrime

in

Southeast

Asiahttps://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime/Cybercrime-operations/ASEANCybercrime-Operations-Desk
157.

Interpol, What is Interpol, available from https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-

is-INTERPOL
158.

ISBuzz Staff. (2015). The Secret History of Cyber Crime. Information Security Buzz

<https://www.informationsecuritybuzz.com/articles/the-secret-history-of-cyber-crime/>
159.

ITU Global Cyber security Agenda / High-Level Experts Group, Global Strategic

Report,

2008,

p.

17,

available

from

<http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/index.html>..
160.
High

ITU High Level Experts Group (HLEG). (2008). ITU Global Cyber-Security Agenda
Level

Experts

Group

(HLEG)

Global

Strategic

Report

(2008)

p.

27<http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/gca>
161.

IWF.

(2020).

Internet

Watch

www.en.m.internetwatchfoundation.org/iwf/internet_Watch_Foundation>

247

Foundation.

162.

Jarret, M., Bailie, M. (2019). Prosecuting Computer Crimes. Office of Legal Education

Executive

Office

for

United

States

Attorneys

<http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf>
163.

Javatpoint. Cyber Security Goals. <www.javatpoint.com/cyber-security-goals>

164.

Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime

issued on October 11, 2001 in Singapore: available from http://www.aseansec.or.id/5621.htm
165.

Joyce, H., Allison, P. (2020). A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for

Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet. Net Politics. https://www.cfr.org/blog/newun-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet
166.

Judge Harvey, D. Cyberstalking and Internet Harassment: What the Law Can Do

<http://www.netsafe.org.nz/Doc_Library/netsafepapers_davidharvey_cyberstalking.pdf>
167.

Kabay, M.E. (1998). Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation,

Incivility and Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy. Paper Presented at the Annual
Conference of the European Institute for computer Anti-virus Research (EICAR), (Munich,
Germany March, 1998).
168.

Kaspersky,

L.

The

Evolution

of

Phishing

Attacks:2011-

2013<http://media.kaspersky.com/pdf/Kaspersky_Lab_KSN_report_The_Evolution_of_Phis
hing_Attacks_2011-2013.pdf>
169.

Kaundal, B. Cybercrimes: Are the Laws Outdated?.Supremo Amicus Vol. 9,

p.68<https://supremoamicus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/A10v9.pdf>
170.

Kelsey, J. (2008). Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law: the Principles of

Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare. 106 Michigan Law Review (2008)
p.1429
171.

Kenichi, T. (23 May 2008). The Role of INTERPOL in the Fight against Cybercrime

INTERPOL NCRP for Computer Related Crime, being a paper presented at 3rd Facilitation
Meeting for WSIS Action Line C5 Geneva(May 23 2008)
172.
Cyber

Kennedy, G. Lee, H.F. (29 October 2018). A Structured Guide to Data Protection and
Security

in

China.

Mayer

and

Brown;

Lexology,

2020)

https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6a51305a-eccd-4f3f-a3a4-0b9e21843c19
173.

Kier, G. (2012). Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues. 4th International

Conference

on

Cyber

Conflict

(2012),

p.67,

https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/2_1_Giles_RussiasPublicStanceOnCyberInf
ormationWarfare.pdf
248

174.

Klimburg, A., Zylberberg, H. (2012). CyberSecurity Capacity Building: Developing

Access. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Report No. 6>
175.

KnowBe4.

AIDS

Trojan

or

PC

Cyborg

Ransomware.

<https://www.knowbe4.com/aids-trojan>
176.

KPMG. (2001). Global E-fraud Survey. KPMG Forensic and Litigation Services

<https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/advisory/risk-consulting/forensic.html>
177.

Krannenbarg, M.W. (2018). Cyber-Offending and Traditional Offending over the Life-

Course: an Empirical Comparison. Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology 4,
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40865-018-0087-8
178.

Krotidou, D., Teokleous, N., Zahariadou, A. (2012). Exploring parents’ and children’s

awareness on internet threats in relation to internet safety. Campus-Wide Information Systems,
Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 133-143.
179.

Ladan, M.T. (2015). Overview of The 2015 Legal and Policy Strategy on Cybercrime

and Cybersecurity in Nigeria.Prof. M.T. Ladan’s Law and Policy Review Research Working
Papers, Faculty of Law, Ahmadu Bello University, p. 2
180.

Landler, M.,Markoff, J. (2007). Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia.

New York Times (2007)
181.

Laura P. T. (2013). FISMA Trickles into the Private Sector. FISMA Compliance

Handbook

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/federal-information-

security-management-act> accessed 15 August 2020
182.

Le VPN. (2018). Where Does Cybercrime Come From? The Origin & Evolution of

Cybercrime. https://www.le-vpn.com/history-cyber-crime-origin-evolution/
183.

Legal Approaches to Criminalize Identity Theft, Commission on Crime Prevention and

Criminal Justice, 2009, E/CN.15/2009/CRP.13.
184.

Leukfeldt, R., Veenstra, S., Stol, W. (2013). High Volume Cyber Crime and the

Organization of the Police: The Results of Two Empirical Studies in the Netherlands.
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 7(1), p. 1
185.

Lewis, B. (2004). Prevention of Computer Crime Amidst International Anarchy.

American Criminal Law Review pp 1354
186.

Lipson, H. F. (2002).Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and

Global Policy Issues 13 Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 2002, p.
5.

249

187.

Liska, A. (2015). CERTs, ISACs, and Intelligence-Sharing Communities. Science

Direct.

<www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/computer-emergency-readiness-

team>
188.

Lokwani, P. (2020). Do You Know About Strange I LOVE YOU Virus?

Procaffenation<https://procaffenation.com/know-about-strange-i-love-youvirus/#:~:text=I%20LOVE%20YOU%20virus%2C%20also%20known%20as%20a,5%20th
%20of%20May%202000%20from%20the%20Philippines>
189.

Lotrionte, C. State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative

Framework for Balancing Legal Rights. Emory International Law Review
190.

Macfoy V United Africa Company Limited (West Africa) 1962 AC 152

191.

Madukolu&Ors V Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587

192.

Mahawar, S. (2021). Investigation and nabbing of accused in cybercrime offences. IP

Leaders.<https://blog.ipleaders.in/investigation-nabbing-accused-cybercrime-offences/>
193.

Makinde, S. (2021). SeyiMakinde’s Achievements in Other Sectors (2 years in

Office)<https://seyimakinde.com/promises-kept/seyi-makindes-achievements/>
194.

Manila 1997, Yangon 1999, Singapore 2001, Bangkok 2003

195.

Marc D. G., Susan W. B. (2000). The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in

Cyberspace," 6 UCLA Journal of Law and Technology (2002), 70; see also Sofaer, et al, A
Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, p.i,. https://fsilive.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sofaergoodman.pdf
196.

Marco, G. (2009). Understanding Cybercrime: A Gide for Developing Countries. p.

216.
197.

Marie-Helen, M. (2014). Computer Forensics: Cybercriminals, Laws and Evidence.

Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett, 2nd ed..
198.
so

Maska, M. (2019). Building National Cyber security Capacity in Nigeria: The Journey
Far:

Regional

Cyber

security

Forum

for

Africa

and

Arab

States,

Tunis

<http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/events/2009/tunis/docs/maska-nigeria-cybersecurity-june09.pdf>
199.

Maurer, T. (2018). Cyber Proxies and Their Implications for Liberal Democracies. The

Washington

Quarterly

Vol

41,

Issue

2

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1485332?journalCode=rwaq
20>
200.

Maurushat, A. (2010). Australia’s Accession to the Cybercrime Convention: Is the

Convention Still Relevant in Combating Cybercrime in the Era of Botnets and Obfuscation
250

Crime Tools? University of New South Wales Law Journal, p. 431-432;1SADC Protocol on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Luanda, 3 October 2002)
201.

McConnell. (2000). International LLC Cyber Crime and Punishment’ Archaic Laws

Threaten

Global

.McConnell

Information

International

LLC,

p.

7

<http://www.mcconnellinternational.com>
202.

McGraw, D. (1995). Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome

E-mail. RutgersComputer and Technology Law Journal, 492
203.

Mercer,

J.

Cybersquatting:

Blackmail

on

the

Information

Superhighway<http://128.197.26.36/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/scitech/volume6/m
ercer.pdf>
204.

Michalsons.

(2020).

Cybercrime

Law

around

the

World.

Michalsons<https://www.michalsons.com/focus-areas/cybercrime-law>
205.

Microsoft Encarta Dictionary 2009

206.

Mifitzgerald.

(2004).

Nine

Famous

Hacks.

Extreme

Tech.

<https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/55530-nine-famous-hacks>
207.

Miquelon-Weismann, F. M. (2005). The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized

Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process? John
Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law, vol. 23, no. 2 , 329-61 at 353.
208.

Modise, S. (2020). Botswana’s Position on Encryption.Lawyard Journal, Vol. 2 p. 25.

209.

Mohammed, I. (2017).A study of cybercrime in the United Arab Emirates. Rochester

Institute of Technology<https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses>
210.

Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act Cap M18, LFN 2010

211.

Monnik, M. (2017).

Which Countries Have no Cybercrime Laws. Quora.

<https://www.quora.com/Which-countries-have-no-cyber-crime-laws>
212.

Morton,

H.

(2019).

Net

Neutrality

Legislation

in

States.

<https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/netneutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx
213.

Mosalanejas, L., Dehghani, A., Abdolahofard, K. (2014). The students’ experiences of

ethics in online systems: A phenomenological study. Turkish Online Journal of Distance
Education, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 205-216;
214.

Mosyagin,

J.

(2010).

Using

4G

Wireless

Technology

in

the

Car.

Researchgate<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224167500_Using_4G_wireless_tec
hnology_in_the_car>
251

215.

Moteff, J. & Parfomak, P. (2004). Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition

and Identification. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, p. 4
216.

Muniandy, L., Muniandy, B. (2013). The impact of social media in social and political

aspects in Malaysia: An overview. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,
Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 71-76.
217.

National Intellectual Property Management Office. (2021). World IP Day 26 April 2021

‘IP & SMEs: Taking Your ideas to Market, NIPMO.<https://nipmo.dst.gov.za/events/worldip-day-26-april-2021-ip-smes-taking-your-ideas-to-market>
218.

Nelson, D. Cyberstalking .http://www/tccmweb.com/swcm/may97/stalk.html

219.

NESA (National Electronic Security Authority). (2021). Our Thinking, NESA: The

New Standard (NESA, 2021) <https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/nesa-the-newstandard-of-information-security-in-the-uae/>
220.

Nimpar JCA, M. V Breughel & Ors v. Mondivest Ltd (2018) LPELR-44728 (CA) (Page

38, Paras. D-E).
221.

Niram, Gibson &Miralis. 2021). TheFive Key Challenges of Law Enforcements in

Fighting

NGM.

Cybercrime.

<https://ngm.com.au/cybercrime-5-key-

challenges/#:~:text=Challenges%20associated%20with%20national%20legal%20frameworks
%20Legal%20frameworks,is%20criminalised%20and%20how%20investigations%20may%2
0be%20conducted>
222.

Noble, R. (2003). Interpol’s New Approach: A Return to Basics, in Broadhurst, R.

(Ed.), Bridging the GAP: A Global alliance on Transnational Organised Crime, (Hong Kong:
Police Printing Department, 2003).
223.

O’Brien, D. (2018). A Short History of Law Enforcement and Cyber Crime. Medium.

https://medium.com/threat-intel/cyber-crime-takedowns-66915be7307e
224.

O’Dea,S. (2021). Number of mobile broadband subscriptions worldwide 2007-2021.

Statista.https://www.statista.com/statistics/273016/number-of-mobile-broadbandsubscriptions-worldwide-since-2007/
225.
and

O’Niel, M. (2001). Cybercrime Dilemma: Is it Possible to Guarantee Both Security
Privacy?

Brookings.

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cybercrime-dilemma-is-it-

possible-to-guarantee-both-security-and-privacy/amp/.
226.

Obasi, N. (1998). Developing Capacity for Management of Africa’s Socio-Economic

Crisis. Garuba C.A., (ed) (1998) Pp 275-296.
227.

Official Gazette of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

(15 October 2011)
252

228.

Oke, R., ‘Cyber Capacity without Cyber Security: A Case Study of Nigeria’s National

Policy for Information Technology (NPFIT)’ (2012) The Journal of Philosophy, Science and
Law’ Vol. 12, Page 21
229.

Olayemi, J. (2014).

A Socio-Technological Analysis of Cybercrime and Cyber

Security in Nigeria. International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 6(3), page 116125

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263967388_A_socio-

technological_analysis_of_cybercrime_and_cyber_security_in_Nigeria
230.

Oloni, V. (2020). A Long Walk To Freedom: Nigeria’s Data Protection Journey.

Lawyard Journal, Vol. 2, p.25
231.

Olukanmi, A., ‘Expert Group Meeting on Cybercrime’ (2011) 17-21 January, Vienna

232.

Oriola, T., ‘Advance Fee Fraud on the Internet’ (2005) Vol. 21 Computer Law and

Security Report, p 241
233.

Orji, U. J. (2015). Multilateral legal responses to cyber security in Africa: Any hope

for effective international cooperation?. (Conference Paper 2015 presented at the 7th
International

Conference

on

Cyber

Conflict.

May

2015)file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Art08MultilateralLegalResponsestoCyberSecurityin
Africa-AnyHopeforEffectiveInternationalCooperation.pdf
234.

Orji, U.J. (2012). Cybersecurity Law and Regulation .Wolf Legal Publishers. p.31

235.

Orji, U.J. (2012). A Discourse on the Perceived Defects of the Draft African Union

Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for Cybersecurity.
Communications Law. The Journal of Computer, Media and Telecommunications Law, vol.
17, no. 4 ,pp. 128–130.
236.

Peavy v. Harman, 37 F. Supp., 2d 495 at 513

237.

Percy, E. (2014). Africa Moves Towards a Common Cyber Security Legal Framework.

Digital

Security.<https://www.accessnow.org/africa-moves-towards-a-common-cyber-

security-legal-framework/>
238.

Peter, C. The Council of Europe Convention on cyber-crime: A response to the

challenge of the new age?, in Giovanni Ilarda and Gianfranco Marullo(eds), Cybercrime:
Conferenzainternazionale.

La

Convenzione

del

Consigliod'EuropasullaCriminalitàInformatico,. (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004) pp. 3- 29 at 10-11.
239.
Now.

Pratap, V.S. (2013). India won't sign Budapest Pact on Cyber Security. Governance
http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/india-wont-sign-budapest-pact-

cyber-security
253

240.

Prof. Dr. Ulrich, S. (1999). Memorandum on A European Penal Code. European

Journal of Law Reform, 1, 445-471 http://www.jura.uni-muenchen.del
241.

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating

the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, repealing Framework
Decision 2004/68/JHA, COM (2010) O.J 94.
242.

Protection Group International. (2018). What is the Difference between Cybercrime and

Traditional Crime? PGI 2018 <https://www.pgitl.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-betweencyber-crime-and-traditional-crime/>
243.

Rahman, N.A. (2015).

The Importance of Cybersecurity Education in School.

International Journal of Information and Education Technology, Vol. 10, No. 5
244.

Ramos, A. (2014). United Nations’ Definition of Cybercrime. Innovative Dynamic

Networks.<https://idn-wi.com/united-nations-definition-cybercrime/>
245.

Ratten, V. (2015). A cross-cultural comparison of online behavioral advertising

knowledge, online privacy concerns and social networking using the technology acceptance
model and social cognitive theory. Journal of Science & Technology Policy Management, Vol.
6, No. 1, pp. 25-36
246.

Raven.

(2002).

The

History

of

Hacking

and

Phreaking.

HelpnetSecurity<www.helpnetsecruity.com/2002/04/04/the-history-of-hacking-andphreaking/>
247.

Regional Conference Booklet on: Cybercrime, Morocco, 2007, page 6, available from:

http://www.pogar.org/publications/ruleoflaw/cybercrime-09e.pdf.
248.

Reneau, A. (2020). Judge Offers Alternative Sentences to Young Offenders like ‘Get

Your

Grades

up

and

UpWorthy.

Vote.

<https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.upworthy.com/amp/judge-carlos-moore-offersyoung-people-creative-alternative-sentences-2648592835>
249.

Reno,

J.

(2000).

Speech

to

the

Virginia.

Journal

of

International

Law<http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2000/4100aguva.htm>
250.

Ron,

C.

(2017).

Cybercrime

in

China:

Online

Fraud

(Forbes,

2017)

<www.google.com/amp/s/www.forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2017/03/28/cybercrime-in-chinaonline-fraud/amp/>
251.

Rosewarne, C., Odunfa, A. (2014). The 2014 Nigerian Cyber Threat Barometer Report,

(South Africa and Nigeria) Wolfpack Information Risk and Digital Jewels, p. 40.

254

252.

Rouse,

M.

(2020).

Cybercrime.

Techtarget.

<https://www.google.com/amp/s/searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/cybercrime%3famp
=1>
253.

Rustad, M.L. (2014). Global Internet Law. St Paul: West Academic Publishing, p. 112

254.

SADC Model Law on Computer Crime and Cybercrime Version 2.0, Adopted 2 March

2012
255.

SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance on Extradition (Launda, 3 October 2002)

256.

Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime

Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Development in a Changing World
257.

Satola, D., Judy, H.L. (2011). Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing

International Cooperation and Collaboration in Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: Reflections
on the Proceedings of the Workshop on Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010 United Nations
Internet Governance Forum 37.William Mitchell Law Review, 1748-1749 (2011).
258.
–

Schjolberg, S. (2008). The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation
The

Road

to

Geneva,

p.

2.

[online]

http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/cybercrime_history.pdf
259.

Shackelford, S. J. (2009). Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in

International Law. Berkeley Journal of International Law, (2009) Vol. 27(1), P. 205
260.
CCG

Shalini, S. (2016, March 3). Budapest Convention on Cybercrime – An Overview. The
Blog.https://ccgnludelhi.wordpress.com/2016/03/03/budapest-convention-on-

cybercrime-an-overview/#_ftn1
261.
of

Shi, J., Saleem, S. (2012). .Phishing. Computer Security Research Reports, University
Arizona

<http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/Teaching/466-

566/2014/Resources/presentations/2012/topic5-final/report.pdf
262.

Sieber, U. (1997). Memorandum on a European Model Penal Code, p. 2.

263.

Simon, P. (8 September 2017). Keyboard Warrior: the British Hacker Fighting for his

Life. The Guardian.
264.

Soering V The United Kingdom (1989) European Court of Human Rights; Othman (Abu

Qatada) V United Kingdom 8139/09 (2012) ECHR 56
265.

Sofaer, et al. A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and

Terrorism, p.iv. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sofaergoodman.pdf
266.

Sosa, G. C. Country Report on Cybercrime: The Philippines. 140th International

Training Course Participants’ Papers.
255

267.

Stahl, W. M. (2011). The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the Principles of

International Maritime Law to the Problem of Cybersecurity. 40 georgia journal of
international and comparative law, p.248.
268.

Stanford

Encyclopedia

of

Philosophy.

(2018).

Theories

of

Criminal

Law.<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/>
269.

STC-CICTC. A Global Approach To Cybersecurity and Cybercrime in Africa.

Recommendations

of

the

First

Ordinary

Session

of

the

STC-CICT-1

<https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/31357-wda_common_african_approach_on_cybersecurity_and_cybercrime_en_final_web_site_.pdf
270.

Stein, S. (August 15, 2018). The Road in Cyberspace to United Nations, A Report on

the development of global cybersecurity since 2008 and recommendations for future initiatives,
p.36.The Chairmans Anniversary Report4 (cybercrimelaw.net)
271.

Stein, S. and Solange, G. (2009). A Global Protocol on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime,

(Oslo: E-dit, 2009), p. 3.
272.

Stella, O. (2017). Cybercrime and Poverty in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science(2017)

Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 19-29
273.

Susan, N., Han, W. (2020). China: Cyber security Laws and Regulations 2020. King &

Wood Mallesons. <https://iclg.com/practice-areas/cybersecurity-laws-and-regulations/china>
274.

Techopedia. Cybercrime” <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2387/cybercrime>

275.

The Advanced Learners Dictionary (6th Ed..1063

276.

The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential

Decision Directive No. 63, White Paper (May 22, 1998).
277.

The Commonwealth Secretariat, Model Law on Computer and Computer Related

Crime

(2017),

available

from

https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/key_reform_pdfs/P15370_11_ROL_Model_L
aw_Computer_Related_Crime.pdf
278.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.)

279.

The

Free

Dictionary

by

Farlex.

(2020).

Communications

Security.

<https://www.thefreedictionary.com/communications+security>
280.

The IP Commission Report. (2013). The Report of the Commission on the Theft of

American Intellectual Property. NBR, 2013<https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads
281.

The Oxford Dictionary 2002

256

282.

The United Nations Human Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development

Report (United Nations Geneva, 1994)
283.

The United Nations, GA/12235, General Assembly Approves $3.07 Billion Programme

Budget as It Adopts 22 Resolutions, 1 Decision to Conclude Main Part of Seventy-Fourth
(27

Session

December

2019),

available

from

https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12235.doc.htm.
284.

Tomilehin, B. (2015) ‘An Appraisal of the Legal Framework for Cybercrime in

Nigeria’. AFe-Babalola University, Ado Ekiti, Project Archives, p. 16
285.

Tunggal,

A.T.

(2020)

.Why

is

Cybersecurity

Important?

Upguard,

<www.guard.com/blog/cybersecurity-important>
286.

Tunis

Agenda

For

05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E

The
(18

Information

Society,

Document:

WSIS-

November

2005)

available

from

https://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.doc
287.

Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, GA Res

65/230, UN GAOR, 65th sess, Agenda Item 105, UN Doc A/RES/65/230 (1 April 2011,
adopted 21 December 2010).
288.

UAE

Telecommunications

Regulatory

Authority

(TRA)

<https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra.aspx> accessed 6 May 2021
289.

UN

General

Assembly,

A/RES/45/121,

(14

December

1990)

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r121.html
290.

UNCTAD. (2018). Economic Development in Africa Report 2018 .UNCTAD Report

2018. <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en>.
291.

UNDOC, A/RES/55/63, <www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5563e.pdf>

292.

United Arab Emirates, Computer Emergency Response Team, Accessed from

<https://www.tra.gov.ae/aecert/en/home/aspx> accessed 6 May 2021
293.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2021). Cybercrime

Legislations

Worldwide.

UNCTAD<https://unctad.org/page/cybercrime-legislation-

worldwide
294.

United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network (UNCJIN). (2000). Report of

the tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.
A/CONF.185/15, No. 165, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/congr10/15e.pdf
295.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Draft African Union

Convention

on

Cybersecurity

Comes

to

its

Final

http://www1.uneca.org/TabId/3018/Default.aspx?ArticleId=1931
257

Stage

(Press

Release,)

296.

United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. (2019). Module 6: Practical Aspects of

Cybercrime

Investigation

and

Digital

Forensics.

UNODC.

<https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-6/key-issues/legal-and-ethicalobligations.html>
297.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016). Comprehensive Study

on Cybercrime. Draft prepared for the second meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental
expert group on cybercrime by the UNODC 2016
298.

United

Nations.

(2020).

Trade

in

Africa

–

the

United

Nations.

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.un.org/africarenew
al/sites/www.un.org>
299.

United Nations. (2021). United Nations Charter. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-

charter>
300.

United Nations. UN Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime

(United

Nations

publication,

Sales

No.

E.94.IV.5)

http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/EighthCongress.html
301.

United Nations. United Nations Charter. UN, 2021<https://www.un.org/en/about-

us/un-charter>
302.

United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d p1 at p5 (Ist Circuit. 1997)

303.

United States v. Villanueva, (1998)32 F. Supp. 2d 635 at 639

304.

UNODC, ‘The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes’, (2012) United Nations

Publication Vol. 12
305.

UNODC.

(2019).

Legal

Frameworks

and

Human

Rights.

UNODC.<https://www.unodc.org/e4/en/cybercrime/module-3/key-issues/the-role-ofcybercrime-law.html
306.

UNODC.<www.unodc.org/e4/en/cybercrime/module-3/key-issues/the-role-of-

cybercrime-law.html
307.

US Legal. (2018). Cyber Security Research and Development Act Law and Legal

Definition. (The US Legal, 2018) <www.definitions.uslegal.com/c/cyber-security-researchand-development-act/>
308.

Van Zyl, G. (2014). Adoption of ‘flawed’ AU Cybersecurity Convention Postponed. IT

Web Africa. http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/523-africa/232273-adoption-offlawed-au-cybersecurity-convention-postponed.
309.

Walt, S.M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies

QuarterlyVol.35 (2).
258

310.

Williams P. (2002). Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Implications for Business.

CERT Coordination Center Carnegie Mello University: USA, p. 3
311.

Wiretap Act 1968, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510-22

312.

World Bank. (2011). Combating Cybercrime – World Bank Document. World Bank

Group <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en
313.

WSIS Geneva Declaration of Principles, Building the Information Society: A Global

Challenge in the New Millennium, WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (12 December 2003),
available from https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/outcome/booklet/declaration_A.html
314.

Yasin, M. (2006). Global Nature of Computer Crimes and the Convention on

Cybercrime. Ankara Law Review, Vol. 3(2)pp.129-142 at pp 135
315.

Young, E. (2003). Fraud: Unmanaged Risk’ 8th Global survey. Global Investigations

Dispute

Advisory

Services,

South

Africa.

<https://www.whistleblowing.com.au/information/documents/EY8thGlobalSurvey2003.pdf>
316.

Zingerle, A. (2014). The Art of Trickery: Methods to Establish First Contact in Internet

Scams. InxCoAx Conference, Porto, Portugal, pages,.

REPORTS
1. Rep of the Secretary-General, Countering the use of Information and Communications
Technologies

for

Criminal

Purposes

A/74/130

(30

July

2019)

available

from

https://undocs.org/en/A/74/130
2. Rep. for the workshop on Potential Consequences for Data Retention of Various Business
Models Characterizing Internet Service Providers, G8 Government-Industry Workshop on
Safety And Security in Cyberspace, Tokyo, (May 2001).
3. Rep. of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in Nairobi from 8 to 10 September 2009, UN Doc
A/CONF.213/RPM.4/1 (24 February 2010) 8–9 [40].
4. Rep. of the Asian and Pacific Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in Bangkok from 1 to 3 July 2009,
UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.3/1 (8 September 2009) 7–8 [298]; Rep of the Western Asian
Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice, Held in Doha from 1 to 3 June 2009, UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.2/1
(12 June 2009) 10 [47].
259

5. Rep. of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in San Jose, from 25
to 27 May 2009,UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.1/1 (26 May 2009) 10 [41].
6. Rep. of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in San Jose, from 25
to 27 May 2009,UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.1/1 (26 May 2009) 10 [41].
7. Rep. of the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, UN
Doc A/CONF.213/18 at 56–7 [202]–[204] (18 May 2010)
8. Rep. of the Western Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Eleventh United Nations
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, A/CONF.2003/RPM.4/1, No. 14 (2003).
9. Rep. on the Meeting of the Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime,
Doc No UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2013/3 (1 March 2013). See also Comprehensive Study on
Cybercrime, op.cit.
10. Rep. on the Meeting of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group to Conduct a
Comprehensive Study of the Problem of Cybercrime, Held in Vienna from 17 to 21 January
2011, Doc No UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2011/3 (31 March 2011).
11. Reps. related to the activities of the working group are published. See: First meeting of the
Core Group of Experts on Identity-Related Crime, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 29-30
November

2007,

available

at:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-

crime/Courmayeur_report.pdf (last visited: October 2008); Second meeting of the Core Group
of Experts on Identity-Related Crime, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 June 2008, available at:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/organizedcrime/Final_Report_ID_C.pdf
October 2008)

260

(last

visited:

